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53 Cards in this Set
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Palko v. Connecticut
(1937) |
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The double jeopardy prohibition provision included in the Fifth Amendment is not applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
(overruled in Benton v. Maryland in 1969) Brief Fact Summary. Defendant Palko is tried and convicted of murder for a second time after state appeals previous murder conviction on same events. |
Facts. Defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree. The jury returned a conviction of murder in the second degree, for which he received a life sentence. Pursuant to state law, the State of Connecticut appealed and the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. This court found harmful error to the state as a result of the exclusion of testimony as to a confession by the defendant, the exclusion of cross-examination testimony to impeach the defendant, and faulty jury instructions as to the difference between first and second degree murder. They ordered a second trial at which the jury sentenced the defendant to death. The defendant was granted certiorari to have the second conviction overturned.
Issue. Does the entire Fifth Amendment double jeopardy prohibition apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? |
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United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, (2006)
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A trial court's erroneous deprivation of a criminal defendant's choice of counsel entitles him to reversal of his conviction.
6th - Choice of Counsel |
Background
The defendant in the underlying case, Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez, was charged with conspiracy to distribute marijuana, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. His family initially hired local attorney John Fahle to represent him, but Gonzalez-Lopez then contacted and hired a California attorney, Joseph Low, to represent him, and the understanding appeared to be that Fahle and Low would work together on his case. The district court initially permitted Low and Fahle to work together, admitting Low pro hac vice (i.e., just this once), but soon revoked such permission, ruling that Low, when he passed notes to Fahle in a pretrial hearing, violated a local court rule restricting the cross-examination of a witness to one attorney. Gonzalez-Lopez then informed Fahle that he wanted Low to be his only attorney, and Low then filed another request to be admitted pro hac vice, which the district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit both rejected. Meanwhile, Fahle filed a complaint against Low, claiming that Low had violated the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct by contacting Gonzalez-Lopez while Fahle represented him. Fahle also sought to withdraw from the case. The district court let Fahle withdraw, ruled that Low violated the rules of professional conduct, and did not let Low represent Gonzalez-Lopez. Gonzalez-Lopez went to trial represented by another attorney, Karl Dickhaus, who requested permission for Low to sit with him at the counsel table. The trial judge denied that request and ordered Low to sit in the audience and not to speak with Dickhaus, enforcing the order by having a federal marshal sit between Dickhaus and Low throughout the trial. Gonzalez-Lopez was found guilty. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Gonzalez-Lopez's conviction. It ruled, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F. 3d 924 (8th Cir. 2005), that the district court both erred in ruling that Low violated the rules of professional conduct and in refusing to allow Low to represent Gonzalez-Lopez. It further ruled that the error in denying Gonzalez-Lopez his right to choice of counsel (Low) was "structural" in nature—i.e., reversible without harmless error analysis. The prosecution then petitioned for certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. It did not dispute that the district court erred and improperly denied Gonzalez-Lopez his choice of counsel, but argued that such error should be subject to harmless error analysis, and that Gonzalez-Lopez was not prejudiced by the error. [edit]Opinion of the Court [edit]Majority Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority (5-4), held that the denial of Gonzalez-Lopez's right of choice of counsel was a structural error, requiring reversal without harmless error analysis. The Scalia opinion reasoned that the refusal to let Low represent Gonzalez-Lopez caused effects that could never be adequately measured for harmless error, because it is impossible to speculate on what the effect that a different attorney and one that the defendant wished to have would have had on the proceedings—including, whether a trial would have occurred in the first place. The entire proceeding was therefore unfair and unreliable, and must be reversed. Justice Scalia was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice David Souter, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen Breyer. [edit]Dissent Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Anthony Kennedy, and Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented. Alito wrote that the Court had misinterpreted the Sixth Amendment's protection of the right to counsel to protect a defendant's choice of counsel, when he believed the text and history of the Amendment indicated that it merely protected a defendant's right to assistance that was as effective as his choice of counsel would be. Even if it protected choice of counsel, it did not mean that violation of this right should be grounds for automatic reversal. Instead, because the Constitution lacked directives as to how such rights should be enforced, the Court should follow the Congressional directive to apply harmless error analysis. |
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Powell v. Alabama
(1932) |
Under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, counsel must be guaranteed to anyone facing the possibility of a death sentence, whether in state or federal courts.
