The phenomenon of Global Warming, the gradual warming of the earth’s atmosphere due to emissions of greenhouse gases associated with human industrialization activities is a major concern for the world community. Most nations are in agreement that addressing greenhouse gas emissions as a way to contain Global Warming and its disastrous consequences is imperative, yet still; the world community has yet to form a comprehensive policy that gives each individual country reasonable standards which to abide by. So the question remains, to what extent will countries in the coming years cooperate to slow global warming? While there has been meager cooperation among European nations, the sustained world cooperation that is necessary is absent. The absence of sustained cooperation is due to the lack of community and incentive. A community is a group of people with some shared element. Incentive is a positive and motivational influence to encourage certain acts over others. As long as a deficiency of these two vital components exists, the extent to which countries cooperate to slow global warming is insufficient at best. Global Warming presents countries with a major collective action problem. As the world community gears towards pursuing the ultimate goal of lowering greenhouse gas emissions to acceptable levels, many conflicts of interest occur. There is not a non-rival or non-excludable good to be dealt with in forming a policy concerning global warming; therefore it is a public good (Russett 846). It is a public good because consumption of the good by one state does not reduce the amount of the good available for consumption by other states (Russett 846). Yet there are negative externalities that exist. For example, nation A can choose to play by the rules and lower its greenhouse gas emissions, but then nation B can choose not to abide by any type of global warming policy and pollute as much greenhouse gas emissions it wants. This is the dilemma. What assurance is there that the world community can join together to form rules and standards that are fair and reasonable so this issue can be dealt with in a serious matter? As of now, there is none. The shared element needed to form community and consensus is missing. In order to provide incentive to the states to join a world-wide policy regarding greenhouse gas emissions, each nation must individually understand their cost-benefit analysis. Each nation must weigh the total expected costs against the total expected benefits of their actions in order to choose the best or most profitable option. A nation must come to a conclusion that being proactive and doing something to slow global warming has a marginal net benefit which surpasses the cost of simply adjusting to global warming. In order for the United States to join an effort to curb global warming, there must be some type of assurances from the developing nations that they won’t simply free-ride and benefit from the externalities. Granted, developing nations such as China and India aren’t the
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Drops in a bucket policy would require each state to commit to a certain standard of responsibility that is proportionate to their input of greenhouse emissions into the atmosphere. The current problem with that policy would be that there are nations in the world who are unwilling to commit proportionate input due to the effect that would have on their economic stability. When major states are unwilling to adopt the drops in a bucket policy, then the weakest link principle is formed. An institution is only as strong as its weakest link; therefore the world cannot afford the drops in a bucket policy because any credible community is only as strong and meaningful as its weakest link. Many argue that the world’s last standing superpower, The United States, which has the disproportionate ability to solve this issue single-handedly, should do so. But the United States has no interest in being ‘the best shot’ for the world at this time, believing it does not gain the disproportionate benefit from solving the problem, therefore it is only willing to cooperate to a certain extent. The most reasonable solution in the short-term to address this dilemma would be if all major nations joined together to form a community of shared purpose; a community that understood the incentive of lowering greenhouse gas emissions ultimately would benefit
Drops in a bucket policy would require each state to commit to a certain standard of responsibility that is proportionate to their input of greenhouse emissions into the atmosphere. The current problem with that policy would be that there are nations in the world who are unwilling to commit proportionate input due to the effect that would have on their economic stability. When major states are unwilling to adopt the drops in a bucket policy, then the weakest link principle is formed. An institution is only as strong as its weakest link; therefore the world cannot afford the drops in a bucket policy because any credible community is only as strong and meaningful as its weakest link. Many argue that the world’s last standing superpower, The United States, which has the disproportionate ability to solve this issue single-handedly, should do so. But the United States has no interest in being ‘the best shot’ for the world at this time, believing it does not gain the disproportionate benefit from solving the problem, therefore it is only willing to cooperate to a certain extent. The most reasonable solution in the short-term to address this dilemma would be if all major nations joined together to form a community of shared purpose; a community that understood the incentive of lowering greenhouse gas emissions ultimately would benefit