Historically, if assessed both are research traditions and particularly in last 30 years, these two schools of thought have produced much articles, books and researchers in parallel. Therefore, while the researchers belonging to HRO were busy in assessing aircraft carriers, air traffic controls and nuclear power plants, the Resilience Engineering researchers were developing conceptualization of problem of error and its eventual consequences for interfaces design in nuclear, aviation and medicine aspects. In early 90s, HROs in relation to the thesis of a normal accident debated the outcome of their investigation whereas the resilience engineers defined the naturalistic side to cognition broaden the approach towards safety with complexity and systems version and at same times developed tools and practical guidance to range of factors; risk assessments, engineers, interface designers and investigators etc. In 2000, the HRO researches developed a tool now known as “collective mindfulness”, at same time cognitive engineers supported the notion of resilience engineering for emphasizing positive side and natural views of cognition of frontline factors mentioned above (Le Coze, 2016).
The Human reliability organization approach debates on the topics such as “Nearly error-free” operations, training, socialization, culture, collective mindfulness & sense making, redundancy, interdependence, institutional trust and flexible structures and networks while Resilience engineering involves human machine interface, human error, reliability of cognition and resilience, situation awareness and expertise, adaption, self organization and complexity. As described topics above both the approaches involves overlapping areas and they are not rigid in being the first or the legitimate than other as it may present different angles. These scenario leads to two distinct cases such as “having the bubble” for high reliability organizations and “situation awareness” for the resilience engineering (Le Coze, 2016). The “having the bubble” scenario for HRO is derived from observations of real life situations which take in consideration different factors such as by keeping observation of whatever is happening through big picture update, complex coordinated activities are handled, supervised and managed by experienced individual across the functions during real-time operation on daily basis. This idea is mirrored by concepts of “situation awareness” for resilience engineering which is considered to be central importance of concrete practical methods, tools and concepts to train pilots and assessment of situation against the risk of errors where problems in situation awareness are considered production of errors. These specific moments are characterized by failure to interpret adequate circumstance of complex dynamic environments and provoked outcomes. These two techniques in their characteristics are different however; they do come under one umbrella as they both are capable of maintaining appropriate scenario of situations to perform safer operations, for example, whether work is being carried out in case of aircraft pilot, crew, ground staff or carrier officer who observes ordination amongst diversity of individuals; making the two approaches to be grouped under “sensitivity to operation” category (Le Coze, 2016). A high risk system has feature such as self-adopting, self-designing and self-organizing which are recognized by these two approaches at their early stages and categorizes as important feature. In High reliability Organization, it is ascertained by description of dynamics of informal network by fieldwork and in Resilience Engineering it is mostly derived at micro level from empirical and conceptual investigation and later turned into macro one (Le Coze, 2016). Similarity The two approaches sometimes borrow each other’s principles to serve particular arguments, appealed by Weick’s cognitive approach through sensemaking, constructist and interactionist lenses applied to resilience engineering with retrospective accounts of event which was further quantified by Dekker in 2004. Moreover, Dekker in 2004, further supported Weick for an alternative view for processing of information to resilience and cognition and in the context of accident investigation it has been proved to be highly relevant (Le Coze, 2016). Therefore, because of the existing interest proximities, explicit references between these traditions are usually observed, moreover, the cognitive side to High Reliability Organization; with …show more content…
This isn’t without implications as it derives from the level of analysis and the purpose as well as origins of the disciplines for example; a sociologist working for HRO is certainly not resilience or cognition scientist (Le Coze, 2016).
Both approaches into modern OHS
The Human reliability organization approach debates on the topics such as “Nearly error-free” operations, training, socialization, culture, collective mindfulness & sense making, redundancy, interdependence, institutional trust and flexible structures and networks while Resilience engineering involves human machine interface, human error, reliability of cognition and resilience, situation awareness and expertise, adaption, self organization and complexity. As described topics above both the approaches involves overlapping areas and they are not rigid in being the first or the legitimate than other as it may present different angles. These scenario leads to two distinct cases such as “having the bubble” for high reliability organizations and “situation awareness” for the resilience engineering (Le Coze, 2016). The “having the bubble” scenario for HRO is derived from observations of real life situations which take in consideration different factors such as by keeping observation of whatever is happening through big picture update, complex coordinated activities are handled, supervised and managed by experienced individual across the functions during real-time operation on daily basis. This idea is mirrored by concepts of “situation awareness” for resilience engineering which is considered to be central importance of concrete practical methods, tools and concepts to train pilots and assessment of situation against the risk of errors where problems in situation awareness are considered production of errors. These specific moments are characterized by failure to interpret adequate circumstance of complex dynamic environments and provoked outcomes. These two techniques in their characteristics are different however; they do come under one umbrella as they both are capable of maintaining appropriate scenario of situations to perform safer operations, for example, whether work is being carried out in case of aircraft pilot, crew, ground staff or carrier officer who observes ordination amongst diversity of individuals; making the two approaches to be grouped under “sensitivity to operation” category (Le Coze, 2016). A high risk system has feature such as self-adopting, self-designing and self-organizing which are recognized by these two approaches at their early stages and categorizes as important feature. In High reliability Organization, it is ascertained by description of dynamics of informal network by fieldwork and in Resilience Engineering it is mostly derived at micro level from empirical and conceptual investigation and later turned into macro one (Le Coze, 2016). Similarity The two approaches sometimes borrow each other’s principles to serve particular arguments, appealed by Weick’s cognitive approach through sensemaking, constructist and interactionist lenses applied to resilience engineering with retrospective accounts of event which was further quantified by Dekker in 2004. Moreover, Dekker in 2004, further supported Weick for an alternative view for processing of information to resilience and cognition and in the context of accident investigation it has been proved to be highly relevant (Le Coze, 2016). Therefore, because of the existing interest proximities, explicit references between these traditions are usually observed, moreover, the cognitive side to High Reliability Organization; with …show more content…
This isn’t without implications as it derives from the level of analysis and the purpose as well as origins of the disciplines for example; a sociologist working for HRO is certainly not resilience or cognition scientist (Le Coze, 2016).
Both approaches into modern OHS