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7 Cards in this Set
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Ryle characterizes "Descartes Myth" as the Ghost in the Machine--what exactly does he mean by this, and why is this a problem, for Ryle? Why does he find the "private" inner life philosophically or scientifically threatening? How does this lead to a type of behaviorist theory of the mind and mental states? What does Behaviorism say that the mind and mental states are identical to? How would a contemporary dualist like JP Moreland respond? How would dualist Thomas Nagel respond to his fellow atheist Ryle? Would he support him? Would he chastise him? How so? You must be specific and thorough. |
The official Doctrine: Ghost in the machine-Descartes myth -*if you believe in consciousness you believe in ghosts But Ryle says: |
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Describe in detail the following physicalist theories: Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Eliminativism, and Functionalism. Using 3 examples of mental states (pain in your left pinky, a perception of redness, and what it is like to be you), what would each theory say that those mental states are identical to? In contrast, what would the Dualist say that these mental states are identical to? |
Behaviorism: redefines consciousness to be public; consciousness is a function hurt face maybe tears from the pain saying “my pinky hurts” Identity Theory: denies the soul but retains soul like language; mental states are brain states -talks like a dualist but believe body is just parts, so pinky hurts is just a the neurons in our brain telling “you” your fingers hurts Eliminativism: mental states are brain states but also there are no mental states; eliminate mental language pain in pinky, redness, you: brain jargin that doesn't have you or any ownership just brain states Functionalism: philosophy that claims mental states are patters of cause and effect: input processing behavioral outputs of the body how do explain what they think? |
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According to John Searle's Chinese Room argument, functionalism is defective. How so exactly? How could Searle's Chinese Room Argument be marshaled against Identity Theory and Eliminativism as well? Would JP Moreland agree? How so or how not? Would Nagel agree—how so or how not? You must be specific and thorough. |
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Describe in detail JP Moreland's "Contemporary Defense of Dualism." What is/are his argument(s) against physicalism as a general worldview? What are his specific arguments against Mind/Body Physicalism? What are 3 of Paul Churchland's arguments against Mind-Body Dualism (including his contention that the argument from introspection is "deeply suspect")? How would Moreland respond to these suggestions? How would Nagel respond? Be specific. |
Moreland: 1) If theism is true physicalism is false because god is not a physical being 2) numbers exist-numbers are abstract not physical if you dont believe in numbers then y ou can believe mathematics or science gives us any knowledge 3) Values- nonphysical property of goodness/badness like moral laws 4) Theories, concepts, laws of logic and such entities seem to be nonphysical 5) Universals exist (redness, hardness) is characterizes the nature o matter-non physical Problems with mind body Physicalism: -mental events are private: though, feelings, memories, pictures 2) Private Access and Incorrigibility (incorrigibility=can’t be wrong) -mental states are incorrigible-cant be mistaken about your own thoughts -a brain surgen could never know my mental life as well as I do 3) The experience of first person subjectivity the experience in its first person view 4) Secondary Qualities (qualia) -taste, color 5) Intentionality-mind’s aboutness 6)Personal identity Churchland’s arguments against Dualism moreland would say: Nagel: common sense principle, and that church land is suffering from the cosmic authority problem |
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What are John Locke’s, David Hume’s theories of personal identity? In John Locke, explain how he uses the Prince and the Cobbler; Socrates and the present mayor of Queensborough, the drunk and sober man, and you and Nestor/or Thersites—how do each of these illustrate and help him to define his key terms? Define key terms for Hume, as well. In the film clip we saw in class from “The Hot Chick,” interpret that clip from both a Lockean and a Humean perspective, and clearly distinguish how those interpretations would differ from a Reidian interpretation of it. |
John Lock on Personal identity: Dualist later(your earliest memory) examples: -Nestor and Thersites-suppose the soul of Nestor, for souls don’t care which matter they are in, came into you. Are you the same person as Nestor? No because you don’t pocess the same memories as Nestor-you don’t remember the siege of Troy. Sameness in soul is not sameness in person -Drunk man and Sober man-a man drunk and sober is the same person even though the sober man doesn’t recall the drunk man’s doings? It may be reasonable to think no one should be punished for what they know nothing of but human laws justly punish him -the deed happened but it wasn’t “you” you didn;t exist at that moment Hume: Empiricist( perceptions are the sole source of knowledge) -knowledge of the world is derived from experience -theres a bundle of perceptions -so we don’t exist |
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How does Reid defend a Common Sense theory of personal identity against those of Locke and Hume? Make sure you are faithful to the structure of Reid’s piece, including accurate, precise summaries of all parts. Be sure to state the essential difference between Commonsense and the Empiricist theories in Locke and Hume. Be thorough and specific, and thorough, too. |
Ried: -identity cannot be applied to perceptions, thoughts, pleasures, -memory gives evidence of that identical person throughout time, without memory you know its relation to you and it could have been something you did -all bodies consist of parts that change but we keep the name because our language could not afford a different name for every different state. ex: old regiments that still exist and retain the origonal name even though all original members have died -identity when applied to a person has no ambiguity it is fixed and precise On Locke: 1 consequence(locke was aware of)-if the same consciousness can be transferred from one person to another, multiple people could be the same person Hume: So reid believes we have memories and perceptions thoughts-we have ownership of them. Hume=we are perecepions, Locke=we are memories |
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What is the conclusion of the argument in Thomas Nagel’s “What is it Like to Be a Bat?” How does he argue for that conclusion? How does that conclusion fit with what Nagel deems to be the cosmic authority problem in “The Last Word”? What is “the cosmic authority problem”? What tendencies does it support, according to Nagel? According to Nagel, would Churchland, Dennett (Youtube video), and Searle (in the “Basic Metaphysics” chapter excerpt from Mind Language and Society) be examples of those who have a “cosmic authority problem”? Why or why not. Would Moreland? Be specific, and thorough, and clear. |
Nagel: atheist dualist scientism: the claim that all knowledge can be attained through he scientific method and that there is no other reliable route to truth(where Churchland, Dennet, Searle arise from which arises Physicalism) -we couldnt even know scientism theory through scientic method -tendency to reduce mental states to brain states and getting rid of ownership of mental states -overuse of evolutionary biology to explain everything about life -no consciousness because we dont have souls |