Geog 340 Exam #3

Front 1

- Identify the roots of Riparian and Prior Appropriation water law

Back 1

Riparian: Rome

Prior Appropriation: Mining rights in CA

Front 2

- Explain and contrast their four basic tenets

Back 2

1) How water user establishes rights

2) The rights of the senior water user

3) Limits to that right

4) How the rights of downstream (or jr.) users are assured.

Front 3

Clarify how they each allocate water in times of scarcity

Back 3

Riparian: Correlative rights principle- allocation is based on amount of land bordering the stream

Prior Appropriation: Jr. gets screwed. Domestic use trumps ag/mining. - Seniority (date of original appropriation rights) wins among equal level of beneficial use. (domestic always wins). e.g.. 1800 gets entire share, 1945 gets 1/2 and 1975 gets none.

Front 4

- Explain two ways in which surface water rights can be “over-appropriated” under Prior Appropriation

Back 4

1. In the wet years, they will appropriate all available.

2. They have paper rights (history), so they'll still suck it out.

Front 5

- Identify the dividing line where the two forms of water law generally APPLY

Back 5

The 100th Meridian (West/East)

Front 6

- Identify the two “water doctrines” of the West, and what they each generally mean

Back 6

Colorado Doctrine: West, strict prior Appropriation Rights.

California Doctrine: West, mixed Prior Appropriation and Riparian.

Front 7

- Clarify the rights of in-stream uses under both systems, explaining why fish are doubly screwed under Prior Appropriation

Back 7

Riparian: None

Prior Appropriation: Double disqualified- 1. Est, right through diversion (and fish don't divert, so fish have no right). 2. Beneficial use only (and fish is only "reasonable")

Front 8

- Explain why it is argued that Prior Appropriation drove water development (e.g. dams) faster than socially desirable

Back 8

"Use it or loose it"- Other users will take your water if you don't, you must use it for beneficial use.

-Dam it! Claim it! Save it for later! (this was seen as beneficial in the 50s)

Front 9

- Explain why irrigation districts were established in California (and in the West)

Back 9

The Wright Act of 1887- go far to get water/ build a dam. To establish large irrigation projects.

Front 10

- Identify 2-3 powers of irrigation districts, and clarify why they are especially powerfu

Back 10

1.Taxation (no rule on how to draw district lines, all are taxed)- establishes means on how to divert the water.

2. Lobby of the gov't in support of irrigation

3. To construct water projects

4. To sell bonds

5. To acquire water rights

6. To impose property assessments

Front 11

- Identify the basis of the Public Trust Doctrine - Identify the situation in which it was first invoked to resolve conflict over water resources

Back 11

Basis of Doctrine: English Common Law

Invoked to resolve conflict: Gold Rush vs Farmers- Sediment clogged rivers causing flooding, the gold rush could do whatever they wanted before the PTD deemed hydrologic mining not beneficial.

Front 12

- To characterize the power of the Public Trust Doctrine in California water law, identify two critical powers that were established in Supreme Court cases Identify the inherent conflict within the California Doctrine, and identify which law trumps.

Back 12

1. Est. in the Supreme Court case of Marks v. Whitney (1971): Power of the state to limit water rights to protect the environment. Prior appropriation says this is not "beneficial."

2. Est. in Supreme Court case National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: PTD TRUMPS PRIOR APPROPRIATION "vested rights." The Government (PDT) can force public to sell water shares in order to protect the environment.

Front 13

Oct 26 (M) Water Development - Explain the importance of 1914 in California Water Law, clarifying 1) how water rights were established before and after that date and 2) the three main powers of the State Water Commission

Back 13

Water Commission Act of 1914.

Before: Prior Appropriatin and Riparian but not in sync. Seniority and Riparian Rule.

After: 1.Post 1914 rights need permits from State Water Commission. 2.Commission decides what is reasonable use. 3. And Commission can invoke public trust because the best interest of the society lies in the decision of water use.

Front 14

- Clarify how much of California’s water is under post-1914 regulations

Back 14

Most of it

Front 15

- Explain how California changed the water law regulating conflict between riparian and prior-appropriation rights, and explain the implications for dam building

Back 15

Conflict:

Appropriative Rights will continue to be inferior to Riparian Rights. In cases of conflict, riparian rights would be entitled to the "natural flow of the watercourse undiminished except by its reasonable consumption by upper riparian) proprietors." So: Downstream riparians could claim unencumbered flow of the rivers despite the burden such claims would place on upstream appropriators.