Right to Counsel in CAPITAL TRIAL Expanded by Gideon v Wainright - Right to Counsel in ALL FELONY cases |
Background of the case
The case stems from events that occurred in March 1931. Nine black men — Charlie Weems, Ozie Powell, Clarence Norris, Olen Montgomery, Willie Roberson, Haywood Patterson, Andrew (Andy) Wright, Leroy (Roy) Wright and Eugene Williams, later known as the Scottsboro Boys, were accused of raping two young white women, Ruby Bates and Victoria Price. The group was traveling in a freight train with seven white males and two white females. A fight broke out and all of the white males, except for one, were thrown from the train. The women accused the black men of rape, although one woman later retracted her claim. All of the defendants, except for Roy Wright, were sentenced to death in a series of one-day trials. The defendants were only given access to their lawyers immediately prior to the trial, leaving little or no time to plan the defense. The ruling was appealed on the grounds that the group was not provided adequate legal counsel. The Alabama Supreme Court ruled 6-1 that the trial was fair (the strongly dissenting opinion was from Chief Justice Anderson). This ruling was then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. [edit]The court's decision The majority opinion reversed and remanded the decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court, holding that due process had been violated. The ruling was based on three main arguments: "(1) They were not given a fair, impartial and deliberate trial; (2) They were denied the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of consultation and opportunity for trial; and (3) They were tried before juries from which qualified members of their own race were systematically excluded." |
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Johnson v. Zerbst,
(1938) |
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.
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Petitioner, Johnson, had been convicted in federal court of feloniously possessing, uttering, and passing counterfeit money in a trial where he had not been represented by an attorney but instead by himself. Johnson filed for habeas corpus relief, claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated, but he was denied by both a federal district court and the court of appeals.
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Betts v. Brady,
(1942) |
Where a man is tried for robbery, due process of law does not demand that Maryland (or any state) furnish counsel to an indigent defendant.
OVERTURNED BY GIDEON V WAINRIGHT |
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Hamilton v. Alabama (1961)
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Absence of counsel for petitioner at the time of his ARRAIGNMENT violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Ander's v California
1967 |
The failure to grant this indigent petitioner seeking initial review of his conviction the services of an advocate, as contrasted with an amicus curiae, which would have been available to an appellant with financial means, violated petitioner's rights to fair procedure and equality under the Fourteenth Amendment.
ANDER'S RULE |
Specifics of the Case
The specific case involved a California defendant, Charlie Anders, who was convicted of felony possession of marijuana. Anders then requested that the California District Court of Appeal appoint appellate counsel for him, which was granted. However, Anders' counsel, after review of the case and discussion with Anders, determined that no non-frivolous grounds for appeal existed and notified the court by letter that counsel would not file an appeal but that Anders wanted to file an appeal on his own behalf. The entire notification consisted of a single letter from Anders' counsel to the court stating that there was no merit to the appeal. Anders then requested another attorney be appointed which was denied whereupon Anders filed a pro se appeal which was not successful. Six years later Anders requested that his case be re-opened on the basis that he was denied the right to counsel. Both the California District Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court ruled against Anders, whereupon Anders appealed to the Supreme Court which granted a writ of certiorari. The U.S. Supreme Court held in the specific case Anders was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as the bare assertion of lack of grounds for appeal was not enough. However, the Court ruled that an attorney could still move to withdraw on the basis that no non-frivolous grounds for appeal exist, but certain steps had to be taken before such a motion could be granted. [edit]Anders Brief In order to file an Anders brief (also called a "no-merits brief"), the attorney must do the following: The attorney must file a motion to withdraw as the defendant's counsel. The motion to withdraw must "be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal." Any and all grounds, even if counsel considers them frivolous, must be raised in the brief. Those grounds include areas such as a plea of guilty was made voluntarily and freely, or the sentence imposed by the court was within the permissible range. The defendant should be given a copy of the brief and given time to raise any grounds (either pro se or by other counsel) that the defendant so chooses to raise. The court must then independently "after a full examination of all the proceedings" decide if the appeal is wholly frivolous. If the court decides it is, then it is to grant counsel's motion to withdraw and then (depending on state law) either dismiss the appeal or rule on its merits, but must still allow the defendant to further appeal if desired. If the court, though, finds that there is at least one non-frivolous ground, it must then allow the defendant the right to make the case and appoint counsel if needed. (An attorney may, as part of an Anders brief, request that if the court finds a non-frivolous ground for appeal, to withdraw the brief and remain as counsel.) |
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Argersinger v. Hamlin,
(1972) |
A criminal defendant may not be actually imprisoned unless provided with counsel
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Background
Jon Richard Argersinger was sentenced under Florida law to 90 days in jail for carrying a concealed weapon, but was never represented by counsel. Hamlin was the local sheriff. Argersinger claimed his conviction was unconstitutional, but his case was dismissed by the Florida Supreme Court, who relied on Duncan v. Louisiana, which held that jury trials were not required for crimes with a sentence of less than six months. The Florida court claimed that since jury trials were not required for misdemeanors, then neither was counsel. |
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Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)
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PROBATION REVOCATION HEARING
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Scott v. Illinois
(1979) |
A person may be imprisoned only if given the opportunity to be represented by counsel.
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After being denied a request for court-appointed counsel, Scott was convicted in a bench trial of shoplifting and fined $50. The statute applicable to his case set the maximum penalty at a $500 fine and/or one year in jail.
