Failure of Detection: Iraq Weapon of Mass Destruction program
The “Smoking Gun” was discovered on the Iraq Weapon of Mass Destruction program as was told to the executive leadership of the United States prior to the Invasion seen in 2003. The United States had questioned for a time, to what extent Saddam Hussein maintained WMD’s as well as the possible ability to create this WMD’s under the scrutiny of the UN inspectors and the world watching. What came after was a large intelligence failure in determining the WMD program as well as being flooded with false intelligence from a principle source that was not vetted correctly by the Western Intelligence Agencies that had maintained contact with him.
From the intelligence provided, Saddam was …show more content…
One side cast the blame on the US as politicizing the intelligence driving the war effort forward, and falsifying the intelligence. Another side says that the Intelligence simply failed in the capability to determine that the intelligence was false and misleading from the outside sources. In an article from N Busch and J Pilat, talk about the issues within the verification and detection of WMD proliferation as well as the issues that were seen in the Iraq WMD failure. During inspections in 1998 the Iraqi government would pose issues as to blocking the Inspectors access to the facilities that may have housed the WMD, giving rise to the idea that Iraq did have WMD’s. The eventual expulsion of the UNSCOM inspectors from Iraq gave the UN Security Council as well as the US Intelligence community that idea that Iraq was hiding something more that leftover barrels of Ricin. In this idea there were thoughts Iraq was maintaining stockpiles of WMD and had links to Al-Qaeda. Fitzgerald and Lebow echo this notion that the Iraqi WMD program was a throwback to the IAEA and UNSCOM inspectors politicizing the Iraq resistance to inspections of certain locations. Where the Intelligence community failed to fully assess the WMD program in Iraq can be seen in the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate created for President George Bush. In this Russel argues, that the intelligence community indeed did have false intelligence as well as utilized a source for human intelligence that was not verified. One of the major sources of false intelligence provided to the US intelligence community, mainly the CIA, were given from sources that were defectors who had fabricated intelligence in order to gain money or other benefits from the United States. In other articles, the intelligence is have been blamed as being politicized in order to answer what the policy
The “Smoking Gun” was discovered on the Iraq Weapon of Mass Destruction program as was told to the executive leadership of the United States prior to the Invasion seen in 2003. The United States had questioned for a time, to what extent Saddam Hussein maintained WMD’s as well as the possible ability to create this WMD’s under the scrutiny of the UN inspectors and the world watching. What came after was a large intelligence failure in determining the WMD program as well as being flooded with false intelligence from a principle source that was not vetted correctly by the Western Intelligence Agencies that had maintained contact with him.
From the intelligence provided, Saddam was …show more content…
One side cast the blame on the US as politicizing the intelligence driving the war effort forward, and falsifying the intelligence. Another side says that the Intelligence simply failed in the capability to determine that the intelligence was false and misleading from the outside sources. In an article from N Busch and J Pilat, talk about the issues within the verification and detection of WMD proliferation as well as the issues that were seen in the Iraq WMD failure. During inspections in 1998 the Iraqi government would pose issues as to blocking the Inspectors access to the facilities that may have housed the WMD, giving rise to the idea that Iraq did have WMD’s. The eventual expulsion of the UNSCOM inspectors from Iraq gave the UN Security Council as well as the US Intelligence community that idea that Iraq was hiding something more that leftover barrels of Ricin. In this idea there were thoughts Iraq was maintaining stockpiles of WMD and had links to Al-Qaeda. Fitzgerald and Lebow echo this notion that the Iraqi WMD program was a throwback to the IAEA and UNSCOM inspectors politicizing the Iraq resistance to inspections of certain locations. Where the Intelligence community failed to fully assess the WMD program in Iraq can be seen in the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate created for President George Bush. In this Russel argues, that the intelligence community indeed did have false intelligence as well as utilized a source for human intelligence that was not verified. One of the major sources of false intelligence provided to the US intelligence community, mainly the CIA, were given from sources that were defectors who had fabricated intelligence in order to gain money or other benefits from the United States. In other articles, the intelligence is have been blamed as being politicized in order to answer what the policy