Resolution: 1928 Amendment to the CA Constitution; reasonable and beneficial use trumps all rights- even Riparian. (meaning that Riparians can be injured)

Front 16

*LOOK UP IN BOOK PG.34 BRIEF HISTORY OF CALI WATER POLICY) - Identify the situation that launched the “county of origins act,” and clarify what the Act does - Clarify why irrigation districts were unable to support their own water needs

Back 16

County Of Origins Act (1933)- Owens Valley Tragedy - "We have a say where our water goes."

Owens Valley Tragedy: 1900LA took water, and it was poured into the LA aquifer by 1913. The residence were upset at the depletion of the lake, dynamited the aqueduct in 1920, remaining land acquired -pump the groundwater and extended the aqueduct to Mono Basin.

Front 17

- Explain the purpose of the Reclamation Act of 1902 and identify its main agency.

Back 17

Reclamation Act of 1902: CVP Bureau of Reclamation: 1.formed bc of insufficient capital to irrigate through drought- needed the Shasta Dam. The local farmers couldn't pay for the dam so they taxed.

Front 18

- Identify the TYPES of farmers the Act is intended to support, and identify two key eligibility provisions in the Reclamation Act of 1902 designed to ensure that outcome

Back 18

The Reclamation Act of 1902 was intended to support homesteaders. Eligibility provisions: 160 acreage limit, no corporations (residence only).

Tulare farmers would have to break up their farms into 160 acres (divide amongst family), or pick Corpse when shopping for a Federal Agency.

Front 19

- Describe the difference between Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation Projects, clarifying which agency was more attractive to growers

Back 19

The Corps didn't have to worry about Acreage limits, or about paying back loans.

The Bureau didn't want to subsidize CA corporations.

Front 20

- Explain why many growers felt that Bureau requirements were too onerous, and illustrate 2 ways that growers subverted the rules and 3 ways that they avoided paying the full cost for the water

Back 20

Growers felt that 160 acres of production would not produce enough income to be a functioning member of society.

The Growers would break uo their farm land and allocate the 160 acre divisions among their family members, or they would lease their land.

The Growers would avoid paying for the full cost of the water: the bureau would not enforce interest on loans (so basically it would turn into a subsidy), the Bureau would give need based grants and restructure how much money someones owns based on their income, and the Bureau would give discounts (it would subtract the cost of the dam and economic benefit that would come from the cost of the water.

Front 21

- Use Huron to illustrate the degree to which LARGER society (farm workers) benefited from the agricultural system that developed

Back 21

*LOOK UP HURON CASE*

Large corporations prevailed thus the farm workers in Huron woefully underpaid. The area fell 40% below the poverty level.

Front 22

- Explain 3-4 factors that lead to the end of the large-scale federal water development projects and forced reform of the Reclamation Act of 1902

Back 22

1. The Jimmy Carter investigations on Dam/Federal Water Projects.

2. Selenium in Kesterson wildlife refuge.

3. Killing Salmon

4. Drought that lead to the crash on i5

5. Water Subsidies for large corporations who dispense poor labor regulations.

Front 23

- Identify 2-3 provisions in the Reform Act of 1982

Back 23

1. Return the water to the Salmon streams

2. Raised $ off water- good no subsidies

3. Acreage limit raised to 960 acres (but still subsidized for acreage under that)

4. Rid of the residency requirement

Front 24

- Sketch California’s 4 main water projects on a map. Identify the main features in each (given on the PowerPoint Slide) and identify the agency that MANAGES IT

Back 24

*PRINT OUT THE MAPS, SKETCH*

CVP

SWP

CO River Aqueducts

Los Angeles Aqueduct

Front 25

Oct 28 (W) Water Allocation through Water Rights: The Klamath Case- Explain how Native American water rights were established (following United States vs Winters), and clarify what is CLEAR and what is not clear from that ruling-

Back 25

The Decision: The Native American tribes possessed reserved water rights, under federal law, dating to the establishment of the reservations 1908, therefore their downstream rights were superior. The US established this land, therefore must set aside the minimum amount of water for the land to fulfill its purpose.

The water rights were unclear as they were still unquantified.