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Pennsylvania v. Finley
(1987 |
The court below improperly relied on the Federal Constitution to extend the Anders procedures to these collateral postconviction proceedings. Denial of counsel to indigents on first appeal as of right amounts to discrimination against the poor in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Alabama v. Shelton,
2002 |
Rule of Law
A suspended sentence that may result in incarceration may not be imposed if defendant did not have counsel at trial. |
"It is not true that only those criminal proceedings resulting in immediate actual imprisonment trigger an indigent defendant's right to state-appointed counsel under the Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment, for (1) no person may be imprisoned for any offense unless the person was represented by counsel at trial; and (2) the Sixth Amendment inquiry trains on the stage of the proceedings where the defendant's guilt is adjudicated, eligibility for imprisonment established, and prison sentence determined."
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Glasser V United States
1942 |
Holding
(1) A defense lawyer's conflict of interest arising from a simultaneous representation of co-defendants violates the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment (2) The exclusion of women from the jury pool, other than members of the League of Women Voters who have attended a jury training class, violates the fair-cross section requirement of the Impartial Jury Clause of the Sixth Amendment (Thus requiring reversal of conviction) |
Daniel D. Glasser and Norton I. Kretske were Assistant United States Attorneys in the Northern District of Illinois, specializing in liquor and revenue offenses.[7] Glasser and Kretske solicited bribes from defendants under indictment, or soon to be indicted
Glasser was the first Supreme Court decision to hold that the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment required the reversal of a criminal defendant's conviction if his lawyer's representation of him was limited by a conflict of interest. Glasser is the first majority opinion of the Court to use the phrase "cross-section of the community," and the first jury discrimination case to invoke the Sixth Amendment (rather than equal protection).[ "The democratic overhaul of the jury began with the Supreme Court's decision in Glasser v. United States. |
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Strickland v. Washington
(1984) |
Holding
To obtain relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel's deficient performance gives rise to a reasonable probability that, if counsel had performed adequately, the result of the proceeding would have been different. |
David Washington pled guilty in a Florida trial court to an indictment that included three capital murder charges. The trial judge told Washington that he had "a great deal of respect for people who are willing to step forward and admit their responsibility."
Counsel opted not to offer mitigating evidence and allowed Prosecutor to include aggravating evidence in hope that judge would relax sentence due to confession. Washington was sentence to death. Petitioned Supreme Court on grounds that counsel was ineffective. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was "deficient," such that counsel's errors were "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Second, this deficient performance must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. SC found that counsel was not ineffective but made strategic decisions. |
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Nix v. Whiteside
(1986) |
The Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to assistance of counsel is not violated when an attorney refuses to cooperate with the defendant in presenting perjured testimony at his trial.
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Before his trial for murder, the defendant, Whiteside, discussed his planned testimony with his attorney, and said that he had seen "something metallic in [the victim's] hand", in contradiction to earlier statements that he had not seen a gun in the victim's hand. Whiteside's attorney, Robinson, had warned that he (Robinson) would have an ethical obligation to report perjured testimony to the court. Whiteside, on the stand, admitted that while he believed the victim had a gun, he did not actually see a gun in the victim's hand. Whiteside was convicted, and subsequently applied for a Federal writ of habeas corpus, on the grounds that his conviction was tainted under the Sixth Amendment in that his attorney's threat to disclose the perjury had deprived him, Whiteside, of effective assistance of counsel.
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Glover v. United States
(2001) |
Holding
A significant increase in a prison sentence is not required in order to show prejudice in a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. |
Paul Glover was the Vice President and General Counsel of the Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union. A trial showed that he tried to enrich himself and others through kickbacks. The federal trial court sentenced him to 84 months in prison, denying a request to 'group' consideration of similar offenses on which he was convicted, which would have lowered the sentence range. His attorneys did not raise this issue on his first appeal to the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed his conviction. Glover filed a motion on his own to try to correct his sentence. He argued that the failure of his attorneys to appeal on the grouping question constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. However, because there was no proof that the sentencing alteration was 'significant', the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Glover wanted a lower range (which would have a minimum of 63 months) and so he appealed to the United States Supreme Court which granted the case for consideration in 2000.
