Account for the Luftwaffe’s failure to win the Battle of Britain.
In 1941, Britain stood on the precipice of German invasion, the only thing in their way, the Royal Air Force, “hopelessly outnumbered, horribly outgunned, [they] battled desperately and somehow, despite the odds, emerged victorious.” With all the odds stacked in their favour, buoyed from their recent success in France, the German Luftwaffe still failed to win the battle in the skies over Britain. This essay will provide a critical analysis of the key areas leading to their defeat, demonstrating the most important cause to be the ill-equipped and inflexible leadership of Goering, and a clear “lack of foresight in planning the strategic use of air power” , further exacerbated …show more content…
There were several intelligence organisations guiding strategy and policy but “as usual in Nazi Germany, most of these organs were rivals, hated each other and fought for influence. There was no co-operation and little co-ordination.” This was particularly evident within German Air Intelligence (GAI), whose role was greatly underestimated by high command, “manned with low quality personnel whose inputs were considered of limited usefulness to the conduct of future operations.” As such a number of key mistakes were made, giving rise to some of the poor decisions by Goering. Despite being advocates of Clausewitz, there primary failing was a dramatic misidentification of British centres of gravity. Even with reports of bomber pilots shoring up fighter command they failed to identify Dowding’s primary concern, the sheer lack of trained pilots. This was also the case following the attacks on British radar stations. They dramatically underestimated the damage being caused by bombing raids, leading to Goering’s decision to attack RAF stations. With a concerted bombing campaign on this key centre, British air defence would be decisively weakened, bringing the RAF to its knees. There second failing was that of underestimation and sycophancy, epitomised by Major …show more content…
The incompetent and arrogant leadership of Goering, and lack of long term goal from Hitler, left an air force with no coherent plan to target Britain’s key centres of defiance forfeiting their numerical advantage and the battle. Exacerbated by disorganised and sycophantic intelligence agencies that refused to cooperate, that guided vital strategic decisions made on wildly optimistic and embellished information. Their principal error being the inherent misunderstanding and underestimation of Britain’s IADS and its force multiplying effect upon the RAF. So ultimately, it has been established that the inept leadership of Goering, underpinned by Hitler’s indecision ensured the Luftwaffe’s fought a confused war based on poor intelligence. A war that at the most base level “neglected two key principles of war: first, know your enemy and yourself, but more importantly, select and maintain your aim” without which victory is close to
In 1941, Britain stood on the precipice of German invasion, the only thing in their way, the Royal Air Force, “hopelessly outnumbered, horribly outgunned, [they] battled desperately and somehow, despite the odds, emerged victorious.” With all the odds stacked in their favour, buoyed from their recent success in France, the German Luftwaffe still failed to win the battle in the skies over Britain. This essay will provide a critical analysis of the key areas leading to their defeat, demonstrating the most important cause to be the ill-equipped and inflexible leadership of Goering, and a clear “lack of foresight in planning the strategic use of air power” , further exacerbated …show more content…
There were several intelligence organisations guiding strategy and policy but “as usual in Nazi Germany, most of these organs were rivals, hated each other and fought for influence. There was no co-operation and little co-ordination.” This was particularly evident within German Air Intelligence (GAI), whose role was greatly underestimated by high command, “manned with low quality personnel whose inputs were considered of limited usefulness to the conduct of future operations.” As such a number of key mistakes were made, giving rise to some of the poor decisions by Goering. Despite being advocates of Clausewitz, there primary failing was a dramatic misidentification of British centres of gravity. Even with reports of bomber pilots shoring up fighter command they failed to identify Dowding’s primary concern, the sheer lack of trained pilots. This was also the case following the attacks on British radar stations. They dramatically underestimated the damage being caused by bombing raids, leading to Goering’s decision to attack RAF stations. With a concerted bombing campaign on this key centre, British air defence would be decisively weakened, bringing the RAF to its knees. There second failing was that of underestimation and sycophancy, epitomised by Major …show more content…
The incompetent and arrogant leadership of Goering, and lack of long term goal from Hitler, left an air force with no coherent plan to target Britain’s key centres of defiance forfeiting their numerical advantage and the battle. Exacerbated by disorganised and sycophantic intelligence agencies that refused to cooperate, that guided vital strategic decisions made on wildly optimistic and embellished information. Their principal error being the inherent misunderstanding and underestimation of Britain’s IADS and its force multiplying effect upon the RAF. So ultimately, it has been established that the inept leadership of Goering, underpinned by Hitler’s indecision ensured the Luftwaffe’s fought a confused war based on poor intelligence. A war that at the most base level “neglected two key principles of war: first, know your enemy and yourself, but more importantly, select and maintain your aim” without which victory is close to