Field Manuel 3-24 was put into practice when the US’s commitment to COIN was confirmed in 2007 when US President George W. Bush announced “The New Way Forward”, or the infamous “surge” of troops in Iraq by 30 000 soldiers to protect civilians and occupy new positions in 4GW. Under the objective of providing security for civilians and building democracy and government infrastructure (as studied in Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro), the main goal of COIN was focused on protecting civilian populations and building their trust. In other words, the aim was to “win the hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people through relationship building with local populations alongside providing economic opportunities for insurgent defectors and security for civilians from insurgents. The premise of COIN was based off a central belief of Gen. Patreus in Field Manuel 3-24, which supported the idea that a long-term presence of US troops in Iraqi communities could improve the security situation and allow for trust to develop between the locals and US military.…
In laying the blame for all that went wrong in Iraq and Afghanistan at the feet of our senior military officers, he lets our political leadership and the other departments of the government mainly off the hook. While he discusses the drawbacks of counterinsurgency, saying the American military is not built for it and questioning the American public’s ability to stomach it, he fails to take successive Secretaries of Defense to task for their part in not asking the hard questions of their senior military advisors and of a lack of clear whole of government strategy in prosecuting the conflicts. He does not question the decisions, strategic guidance, or policy making timelines of both the Bush and Obama administrations. While this book adds to the scholarship on the conflicts since the attacks of September 11, 2001, it is not a complete history nor analysis of why the conflicts ended, in Bolger’s words, as “two lost campaigns and a war gone awry”…
The 20th century brought about the deadliest military conflict ever known to man. No longer would wars be fought for conquest but to defeat a universal threat, no matter the consequences. From new technical innovations like the tank to the deadly poison gas, warfare was forever changed. These new horrors of war brought about a need…
In January of 2007, President George W. Bush announced a new campaign strategy on the war against terror. The surge was a way forward to a more unified, democratic federation that can sustain, govern, and defend itself in future generations. His plan involved the deployment of 28,000 additional U.S. troops to the Anbar Province and Baghdad Area of Influence (AOI). The AOI strategy was based on six essential elements that derived from a proposal meeting with senior Iraqi officials; let the Iraqis lead, help Iraqis protect the population, isolate extremists, create space for political progress, diversify political and economic efforts, and situate the strategy in a regional approach (Mansoor 2013). The rapid deployment of five additional Brigades, in support of surge operations, spanned over a five-month period, from January to May of 2007.…
In late 2009, I was part of a Task Force (TF) whose mission was to capture or kill enemy leadership, or High Value Targets (HVTs) In Order To (IOT) facilitate COIN operations in whatever Area of Operations (AO) needed the TF’s capability. Intelligence led us to doing such a mission to Capture/Kill a HVT in Afghanistan in late 2009. The enemy in this AO, at this time, hammered the FOB that we staged out of with indirect fire and rockets multiple times a day. They also inflicted casualties on the unit at this FOB by using ambushes and IEDs when the unit would do their presence patrols, civil engagements or conduct resupply.…
The Editorial Précis The Editorial Board’s article entitled, “Is the Pentagon Telling the Truth About Afghanistan” (13 October 2015), published by the New York Times, suggests that the United States Pentagon is deceiving the American public with inaccurate intelligence regarding the current military efforts within Afghanistan. The Editorial Board justifies this claim by providing contradictory testimonies from General John Campbell, who applauds the current military efforts, and two editors from The Time’s, who assert that terrorists are quickly gaining control of several areas within Afghanistan and NATO-trained solders are doing little to prevent their insurgency. The Editorial Board’s purpose is to expose the dwindling military efforts…
Alex K. Rich and Gerson Moreno-Riano are the authors of the article War on Terror. Gerson Moreno-Riano earned a doctorate in Philosophy and a Master of Arts degree in political science from the University of Cincinnati (Rich, 2016, p.7). The purpose of this article is to explain the overview and understanding on how the war on terrorism is fought. Although the authors mention several effect that war has throughout the world, the authors argue that the war on terror causes the largest impact because it includes military operations. In paragraph one, the author establishes a setting by providing significant terrorist groups, locations and time.…