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Wiggins v. Smith
(2003) |
The performance of Wiggins' attorneys at sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
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Wiggins was found guilty of capital murder after a bench trial. After the trial, Wiggins elected to have a jury decide the sentence on the murder conviction. Counsel's investigation of Wiggins' background was rudimentary and contained only a superficial knowledge of his history from a few sources, omitting the information in detailed social service reports of severe physical and sexual abuse. The record of the sentencing proceedings suggests that counsels' failure to investigate the defendant's background stemmed from inattention, not strategic judgment. Counsel failed to follow the American Bar Association guidelines in not gathering all such information. Counsel said they had been intent on proving the defendant did not kill the victim with his own hand and had not prepared for the sentencing phase.[1] Counsel presented no mitigating evidence to the jury at the sentencing phase. The jury concluded that the defendant was a principal in the first degree murder of the victim and sentenced Wiggins to death.[4]
Wiggins obtained new counsel and sought post conviction relief on the grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of his dysfunctional background. He presented expert testimony by a forensic mental health specialist who described his personal history including the severe physical and sexual abuse he had endured and its effect upon him. Opinion The Supreme Court granted a new sentencing hearing, holding that Wiggins' Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. Trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence such as Wiggins' personal and social history of severe physical abuse and sexual assault, and none of this information was presented at the penalty phase of trial, thus prejudicing Wiggins' defense.[1][7] The Supreme Court's decision stated that such an investigation is a key component of the strategic decision regarding what, if any, mitigating evidence to present during a sentencing hearing. The Court further held that the counsel's decision in defending a client facing the death penalty must be based on a thorough investigation of all possible mitigating factors. Failing that, it must be based on competent professional judgment providing sound reasons for limiting the investigation. |
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Bobby v. Van Hook
2009 |
Holding
the Sixth Amendment guarantee to criminal defendants of effective counsel is only a "general standard"—"an objective standard of reasonableness," as explained in the governing case, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Restatements of professional standards, such as the ABA Guidelines, can be useful as "guides", "but only to the extent they describe the professional norms prevailing when the representation took place." |
The Sixth Circuit had granted habeas relief to the petitioner on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel during the capital phase of his sentencing, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, believing it was clear the petitioner's attorneys "met the constitutional minimum standard of competence under the correct standard." The Sixth Circuit had instead improperly relied on professional guidelines that were published many years after the trial to determine the applicable standard.
Van Hook was convicted in 1985 for aggravated robbery and aggravated murder. Using a strategy he had used since a teenager, he picked up a homosexual man at a gay bar and lured him into a secluded place to rob him; in this instance, Van Hook concluded the robbery by stabbing the victim to death and disfiguring his body. At his sentencing hearing, the defense called several witnesses, and Van Hook himself gave an unsworn statement, presenting mitigating evidence regarding Van Hook's traumatic childhood, personality disorder, and substance abuse. The court weighed the factors and sentenced him to death. In 1995, Van Hook submitted his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was finally denied by the District Court in 2003. A panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed, ruling that his confession had been unconstitutionally obtained. That decision was vacated on rehearing en banc. On remand, the Sixth Circuit panel again granted the petition, finding that Van Hook's attorneys were ineffective during Van Hook's sentencing for failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence, for not securing an independent mental health expert, and for failing to object to damaging evidence in an investigation report. The en banc Sixth Circuit again vacated, and remanded for the panel to revise its opinion. In its third opinion, the panel granted relief to Van Hook on the sole ground that his lawyers did not adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence, relying on the American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases published in 2003. In reversing, the Supreme Court observed that the Sixth Amendment guarantee to criminal defendants of effective counsel is only a "general standard"—"an objective standard of reasonableness," as explained in the governing case, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Restatements of professional standards, such as the ABA Guidelines, can be useful as "guides", "but only to the extent they describe the professional norms prevailing when the representation took place." The Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth Circuit erred in treating the ABA Guidelines as "inexorable commands" rather than as "evidence of what reasonably diligent attorneys would do." The Sixth Circuit further erred in relying on Guidelines published 18 years after Van Hook went to trial, "without even pausing to consider whether they reflected the prevailing professional practice at the time of trial." Even applying the standards prevailing at the time, the Supreme Court found that Van Hook's counsel was not ineffective. The Sixth Circuit had incorrectly characterized defense counsel as waiting until the "last minute" to begin their mitigation investigation, as the record showed counsel had repeatedly interviewed family members, contacted an expert, and reviewed Van Hook's military history months before the start of trial. The Sixth Circuit panel believed that the evidence counsel did uncover should have prompted them to seek more. The Supreme Court, however, considered that such further testimony on the same points would have added nothing of value, and the decision not to investigate further was reasonable under the circumstances. The Supreme Court further found that the aggravating factors were strong. Van Hook was indisputably the sole perpetrator and had the intent to rob the victim from the start, even using the same strategy he had used in past robberies and deviating in this case only by killing his victim. The Sixth Circuit ultimately "focused on the number of aggravating factors instead of their weight...leading it to overstate further the effect additional mitigating evidence might have had." Alito filed a separate concurrence, to emphasize his understanding that the Supreme Court's opinion "in no way suggests that the [ABA Guidelines] have special relevance in determining whether an attorney’s performance meets the standard required by the Sixth Amendment." He wrote that it is purely the responsibility of the courts to determine what work by an attorney meets constitutional standards, and he saw "no reason why the ABA Guidelines should be given a privileged position in making that determination." |
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Wong v. Belmontes
2009 |
Holding
the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, failed the two-prong test under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because he could not establish that prejudice resulted even if his attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient. |
In 1981, Belmontes broke into a woman's home in Victor, California, and bludgeoned her to death, repeatedly striking her in the head with a steel bar. He and his accomplices then stole the victim's stereo, sold it for $100, and used the money to buy beer and drugs for the night. Belmontes was convicted of murder in state court in 1982. During the sentencing phase, his defense attorney successfully excluded evidence he had committed another murder, for which he had served time only as an accessory, though the court warned that the prior murder could be admissible as rebuttal evidence if the defense made it an issue. Constrained by that limit, the defense attorney nevertheless presented several witnesses, and testimony from Belmontes himself, regarding the abuse he suffered as a child, and his religious conversion while in jail on the accessory charge. The jury returned a sentence of death.
