Discharge in Bankruptcy In this case, Joseph Harman, the president of Carter Oaks Crossing was loaned $400,000 by Caroline McAfee. Harman signed a promissory note that specified the company would repay the amount of the loan with interest in installments in which the installments would begin in 1999 and end in 2006. Harman signed a personal guaranty with the promissory note. Carter Oaks Crossing eventually defaulted on the note causing McAfee to sue Harman for payment under the guaranty. Harman had filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy after 1999 but before defaulting on the note and thus moved for summary judgment on grounds that McAfee’s claim against him had been discharged in the bankruptcy case. However, Harman had not listed the guaranty among the debts in the bankruptcy case. The legal issue being presented in this case is exceptions to dischargeable debts in bankruptcy. This case raises the question of the whether the obligation under the guaranty would have been discharged in Harman’s bankruptcy. According to our textbook, Business Law Text and Cases, a guarantor can be required to pay the obligation only after the principal debtor defaults, and usually, only after the creditor has made an attempt to collect from the debtor. The Supreme Court had laid down a near per se rule that if a debtor failed to schedule a known debt, then that debt is not discharged unless the creditor received actual notice in enough time to participate in the administration of the estate (Birkett v. Columbia Bank, 1904). If the state court finds the creditor does have a colorable claim under sections 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) and was deprived of the opportunity to timely request a determination of dischargeability of the debt because he had no notice of the bankruptcy proceeding in time to do so, then such a state court has the authority to declare that the debt was not discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding and proceed to a judgment that the debtor remains personally liable for the debt (11 U.S. Code § 523 - Exceptions to discharge, 2016). As a result of Harman not listing the guaranty obligation there was no determination on the status of the obligation during his bankruptcy proceedings, therefore, he owes McAfee under the guaranty. Normally these matters are determined by the bankruptcy court, however, since McAfee was never given notice of Harman’s bankruptcy proceedings the state court can decide whether she has a colorable claim and sustain the validity of the obligation to affirm that it was not discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings. In the actual case on which this problem is based, James McAfee originally loaned the money to Carter Oaks Crossing, however, he passed away during proceeding making Carolyn McAfee a substitute plaintiff, and though the courts initially ruled in favor for McAfee the case still ongoing (Harman v McAfee, 2010). Discrimination Based on Gender In this case, Brenda Lewis had spent two years working her way up to a management position at Heartland Inns of America. …show more content…
Lewis had been commended on her work performance despite referring to herself as a tomboy. Lewis had transferred to a different Heartland hotel where the director of operations, Barbara Cullinan, had reported to one of the owners that Lewis would not be a “good fit” for the front desk due to her not being famine enough. Cullinan then told various people that the hotel only desired “pretty” girls at the front desk. Lewis was informed by Cullinan that her hiring was not done properly and she would need to go through another interview. Lewis was fired shortly after the interview by Cullinan and given a letter that stated the reason for her termination was due to Lewis being hostile during the interview. Lewis filed a suit against Hartland for gender discrimination based on unlawful gender stereotyping. However, the suit was dismissed by the district court prompting Lewis to file an appeal. The legal issue being presented in this case is discrimination based on gender. The question in this case, is the validity of Lewis’s claim and whether it falls under the Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination based on gender. According to our textbook, Business Law Text and Cases, under