Hitler's Airpower Theory

Theories on airpower and how best to use it has evolved over the past century due to experiences from the battlefield and with increasing air technology and communications ability. WWI and WWII were instrumental in creating a background on which to build current airpower theory. Early theorists such as Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard focused primarily on strategic bombing as a way to subdue the enemy. Current theorists have modified this stance to include the thinking and the morale of the enemy as well as using effects-based operations. Airpower theory has incorporated lessons learned over the past century by moving from a service centric view of battle and use of primarily strategic bombardment into a more joint or unified stance with other branches of the military working in unison to achieve strategic objectives and reach the desired end state. Typically the end state is what theorists like Douhet envisioned for the use of airpower. Douhet stated that we must have command of the air in order to achieve victory. This was one of the preliminary uses of effects-based operations even though this strategy was not called that at the time and bombing with precision was less than optimal. The thought was to strike an objective such as an enemy production area or a civilian center and destroy their will thus ensuring that the government would concede to the population’s view. Even Billy Mitchell stated that the enemy “nation’s power to make war must be destroyed” and that involved destroying arms producing factories, electricity centers, communications, fuel and oil production facilities and even food suppliers. He also advocated that air power would be the most important element in any future conflict and that the fielded forces were not the main objective and completely annihilating them is not obtainable. His use of effects-based operations have evolved into today’s theories by focusing on the desired effect and then figure out how best to proceed and what was needed to make that effect. Once the main effect is obtained, then there would be further outcomes as a result as seen by Germany calling for an end to the destruction and devastation of their homeland. Devastation of the homeland and decimation of the enemy through aerial bombardment was required according to General Trenchard, of the RAF, to win the battle. As with other early air theorists, Trenchard was looking at how best to use airpower effectively. Trenchard believed that air superiority must be obtained first and foremost and the enemy must not be able to bomb his homeland. He also believed that the army and navy were soon to be a thing of the past due to air development progression. Indeed, an airplane can take …show more content…
Air power during WWII evolved as did the German way of thinking of the use of the aircraft. Germany had great success with the “Blitzkrieg” in 1936 using the Luftwaffe to gain control of the skies and by providing close air support to the ground troops. At this time, Hitler did not use the aircraft for strategic bombardment. He used them in the Blitzkrieg style and also hit main lines of communication to stop supplies from reaching the enemy. This is a highly effective method still used today but we add in the use of precision bombing to create a desired …show more content…
The Air Tactical School (ACTS) created an industrial web theory that was influenced by WWII air campaigns. Energy and transportation targets were the focus of the industrial web theory stating that if these areas are destroyed, it would break the enemy’s ability to create products for war and would stop supply chains. However, this theory did not examine the secondary and tertiary effects of this type of bombardment and did not allow for a substitution, a work around, for a destroyed factory, materiel, or supply chain. The industrial web theory used in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq gave way to current theory with Col John Warden’s Five Rings Model. He thought that by affecting the inner-most ring, the leadership, would be the most effective way to stop an enemy by paralysis. He stated the need to gain air superiority first and that the enemy can adapt and change according to their environment as they did in Germany. The key is to use parallel warfare in which the environment so rapidly changes that adjustments cannot be