The District Court denied Belmontes' petition for habeas relief, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding error in the jury's instructions. The Supreme Court summarily vacated that decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005). On remand, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its decision, and the Supreme Court reversed in Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006). On remand, the Ninth Circuit again granted Belmontes relief, this time on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial. In Wong v. Belmontes, the Supreme Court again reversed, holding that Belmontes failed to establish the showing of prejudice required by Strickland, regardless of whether his attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient. The Supreme Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for changing its view of the case; the same panel of judges that characterized the mitigation evidence presented as merely "cursory" in its most recent opinion had characterized the same evidence as "substantial" in its first opinion. Though the Ninth Circuit ruled that Belmontes was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to present even more evidence to "humanize" him, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that such evidence would either be merely cumulative, or would have opened the door for the admissibility of evidence of the prior murder. The Supreme Court dismissed as "fanciful" the notion that the jury's result could have been different if only the defense attorney had called more witnesses, in light of the circumstances of the murder. The Supreme Court took particular issue with the Ninth Circuit's assertion that the case did not involve "needless suffering", given that the motive for the murder was petty burglary, and the victim had been beaten 15-20 times on the head, suffered defensive wounds that indicated a struggle, and remained alive in that state until shortly after police found her. |
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Porter V McCollum
2009 |
The Supreme Court reversed the death sentence of a Korean War veteran who suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, ruling that his defense attorney's failure to uncover or present any mitigating evidence regarding his military service or his mental health deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
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Porter was convicted in 1987 of murdering his ex-girlfriend and her boyfriend in Melbourne, Florida. He represented himself at trial, but eventually pleaded guilty and then was represented by a court-appointed attorney during the penalty phase. That attorney failed to uncover or present any evidence of Porter's mental health, his family background, or his military service. The sum total of the mitigating evidence presented was instead inconsistent testimony about Porter's behavior when intoxicated and testimony that Porter had a good relationship with his son. The jury recommended a sentence of death.
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Padilla v. Kentucky
(2010) |
Holding
The lawyer for an alien charged with a crime has a constitutional obligation to tell the client if a guilty plea carries a risk that he will be deported. The biggest direct impact of the Padilla decision is that criminal defense attorneys must advise their non-citizen clients about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. In cases where the law is unclear, lawyers do not have to do significant legal research, but may simply say that a conviction may lead to the client's deportation. |
In 2001, Padilla, a lawful resident in the US for more than 40 years, was working as a commercial truck driver when he was arrested in Kentucky for transporting marijuana. His defense attorney told him that he "did not have to worry" about the conviction affecting his immigration status, so he pled guilty pursuant to a plea bargain.[2] However, this advice was incorrect, as Padilla's deportation was virtually automatic.[3] In 2004, Padilla filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had been given bad advice from his attorney.
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Sears v. Upton
2010. |
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the lower court and required them to reconsider the claim. Proper application of the prejudice test of Strickland v. Washington "requires precisely the type of probing and fact-specific analysis that the state trial court failed to undertake." Courts must undertake a point-by-point investigation of the deficiencies in the defense and reweigh the likely outcome. Courts may not perform a cursory analysis and claim that there is no way to know how the inadequate defense might have affected the outcome of the trial.
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Having found Demarcus Ali Sears guilty of a capital crime, a Georgia court sentenced him to death despite several mitigating circumstances, including a severe cognitive impairment and an abusive childhood. Most of these mitigating circumstances were never brought out by the defense attorney during the sentencing phase of the trial. A lower court ruled that the Sears' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, failed the two-prong test under Strickland v. Washington.
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Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California
(2000) |
Holding
An appellant in a criminal case does not have the constitutional right to refuse counsel on direct appeal. |
Salvador Martinez worked as an office assistant for a law firm, and in the service of that firm he was given $6,000 by the girlfriend of a client for bail. This bail was not posted, and he was accused of embezzlement and theft, and further was convicted and acquitted respectively on these charges. He filed an appeal, a waiver of counsel, and a motion to represent himself (a "pro se" motion). When the Court of Appeals of California rejected the pro se motion, he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the argument.