Front 26

Identify the main constituencies in the Klamath River Basin claiming water rights, and identify the present order of rights for water allocation in the Klamath basin as adjudicated by 1997

Back 26

1. Fish (Endangered Species Act)

2. Native Americans

3. Farmers

4. Wildlife refuges (birds)

Front 27

- Present a brief historical ACCOUNT to explain why they are in that order (time/situation of established right)

Back 27

1. Fish (Endangered Species Act, Upper Klamath Lake Suckers, 1997- lower Klamath River Coho listed as threatened)

2. Native Americans (1864 North Klamath Tribes loose war with U.S., 1954 Termination Act- loose reservation land but retains right to hunt and fish., 1975/1979 9th Circuit Court- Tribal treaty rights for hunting, fishing, and water., 1986 Congress reverses Termination Act.)

3. Farmers (Klamath Reclamation District: 1902 Reclamation Act, and 1947 Klamath Reclamation distributes land to WWII vets.)

4. Wildlife refuges (birds) (1908 Refugees Est. from leased gov't land, but farmland leased out 1/3 of land.)

Front 28

- Since the order of water rights priorities is clear, explain why there is still conflict

Back 28

The Water rights have not been QUANTIFIED.

Front 29

- Explain one unresolved scientific question surrounding suckers in the Upper Klamath, clarifying the evidence brought forth by environmentalists and by farmers

Back 29

Do water diversions for ag really hurt fish?

Yes: Phosphorus levels are higher with more water

No: bc when water is high, sometimes hey die more, and the lake levels are historically low.

Front 30

- Explain one unresolved scientific question around the upstream vs downstream water conflict clarifying the arguments made by environmentalists/fishermen/tribes and by farmers

Back 30

Is the water really worse now?

Yes: the farmers are using more phosphorus

No: The water quality has always been poor.

Front 31

- Explain what caused the ‘calamity’ for farmers in 2001, and then what caused the ‘calamity’ for fish in 2002, clarifying why/how the Bush administration was able to divert water from the fish to the farmers in 2002.

Back 31

2001: Irrigation goes dry

2002: Scientists could not quantify the amount of water the fish need due to lack of evidence.

The Bush Admin. " Until science proves that low flows are harmful and determines how much water fish need, farmers will get their full allocation"

Front 32

- Describe how the parties came to peace on the Klamath, clarifying what the two main parties (Tribes and Farmers) win and lose under the agreement Explain why some Native Americans and some farmers are not on board with the agreement

Back 32

The Agreement:

1. Removal of 4 dams

2. Fisheries restoration program - beyond minimal survival

3. water for irrigators- full cuts unlikely

4. Water rights for refuges

5. low electricity rates for irrigation

6. 90,000 acres for Klamath Tribe homeland

Native Americans: Win; Fish and land, Loose; some water rights to refuges.

Farmers: Win; Low Electricity/ Guaranteed water. Loose; Less water.

Refuges: Win; water rights. Loose: farmers didn't get off the refuges.

Front 33

Nov 2 (M) Water Markets I: Urban-Ag Transfers- Clarify whether or not water can be classified as a type of economic good and why or why not?

Back 33

It does not fit in a box of a specific type of good. (sub tractable/excludible) There are so many different uses.

Front 34

- Contrast regulatory and market based approaches to scarcity and allocation

Back 34

Regulatory approaches to scarcity: Cut off supply- usage restrictions, regulations->technology.

Market approaches to scarcity: Raise price- teared pricing.

Regulatory approaches to Allocation: Legislators/ government decides (personal gain)

Market approaches to Allocation: Whoever is willing to pay the most for it will put it to its best use.

Front 35

- Comment on the social implications of water markets, referring specifically to the social implications of using price signals to drive CONSERVATION or reallocate water. Clarify whether or not economists view this as a problem.

Back 35

For conservation there will be social impacts on the poor, but not the wealthy. This is where they will look at the "collective impact" rather than changes to individual lives.

For re-allocation purposes:He who can afford it will put it to the best use, however it not socially just to raise the prices of a necessity for poor, who will not be able to afford the price raise, so society rejects that that is the "best use"

Front 36

- Explain why municipalities often do not set water rates that provide the right “price signal” to consumers

Back 36

The right price signal isn't always accurate as the price is set on an average of all historical costs. Buyers then get a unrealistic view of how expensive the water really is, because they are not paying the true cost. (They aren't allowed to have accurate pricing because of a court case in Orange County in 2015- tiered pricing was rules unconstitutional)

Front 37

- Characterize California’s water PORTFOLIO – or what sector uses the most water

Back 37

AG uses the most

Municipal/industry 3% each

Front 38

- Identify 2-3 standard strategies that cities typically use to meet their water needs, and clarify why rural-urban transfers are particularly attractive

Back 38

1. Find a new source of supply(desalinization, dew dams)

2. Reduce Demand (recycle, conservation)

3. Transfers

Front 39

- Explain 2-3 reasons why some farmers are interested in water markets, and describe 1-2 general concerns

Back 39

1. Profitability- buffering profit and helping them stay employed

2. Diversification of portfolio- Commodity rise/fall, to buffer when low

3. Successional issues - new generations can sell out

4. Precluding “buy and dry”

Front 40

- Explain four different ways farmers can produce “extra” water to sell

Back 40

desalinization, recycling, conservation, build new dams.

