Field Manuel 3-24 was put into practice when the US’s commitment to COIN was confirmed in 2007 when US President George W. Bush announced “The New Way Forward”, or the infamous “surge” of troops in Iraq by 30 000 soldiers to protect civilians and occupy new positions in 4GW. Under the objective of providing security for civilians and building democracy and government infrastructure (as studied in Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro), the main goal of COIN was focused on protecting civilian populations and building their trust. In other words, the aim was to “win the hearts and minds” of the Iraqi people through relationship building with local populations alongside providing economic opportunities for insurgent defectors and security for civilians from insurgents. The premise of COIN was based off a central belief of Gen. Patreus in Field Manuel 3-24, which supported the idea that a long-term presence of US troops in Iraqi communities could improve the security situation and allow for trust to develop between the locals and US military.
Although some argue otherwise, many perceived the surge in troops to have resulted in a decrease in violence in Iraq. However, others like Biddle et al. argue that the surge was one of a few reasons for the decrease in conflict at that time. Aside from this argument, the surge in troops was a controversial action that raised the debate about how the US would strike the right balance between COIN and conventional capacity. Rather than focusing on traditional annihilation of insurgents, COIN operations focused on building sustainable security forces as well as a sustainable government infrastructure with optimism that Iraq could become a self-sustaining and eventual ally in the war on terror. While the COIN model used in Iraq is just one example of states’ responses to insurgents in asymmetric conflict, many other states have adopted similar models where they have faced modern insurgence. WRAP UP COING CONCLUSION While “asymmetric conflict” surely does describe the relationship between warring parties of today, compositions of a similar asymmetry have been well documented in warfare throughout the last two centuries. The purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate that over the course of history there have been many strategic shifts in terms of threats and enemies that opponents have faced. With each of these shifts has come a different approach or way for fighting wars. The discussion comes to a full loop with the simplification provided by Gorka and Kilcullen, where they explain that it is highly unlikely that the Taliban in Afghanistan or the extremists on US soil choose to fight “4GW” or “robust insurgency”. They simply choose to fight war as they can. Tying our discussion back the previously mentioned early …show more content…
However, after analyzing the history of asymmetric warfare and the changes and behaviors that have taken place through this time, I have become critical of the assumption that asymmetric warfare has ever ‘risen’. Warfare, in which weak actors have fought against unassailable opponents within their means and resources, is not a type of warfare that can be considered new. The notion of a “rise of asymmetric warfare” may be loaded with assumptions related to Western imperialism and industrialization, whereby the “rise” refers to a pattern of increasing conflicts that were “irregular” because they were wars that could not be won by Western military
Although some argue otherwise, many perceived the surge in troops to have resulted in a decrease in violence in Iraq. However, others like Biddle et al. argue that the surge was one of a few reasons for the decrease in conflict at that time. Aside from this argument, the surge in troops was a controversial action that raised the debate about how the US would strike the right balance between COIN and conventional capacity. Rather than focusing on traditional annihilation of insurgents, COIN operations focused on building sustainable security forces as well as a sustainable government infrastructure with optimism that Iraq could become a self-sustaining and eventual ally in the war on terror. While the COIN model used in Iraq is just one example of states’ responses to insurgents in asymmetric conflict, many other states have adopted similar models where they have faced modern insurgence. WRAP UP COING CONCLUSION While “asymmetric conflict” surely does describe the relationship between warring parties of today, compositions of a similar asymmetry have been well documented in warfare throughout the last two centuries. The purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate that over the course of history there have been many strategic shifts in terms of threats and enemies that opponents have faced. With each of these shifts has come a different approach or way for fighting wars. The discussion comes to a full loop with the simplification provided by Gorka and Kilcullen, where they explain that it is highly unlikely that the Taliban in Afghanistan or the extremists on US soil choose to fight “4GW” or “robust insurgency”. They simply choose to fight war as they can. Tying our discussion back the previously mentioned early …show more content…
However, after analyzing the history of asymmetric warfare and the changes and behaviors that have taken place through this time, I have become critical of the assumption that asymmetric warfare has ever ‘risen’. Warfare, in which weak actors have fought against unassailable opponents within their means and resources, is not a type of warfare that can be considered new. The notion of a “rise of asymmetric warfare” may be loaded with assumptions related to Western imperialism and industrialization, whereby the “rise” refers to a pattern of increasing conflicts that were “irregular” because they were wars that could not be won by Western military