The counsel for the appellant, Ronald Maines, argued that due process coupled with the decision in Faretta required the extension of a constitutional right for criminal defendants to refuse to have a court appointed lawyer argue the appeal, thus requiring the right to extend further to allow criminal defendants to argue their own appeals. This would require any appellant who was a criminal defendant to be allowed, given that the court opted for oral arguments, to be allowed to argue their own case as a constitutional right. The argument of the counsel for the appellee, Robert Foster, held that there were substantial differences between initial trials and appeals courts, therefore the extension of Faretta to the current question was overreaching. Mr. Maines contended that there must be more than simple "differentiation" between the two situations, but there must be a difference consequential to the holding in Faretta to distinguish the trial and appellate situations |
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Faretta v. California
(1975) |
Holding
A criminal defendant in a state proceeding has a constitutional right to knowingly refuse the aid of an attorney. Court held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has the constitutional right to refuse appointed counsel and conduct the trial when he or she VOLUNTARILY AND INTELLIGENTLY elects to do so. However, such a defendant may not later complain that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. "The pro se defendant must be allowed to control the organization and content of his own defense, to make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at appropriate points in the trial" Must understand the "dangers and disadvantages" of self representation |
The defendant Anthony Faretta was accused of grand theft in Los Angeles County, California. Well before the trial began, the defendant requested permission to represent himself. Questioning by the judge revealed that he had once represented himself in a criminal case and that he believed that the public defenders office was under a heavy case load. The judge warned him that he was making a mistake and emphasized that he would receive no special treatment. The judge entered a preliminary ruling allowing Faretta to represent himself, however stating that he might reverse his decision if it seemed that he was unable to adequately represent himself.
Several weeks later, but still before the trial, the judge imitated a hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to defend himself. After questioning him on numerous topics, including hearsay and juries, the judge ruled that his answers were inadequate and had not made an intelligent decision to waive counsel. In addition he ruled that Faretta had no constitutional right to his own defense. Therefore he rescinded his previous decision. During the trial the judge denied Faretta's motions to be co-counsel and other motions he attempted to make on his behalf. Subsequently he was convicted by a jury and sentenced to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal, which relied on a recent California Supreme Court decision that had expressly decided the issue, ruled that Faretta had no federal or state right to represent himself. Appeal to the Supreme Court of California was denied. |
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McKaskle v. Wiggins
(1984) |
Rule of Law
Sixth Amendment right to conduct his own defense was not violated by presence of a court appointed standby counsel. |
Carl Edwin Wiggins was on trial for Robbery and chose to proceed pro se and was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The conviction was overturned on the technicality, that the indictment was defective and Wiggins requested counsel for the second trial.[2] The trial court appointed standby counsel to assist him if requested. Wiggins decided to defend himself and asked that the standby counsel be barred from interfering. Multiple times, both before and during the trial, Wiggins changed his mind regarding the standby counsels' role. Wiggins sometimes allowed or even requested standby counsels' participation. He was once again convicted. After his conviction, Wiggins moved for a new trial on the grounds that his standby counsel had interfered with his presentation of his own defense. This motion was denied by the trial court
Court found that Wiggins' right to present his own defense was not violated, since "it appears that he was allowed to make his own appearances as he saw fit and that his standby counsel's unsolicited involvement was held within reasonable limits." |
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Indiana v. Edwards
(2008) |
Holding
A criminal defendant who is competent to stand trial may nevertheless be found incompetent to represent himself at that trial. Representing oneself at trial is more complicated than deciding what to plead |
Edwards' trial
Ahmad Edwards, who suffers from schizophrenia, tried to steal a pair of shoes from a department store in Indiana. Store detectives caught him in the act, and he drew a gun, fired at a store security officer, and wounded an innocent bystander. He was charged with attempted murder, battery with a deadly weapon, criminal recklessness, and theft. In 2000, he was deemed not competent to stand trial, and ordered to the state hospital for treatment. After seven months of treatment, he was restored to competency. Yet in 2002, his lawyers asked for another competency evaluation. That second competency evaluation resulted in a determination that Edwards was indeed competent to stand trial, although he still suffered from a mental illness. As trial preparations proceeded, his lawyers asked for a third competency evaluation, and in 2003 Edwards was again found not competent to stand trial and again committed to the state hospital. Eight months later, Edwards was again restored to competence, and trial preparations began again. In June 2005, as trial began, Edwards asked to represent himself and asked for a continuance in the trial. The judge denied the request for a continuance, and Edwards therefore proceeded to trial with counsel. He was convicted of criminal recklessness and theft, but the jury could not reach a verdict as to the attempted murder and battery charges. Before the second trial on the attempted murder and battery charges, Edwards again asked to represent himself. The judge denied that request, pointing to the lengthy record of Edwards's mental illness. Edwards proceeded to trial with appointed counsel, and was convicted of the attempted murder and battery charges. |
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Dusky V United State
1960 |
Holding
The Competency standard for standing trial: whether the Defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer w/ a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and a "rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him Dusky Rule - adjudicative competence |
Milton Dusky, a 33 year old man, was charged with assisting in the rape of an underage female and kidnapping. He was clearly suffering from schizophrenia but was found Competent to Stand Trial and received a sentence of 45 years. On petition of writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the petitioner requested that his conviction be reversed on the grounds that he was not competent to stand trial at the time of the proceeding.
brief mental status exam insufficient |
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Godinez v. Moran
(1993) |
Holding:
The Competency Standard for PLEADING GUILITY is the same as the competency standard for STANDING TRIAL |
On August 2, 1984, Richard Allan Moran entered the Red Pearl Saloon in Carson City, Nevada and shot the bartender and a customer before robbing the cash register. Nine days later he shot his ex-wife and then himself, and also unsuccessfully tried to slit his wrists. On August 13 Moran summoned the police to his hospital bedside and confessed to the killings.