Front 41

- Explain/describe 5 different forms of ag-urban transfers

Back 41

1. Sale: water is gone, "buy and dry", sold your right.

2. Sell and lease back: sold it and then lease t back for a period of time.

3. Long Term Periodic Option: Buyer pays for the option to buy it after a period of time, then the seller MUST sell it, but the buyer can choose not to buy it.

4. Long Term Rotational Fallow: fallow to store water and replenish groundwater amongst entire irrigation districts.

5. Short Term Lease: Pumping water but only in dry years

Front 42

- Define water BANKS, and explain their role in facilitating water markets

Back 42

Intermediary between seller and buyer. Help the buyer find a seller and vice versa.

Purpose: increase ease of buying and selling, help find the highest bidder and cheapest seller (right fit), bundling- larger more reasonable contracts, Anonymity - no one knows who bought/sold to whom, Trust (transparency in the contract)

Front 43

- Illustrate how municipalities with different needs will seek a different forms of transfers to meet their needs

Back 43

-City who wants water now and a steady supply will want a Rotational Fallow.

- With who will want water in the future when a city grows will want a Sale and Lease Back

-Who will need water in dry years will want a Periodic Option.

Front 44

- Use the Palo Verde case to illustrate specific reasons why farmers, irrigation districts and rural communities are concerned about water transfers. For each concern, identify a contract specification designed to address it.

Back 44

1. Farmers want to keep their way of life- they want to remain farmers. They are also worried about the problems caused by fallowing- the land becomes dust bowl, neighbor fallowing extends weeds into neighboring crops. This would be addressed with a Rotating Fallow With Restrictions- 15% fallow one in every five years. Fallow Protocols to address the clods and weeds.

2. Irrigation Districts- want prior appropriation rights "use it or loose it" if you aren't diverting it. Enforce a non use fee and Water Law Modification- lease/rights

3. Rural Communities- the economic activity is reduced when farmers aren't farming (using farming supplies) which lead to lower tax base and unemployment. Alter Contract Language to reduce fear?

Front 45

- Use the Arkansas Valley superditch case to further illustrate contract specifications designed to address farmer concerns.

Back 45

Use Long-term Rotational Fallow or a periodic option to reduce buy&dry.

Periodic Option protects rural community economics.

Front 46

Use the Arkansas Valley, Colorado cases to explain, illustrate and debate the broader questions: should water be allowed to be transferred between basins; and should urban growth be allowed to undermine rural communities, should cities be allowed to grow anywhere

Back 46

-should water be allowed to be transferred between basins; Yes because without it, the Arkansas valley residence would have to immigrate. Transfers also avoid the construction of more dams.

-should urban growth be allowed to undermine rural communities; Urban growth should not be able to undermine agriculture, however, the residence still need water to survive. "rotational fallowing shows loss while satisfying urban thirst.

-should cities be allowed to grow anywhere- form this point on, cities should not be able to grow significantly in extremely dry places.

Front 47

Nov 4 (W) Water Markets 2: In-stream (Environmental) Flows

- Identify and explain the specific concern associated with instream water markets

Back 47

Des chutes Case: Don't want water in the streams because if a fish pop grows there, then gets put on the ESL, we will have to support that species and their water rights. "Stream Lease languish"

Front 48

- Identify the water transfer transactional forms that the Deschutes water managers sought and explain why

Back 48

1. Want water now and all of it as steady supply

2. Will need water in the future when the city grows in size.

3. Will need water during dry years. 1/3 Periodic option

1. 1/3 lease: Rotational Fallow

2. 1/3 Sale "buy and dry"

3. 1/3 Conservation Exchange

Front 49

- Illustrate/explain how the CONSERVATION exchange created water for instream flows

Back 49

The government bought the conserved water to give back to the stream?

