Legal Analysis
Union Pacific Did Not Discriminate Against Complainant on the Basis of Gender
The Complainant raises two issues: 1) that she was denied a promotion and 2) dismissed from her position. She alleges that each of these events occurred based on her gender or for filing a prior complainant. She believes others were treated more favorably then she.
To prevail in a claim of gender bias, the Complainant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she suffered “an adverse employment action because of her gender”; and (4) she was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside her protected class. Chappell v. Bilco Co. 114 Fair Empl. Prac. Case (BNA0 1089 (8th Cir. 2012). White v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 429 F.3d 232, 240 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 562–63 (6th Cir.2000)); cf. Brennan v. Tractor Supply Co., 237 Fed.Appx. 9, 16 (6th Cir.2007). The Complainants’’ burden at the prima facie stage is “not onerous” and “poses a burden easily met.” Cline, 206 F.3d at 660 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089). Disparate treatment simply stated, occurs when some employees are treated less favorably or disparately than others because of their membership in a protected group. …show more content…
The Supreme Court wrote that disparate treatment is “the most easily understood type of discrimination.” IBT v. US, 431. U.S. 324,335 n 15 (1977) To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show "(1) [she] engaged in protected conduct; (2) [she] suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally linked to the protected conduct." Jackman v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Dep 't of Corr. Servs., 728 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2013). Additionally, the employee must show this retaliation was the " 'but for ' cause of the adverse employment action." Id. In the allegation of being treated differently based on gender, Ms. Admoeit misleads the agency by failing to note her cardinal rule violation. The Complainant was not selected for the position of Engineer because she had a cardinal rule infraction within the timeline specified by the Qualification Criteria for Promotion to Engine Services. The evidenced demonstrated …show more content…
See Kenny v. Swift Transp., Inc., 347 F.3d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 2003). Complainant failed to follow important safety rules and her actions created a significant risk for a catastrophic accident. Ms. Adomeits comparators were excluded for cardinal rule infractions just as she was.
The burden thus falls on Complainant to show that the reason for denying her the position was not the true reason, but instead was pretext for discrimination, which she cannot do. Dixon v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 578 F.3d 862, 868 (8th Cir. 2009). "[C]ourts will not second-guess an employer 's business decisions when determining whether the reason given for the [employment decision] was a pretext for discrimination." Moschetti v. Chicago, Central & Pacific R.R., 119 F.3d 707, 709 (8th Cir. 1997). There is no evidence Union Pacific harbored any discriminatory animus toward Complainant and Complainant has not shown Union Pacific 's reason was pretext for discrimination. Accordingly, Complainant 's discrimination claim fails and should be
Union Pacific Did Not Discriminate Against Complainant on the Basis of Gender
The Complainant raises two issues: 1) that she was denied a promotion and 2) dismissed from her position. She alleges that each of these events occurred based on her gender or for filing a prior complainant. She believes others were treated more favorably then she.
To prevail in a claim of gender bias, the Complainant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she suffered “an adverse employment action because of her gender”; and (4) she was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside her protected class. Chappell v. Bilco Co. 114 Fair Empl. Prac. Case (BNA0 1089 (8th Cir. 2012). White v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 429 F.3d 232, 240 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 562–63 (6th Cir.2000)); cf. Brennan v. Tractor Supply Co., 237 Fed.Appx. 9, 16 (6th Cir.2007). The Complainants’’ burden at the prima facie stage is “not onerous” and “poses a burden easily met.” Cline, 206 F.3d at 660 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089). Disparate treatment simply stated, occurs when some employees are treated less favorably or disparately than others because of their membership in a protected group. …show more content…
The Supreme Court wrote that disparate treatment is “the most easily understood type of discrimination.” IBT v. US, 431. U.S. 324,335 n 15 (1977) To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show "(1) [she] engaged in protected conduct; (2) [she] suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally linked to the protected conduct." Jackman v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Dep 't of Corr. Servs., 728 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2013). Additionally, the employee must show this retaliation was the " 'but for ' cause of the adverse employment action." Id. In the allegation of being treated differently based on gender, Ms. Admoeit misleads the agency by failing to note her cardinal rule violation. The Complainant was not selected for the position of Engineer because she had a cardinal rule infraction within the timeline specified by the Qualification Criteria for Promotion to Engine Services. The evidenced demonstrated …show more content…
See Kenny v. Swift Transp., Inc., 347 F.3d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 2003). Complainant failed to follow important safety rules and her actions created a significant risk for a catastrophic accident. Ms. Adomeits comparators were excluded for cardinal rule infractions just as she was.
The burden thus falls on Complainant to show that the reason for denying her the position was not the true reason, but instead was pretext for discrimination, which she cannot do. Dixon v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 578 F.3d 862, 868 (8th Cir. 2009). "[C]ourts will not second-guess an employer 's business decisions when determining whether the reason given for the [employment decision] was a pretext for discrimination." Moschetti v. Chicago, Central & Pacific R.R., 119 F.3d 707, 709 (8th Cir. 1997). There is no evidence Union Pacific harbored any discriminatory animus toward Complainant and Complainant has not shown Union Pacific 's reason was pretext for discrimination. Accordingly, Complainant 's discrimination claim fails and should be