He was charged with three counts of first-degree murder, but pleaded not guilty. Two court-ordered psychiatrists concluded that he was competent to stand trial, although both noted he was depressed. The prosecution sought the death penalty. Two months after the psychiatric evaluations, Moran stated to the court that he wished to discharge his attorneys and change his plea to guilty. He also waived his right to counsel. After his trial he was sentenced to death. Moran then sought state post conviction relief on the grounds that he was mentally incompetent to represent himself. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and then it rejected his claim |
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Barker v. Wingo
(1972) |
Holding"
Determinations of whether the 6th Amendment right to a SPEEDY TRIAL has been violated must be done on a case by case basis If right to a speedy trial has been violated, indicted must be dismissed of conviction overturned. A reversal or dismissal of a criminal case on speedy trial grounds means that no further prosecution for the alleged offenses can take place |
Some factors to consider:
Length of Delay - No specific time Frame set forth Reason for the delay - Prosecution may not excessively delay trial for its own advantage but may delay to secure presence of absent witness. Time and Manner in which the Defendant has asserted his right Degree of prejudice to defendant caused by the delay |
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Doggett v. United States
(1992) |
The 8½ year delay between indictment and arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, arguing that the Government had been negligent in pursuing him and that Doggett had remained unaware of the indictment until his arrest.
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Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. Doggett was indicted in 1980 on drug related charges, but having left the US before he could be arrested, was considered a fugitive. He returned to the US in 1982 and proceeded to live a seemingly normal life. The government did not continue to pursue him actively and it was only by coincidence that they became aware of him in 1988, leading to his late arrest.
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Cheff v. Schnackenberg
(1966) |
iMPARTIAL JURY -AVAILABILITY
Court held that crimes carrying possible penalties up to six months imprisonment do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses. |
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Duncan v. Louisiana
(1968) |
A crime carrying a 2-year sentence is sufficiently serious to require the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth.
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In October, 1966, Gary Duncan, a 19-year old African-American, was driving down a Louisiana highway when he noticed his two cousins with a group of white youths on the side of the road. He became concerned because his cousins had reported occurrences of “racial incidents” at the recently de-segregated school. He pulled over the car, stepped out, and asked his cousins to get in the car. The white youths testified that Duncan slapped one of them at this point, while Duncan and his cousins denied it. Duncan was arrested and ultimately charged with simple battery. As it is punishable by no more than two years, simple battery is a misdemeanor under Louisiana law and therefore not subject to trial by jury. Duncan was convicted and received a 60 day prison sentence and a fine of $150. He appealed on the grounds that the state had violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteeing his right to a jury trial. The Court accepted the case under its appellate jurisdiction from the Louisiana State Supreme Court.
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Blanton V North Las Vegas
1989 |
Holding
The right to a jury trial is not found in crimes where the maximum period of incarceration is under six months. The US Supreme Court ruled that Blanton did not have the right to a jury trial because the crime he was charged with was "petty". The court went on to elaborate: "offenses for which the maximum period of incarceration is six months, or less, are presumptively petty...a defendant can overcome this, and become entitled to a jury trial,..by showing that additional penalties [such as monetary fines]...are...so severe [as to indicate] that the legislature clearly determined that the offense is a serious one." |
Melvin R. Blanton was charged with Driving under the influence of alcohol. His petition for a jury trial was denied and he was instead given a bench trial. Blanton appealed, arguing that his sixth amendment right to trial by jury had been violated.
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Griffin V Illinois
1956 |
There is no distinction between a defendant's right to appeal versus a trial. Defendants cannot be denied an appeal because they cannot afford it.
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Mapp V Ohio
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The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth, excludes unconstitutionally obtained evidence from use in criminal prosecutions.
Exclusionary Rule All evidence discovered as a result of a search and seizure conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (”Constitution”) shall be inadmissible in State court proceedings |
On May 23, 1957, police officers in a Cleveland, Ohio suburb received information that a suspect in a bombing case, as well as some illegal betting equipment, might be found in the home of Dollree Mapp. Three officers went to the home and asked for permission to enter, but Mapp refused to admit them without a search warrant. Two officers left, and one remained. Three hours later, the two returned with several other officers. Brandishing a piece of paper, they broke in the door. Mapp asked to see the “warrant” and took it from an officer, putting it in her dress. The officers struggled with Mapp and took the piece of paper away from her. They handcuffed her for being “belligerent.”
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Katz v United States
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The Court extended the Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure to protect individuals with a “reasonable expectation of privacy”
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Charles Katz used a public pay phone booth to transmit illegal gambling wagers from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston. Unbeknownst to Katz, the FBI was recording his conversations via an electronic eavesdropping device attached to the exterior of the phone booth. Katz was convicted based on these recordings. He challenged his conviction, arguing that the recordings were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals sided with the FBI because there was no physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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Terry v Ohio
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Police may stop a person if they have a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may frisk the suspect for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous, without violating the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed.