Front 50

- Clarify why instream transfers could not occur under strict Prior Appropriation Law and identify 4 modifications to the law that were enacted in Oregon to facilitate the process

Back 50

They had to change because the water needs to be going towards "beneficial" use, and flowing down to without diversion wasn't beneficial

1. Beneficial Use- Instream flow must be "beneficial"

2. use it or loose it- can lease it and retain rights

3. water right date- clear law

4. Rights to Conserve Water: we give you pipe, you give us rights.

Front 51

- Explain why LOCAL irrigation districts are concerned, and a policy response designed to alleviate those concerns

Back 51

Concerns: loss of rights to the ESA, loss of funds (exit fee)

Conservation Exchange?

Front 52

- Identify/explain two policy responses designed to alleviate the concern over the Endangered Species Act -

Back 52

Conservation exchange, put the water to beneficial use and don't let if flow downstream.

"private Leasing bill for the government to be able to lease the insert flow.

Front 53

Clarify the main hurdle that appears to make most instream flows languish

Back 53

over allocation

Front 54

- Explain the nature of urban Southern California’s water problem

Back 54

So cal has plenty of dams therefore plenty of storage capacity in wet years.

More storage capacity would not help in the dry years.

Front 55

- Explain why more dams will not necessarily solve the problem

Back 55

More dams won't help because: Don't need any more during the wet years, and it will be underutilized in the dry years because there will be no rain to fill it.

Front 56

- Explay why water transfers that ensure ‘more” water will not necessarily solve the problem either

Back 56

1. War

2. Storage - you have to empty the storage before it rains, so its a waste of the water in there

3. loss- because of pre-rain storage drainage

Front 57

- Identify the water transfer transactional form that is most suited to urban needs

Back 57

Periodic Options: Attractive because you don't have to store it, there is more flexibility for wet and dry years.

Front 58

- Explain why the Delta is a major bottleneck in water transfers within California

Back 58

the fresh water needs to go through the delta

Front 59

Nov 9 (M) Water Markets 3: Inter-State Transfers & Student presentations

-Explain how states handle the allocation of water that crosses state boundaries

Back 59

Everyone has a set amount of water they are allowed to divert, despite wet/dry year fluctuation in supply.

Front 60

- Clarify how these Pacts treat water transfers

- Clarify what happens if states fail to resolve allocation issues between themselves

Back 60

-The Pacts allowed interstate transfer in the Lower Basin.

- There isn't any insert flow left because montana is going to take their full allotment regardless of how much is available.

Front 61

- Clarify the nature of the allocation problem within the Colorado Pact – which side (upper/lower) has the most water, and which side needs it.

Back 61

The river flows north, from Wyoming(upper basin) to Montana(lower basin). Lower needs it, and upper has it.

Front 62

- Explain the Colorado River Compact’s approach to allocating water between Upper and Lower Basin States

Back 62

The Yellowstone River Compact: wants

The state has guaranteed access to any rights issued before 1950

Later (jr rights) states are promised fractions of the river's remaining flow

Front 63

- Explain which side (Upper or Lower) has historically “won” more water in times of scarcity with this approach

Back 63

Wyoming: They much shut off their irrigation on post 1950 land if Montana's pre1915 land instate getting fully irrigated. However, most of Wyoming's land is pre-1950.

Front 64

- Explain what the “law of the river” entails, and how it impacts water transfers

Back 64

"You can't force someone to improve efficiency"

" . . . if Wyoming farmers have a right to a certain amount of water, who is to tell them they can't consume it all?"

Front 65

- Identify the dominant transactional forms the Lower Basin States appear to be seeking as they SECURE water through water transfers

Back 65

Conservation Exchange?

Front 66

- Clarify the Yellowstone Basin’s approach to allocating water (e.g. Tongue River) between the upper (Wyoming) and lower (Montana) states -

Back 66

Montana's pre-1950 rights holders are the ones who have to cut in times of scarcity. Wyoming can use it's conserved water

Front 67

- Explain what the Supreme Court decided concerning who owns CONSERVED water

Back 67

Wyoming is granted allowance of it's conserved water.

Front 68

Explain how “sprinkler conservation” impacts the AVAILABILITY of water downstream

Back 68

Sprinkler conservation does not allow flooding (that flood irrigation does), to flow back into the river.

Front 69

- Clarify whether or not this Supreme Court decision impacts water allocation in the Colorado Basin and why

Back 69

Wyoming can use its conserved water despite downstream depletion.