September 11, 2001, was a terrible tragedy by any measure, but it was not a historical turning point. It herald a new era of international relations in which terrorists with a global agenda prevailed, or in which such spectacular terrorist attacks became commonplace. On the contrary, 9/11 has not replicated. Despite the attention devoted to the “Global War on Terrorism,” the most important developments of the last ten years have been the introduction and spread of innovative information technologies, globalization, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the political disruptions in the Middle East.…
Nick Mariano Dr. Mark Wilson ETH 2050 24 November 2014 Game of Drones In the Civil War, Confederate generals like Robert E. Lee dismissed guerilla warfare as dishonorable and immoral. It was akin to shooting a man in the back, they said. Today, guerilla warfare forms the foundation of modern military strategy.…
“ By the 20th century, military organizations confronted the problem of not only adapting to technological changes in peace time, but also the fact that war itself has inevitably turned up the speed of technological change”. The first Gulf War constitutes a turning point in the history of modern conflicts essentially because of the integration of technology into all levels of military operations. War was always been a declaration of hostility between two opposing groups clashed over a battlefield in a duel with the ultimate aim to impose its will on the other. However, the advent of new technologies has completely changed these legendary and almost static clashes.…
Intelligence support for Information Operations is not decidedly different from “normal” intelligence, as described in Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, as knowledge of the adversary, however the is a difference in the perception of intelligence during peacetime military exercises versus armed military conflicts. Intelligence is collected and processed everyday through the intelligence cycle, but the natural tendency to focus and prioritize intelligence processing based on the current or most conspicuous adversarial crisis. Adding to the intelligence bias for the most pressing issue, are the biases from senior leaders who have entrenched views of adversaries based on cold war doctrine of closed societies. The Joint Vision 2010 for U.S. military operations is succinct in that information superiority against an adversary is key and here in lies a substantial crux of the issue intelligence support for Information Operations; the necessity for adversarial conflict and what course of action to follow without a national adversary.…
Combatting terrorism not only requires the strength of a nation but the incredible dedication and sacrifice of its service members and their families. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, United States military deployments became a regular occurrence. Fighting Islamic Fundamentalism is extremely difficult due to their ideology. These kinds of operations would take our troops into some of the most dangerous and remote regions of the world. Sometimes units would deploy and redeploy with minimal downtime due to the rapid operational cycles.…
Drone Warfare: The United States and their Aggressive Drone Policy in Afghanistan The United States has shifted its military strategies for taking out foreign enemies by reducing the number of boots they put on the ground and increasing the use of unmanned aerial vehicles referred to as drones. The use of drones is effective at sparing the number of U.S. soldiers and pilots being sent to deal with terrorist organizations (Grayson 2016). However it is ineffective in reducing the number of civilians that are killed or wounded through the use of these counterinsurgency strategies (Khalili 2012). This essay argues that the current U.S. drone policy in the country of Afghanistan is too aggressive and is doing more harm than good.…
Counterinsurgency unlike insurgency doesn’t use fear and intimidation, but collects information from the community based on their wants and needs. This again relates to the hierarchy of needs. Being able to be part of a community as a police officer allows the connection of trust between the officer and community. The officer then can use the information given to him by his community and combat insurgency. Winning the “hearts and minds” doesn’t relate to the insurgency, but counterinsurgency does just that.…
Unconventional Warfare (UW) is considered the trademark of the U.S. Army Special Forces (SF). In fact, UW often serves as the focus for training, planning, and discussion within every aspect of the SF community. Most debates involving UW turn into an analysis of defining Unconventional Warfare and trying to figure out how to fit current SF operations into that definition. Special Forces prides itself on owning UW and serving as the Department of Defense’s subject matter experts on operating by, with, and through an indigenous force. The debate over Special Force’s ownership of this domain should not rely solely on the training, funding, or even doctrine that validates UW as a SF core task.…