NSWC Crane would benefit from anti-gaming policy. However, this policy requires more than just implementation. It will also need to be monitored regularly and updated as new forms of gaming are discovered. Pascal Courty and Gerald Marschke encountered this process as they studied a federal job-training program in their article, Making Government Accountable: Lessons from a Federal Job Training Program. They found that after a federal agency created performance measures, the employees learned how to game the measures. The agency would learn of the gaming and reform the measures, to which the employees found other gaming tactics (Courty & Marschke, 2007). It is from their study that NSWC Crane should be advised to implement anti-gaming policies, but provide continuous monitoring in order to reform measurements to prevent gaming. It may be beneficial to NSWC Crane and specifically the BFM Division code 10F31 to understand what types of gaming it is most prone to experience. NSWC Crane can be more equipped to deal with gaming if it understands what type and why they are being gamed in the first place. According to Christopher Hood in the article, Gaming in Targetworld: The Targets Approach to Managing British Public Services, at least three main types of gaming exist surrounding targets. Of these three, at least two are quite possible to exist at NSWC Crane. These include the threshold effect, which occurs when a uniform target output applies to all units giving no incentive for employees to excel beyond this target, and output distortion, which occurs when data is manipulated to show better performance than what actually exists (Hood, 2006). When metrics are self-reported, such as the OFDs and PR reviews, it leaves room for output distortion from employees to make their data better than what it actually is. Often times, when NSWC Crane implements a new process or encourages new metrics a target goal is given. For example, they would implement the PR review metrics and then suggest that each employee strive to reach 90% acceptance on all reviews. This could lead to the threshold effect where employees maintain the 90% level but feel no motivation to excel beyond this target. NSWC Crane not only has to monitor and prevent gaming, but it also must monitor and maintain efficient performance indicators. A phenomenon exists, described by Sandra Van Thiel and Frans L. Leeuw as the performance paradox, which is caused by the trend for performance indicators to lose their value overtime and lose the ability to distinguish between good and bad performers. Four processes cause the breakdown of performance indicators: positive learning, perverse learning, selection, and suppression. Positive learning refers to the process as performance improves, indicators become weak in identifying bad performance. Perverse learning occurs when individuals or organizations learn which performance aspects are measured and then use the information to manipulate their own data. Selection occurs when poor performers are replaced with better performers. Finally, suppression is the result of ignoring differences in performance completely (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). NSWC Crane needs to be aware of these processes in order to prevent the performance paradox for their own
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Wright discuss the increased pressure for performance and accountability in nonprofits and the relationship between performance measures and effective decision making in their work, Does Performance Measurement Improve Strategic Decision Making? Findings From a National Survey of Nonprofit Social Service Agencies. From their survey, they determined that a positive relationship existed between the array of performance measures nonprofits used and their level of effective decision-making (LeRoux & Wright, 2010). Federal positions have also experienced pressure for performance and accountability, as the public wants to know how tax dollars are being spent. This has led to federal agencies developing and implementing more performance indicators and measurements. It cannot be generalized from the study on nonprofits that federal agencies also show a positive relationship between performance indicators and strategic decision-making. However, federal organizations can learn from the nonprofit study and examine their own decision-making strategies in response to performance indicators. From my research, I can already see that information is used from performance measurements in order to make decisions within the BFM Division code
Wright discuss the increased pressure for performance and accountability in nonprofits and the relationship between performance measures and effective decision making in their work, Does Performance Measurement Improve Strategic Decision Making? Findings From a National Survey of Nonprofit Social Service Agencies. From their survey, they determined that a positive relationship existed between the array of performance measures nonprofits used and their level of effective decision-making (LeRoux & Wright, 2010). Federal positions have also experienced pressure for performance and accountability, as the public wants to know how tax dollars are being spent. This has led to federal agencies developing and implementing more performance indicators and measurements. It cannot be generalized from the study on nonprofits that federal agencies also show a positive relationship between performance indicators and strategic decision-making. However, federal organizations can learn from the nonprofit study and examine their own decision-making strategies in response to performance indicators. From my research, I can already see that information is used from performance measurements in order to make decisions within the BFM Division code