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18 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
What's the point of the reproductive skew theory?
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it attempts to explain the reproductive partitioning within animal societies according to the ECOLOGICAL SOCIAL and GENETIC attributes
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What is a high skew society? low skew?
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High- one or a few breeders strongly dominate the reproduction
Low- reproduction is shared more equitably |
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What are transactional models of skew? Give an organismal example.
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the dominant breeders of the society "pay" subordinates (by yielding reproduction) to stay in the group and cooperate peacefully. ex. Paper wasps
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What are the 2 kinds of reproductive incentives that dominants can provide to subordinates?
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1) staying incentive--a fraction of the reproduction just sufficient to guarantee that the subordinate stays and helps the dominant vs. leaves to breed solitarily
2) peace incentive--a fraction of the reproduction just sufficient to guarantee that the subordinate cooperates peacefully instead of fighting to the death for complete control of the group's resources. |
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Define all 4 variables in the staying incentive model where the dominant is alpha and subordinate is beta:
sol, lone, group, r, p |
sol = subordinate's expected reproductive success if it breeds solitarily
lone = the dominant's reproductive success if the subordinate does not join it group = the dyad's total reproductive output if the subordinate joins r = relatedness b/w the 2 p = minimum fraction of group's total reproduction |
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Under what condition will the subordinate require no staying incentive (it will stay even if it gets 0 offspring)?
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if sol < or = r(group-lone) b/c then the numerator of Ps will be less than or equal to 0
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As the relatedness between subordinate and dominant increases, the staying incentive ____________.
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Declines (thus, skew increases)
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Staying incentive will _______ as the group output (group) increases, the lone dominant's output (lone) decreases, and as a solitary subordinate's output (sol) decreases
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decrease (skew increases)
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This is all in the subordinate's point of view but when will the dominant yield the required staying incentive?
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if sol + lone < group
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What will happen if this inequality is satisfied?
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the dominant will yield the minimal staying incentive to the subordinate. NOT GROUP SELECTION...acted on individual genetic interests
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What's an organism that practices staying incentive?
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paper wasps
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the subordinate gets a bigger staying incentive as:
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S increases, G decreases, L increases, r decreases
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How would you get complete skew (in dominant's point of view)?
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if s < r (s-l)
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the group dissolves if
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s > g-l
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In pure tug of war outcomes, what part does relatedness play on skew?
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hardly at all (dominant just doesnt push as hard but neither does subordinate)
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skew increases as...
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G increases and r increases
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In the tug of war model (aka allopine bees), what's the relationship b/w group output and r
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group output significantly increases as r increases and decreases with increasing subordinate abilities
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which model is more prevelant among humans (tug of war or transactional?)
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transational
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