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Smith V Maryland
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installation and use of the pen register was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and hence no warrant was required.
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In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that a pen register is not a search because the "petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company." Since the defendant had disclosed the dialed numbers to the telephone company so they could connect his call, he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed. The court did not distinguish between disclosing the numbers to a human operator or just the automatic equipment used by the telephone company.
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Kirby v Illinois
1972 |
Pre-indictment showup without counsel was not a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the criminal prosecution had not yet begun.
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On February 21, 1968 in Chicago, Willie Shard reported to police that he was robbed by two men that had taken his wallet. The wallet contained his Social Security card and traveler's checks. On February 22, 1968, police stopped Thomas Kirby and Ralph Bean and asked for identification. Kirby produced a Social Security card bearing the name Willie Shard, and police notices he also carried traveler's checks. Kirby said he won them in a game, but he and Bean were arrested and taken to the police station.[2]
Shard was brought to the police station, and upon seeing Kirby and Bean seated at a table identified them as the men who robbed him. Kirby and Bean did not have counsel present, and they had not been advised of their rights. Kirby and Bean were indicted six weeks later for the robbery of Shard, where they were appointed counsel. A pretrial motion by Kirby to exclude the police station identification was denied. A jury convicted both defendants of robbery. Kirby's conviction was affirmed on appeal, where the Illinois appellate court held that the Supreme Court precedents United States v. Wade[3] and Gilbert v. California[4] did not require exclusion of the identification because it was made before the indictment.[5] The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if Kirby had a right to counsel at that pre-indictment showup identification.[6] |
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United States v Wade
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Holding
A post-indictment lineup in the absence of counsel was a violation of the Sixth Amendment. |
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Gilbert V California
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A mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast with the content of what is written, is an identifying physical characteristic outside the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.
The admission of the in-court identifications of petitioner without first determining that they were not tainted by the illegal lineup procedure but were of independent origin was constitutional error. |
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Boyd v. United States
(1886) |
Holding
A search and seizure is equivalent to a compulsory production of a man's private papers. (An thus violates the 4th Amendment as an unreasonable search and seizure. |
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Miranda V Arizona
1966 |
Holding
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination requires law enforcement officials to advise a suspect interrogated in custody of his rights to remain silent and to obtain an attorney. |
The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.[4]
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease ... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. |
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Berghuis v Thompkins
2010 |
A suspect's silence during interrogation does not invoke his right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona. The invocation of that right must be unambiguous, and silence is not enough to invoke it. Voluntarily and knowingly responding to police interrogation after remaining silent constitutes a waiver of the right to remain silent, provided that a Miranda warning was given and the suspect understood it.
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Van Chester Thompkins was considered a suspect in a fatal shooting on January 10, 2000 in Southfield, Michigan. After advising Thompkins of his Miranda rights, police officers interrogated him. Thompkins did not state at any time that he wanted to rely on his right to remain silent, nor that he did not want to talk to the police, nor that he wanted an attorney. The court record suggested that he had been almost completely silent during the 3-hour interrogation and the few sporadic comments he made had no bearing on the case[3] (police described it as "nearly a monologue"[4]), but near the end, detectives changed their approach and "tried a spiritual tac[k]" [5] and an "appeal to his conscience and religious beliefs".[6] Thompkins was asked in sequence - did he believe in God, did he pray to God, and did he pray to God to forgive him for shooting the victim. He answered "yes" to each of these.[1][2] Thompkins made a motion to suppress his statements, claiming that he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, that he had not waived that right, and that his inculpatory statements were involuntary. The trial court denied his motion and Thompkins was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
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Minnick V Mississipi
1990 |
Rule of Law
When the accused asks for counsel, interrogation must cease and cannot begin again once counsel is not present. |
Facts. The petitioner and another inmate escaped from prison in Mississippi. During their escape, they killed two people as they searched for weapons. The two fled to Mexico, but the petitioner returned to San Diego where he was caught. He decided not to sign a waiver of his rights and asked for counsel. After the petitioner met with counsel, the authorities subjected him to more interrogation. He continued to refuse to sign a waiver, but he disclosed incriminating evidence in the follow-up interrogations.
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Davis v United States
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Holding
an ambiguous and unclear request for an attorney does not establish the right. The reasoning was that the defendant's rights under Edwards were not sufficiently requested under these facts. The request for an attorney must be clear and unambiguous. |
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Edwards v Arizona
2004 |
Once Defendant invokes FIFTH amendment right to counsel police must ceases custodial interrogation . Re-interrogation permissible if Defendant initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with police.
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Missouri v Siebert
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Question first, warn later, question again approach unconstitutional
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Rakas v Illinois
(1978) |
Expectation of privacy in area subject to search or seizure required to challenge legality of the 4th amendment.
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Established that vehicular passengers in a car the did not own had no legitimate expectation of privacy
Overnight guest in friend's apartment has such expectation and thus standing. |
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United States v Armstrong
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Holding
Burden of proof is on defendants to demonstrate that people of other races have bot been similarly prosecuted. |
Facts. The respondents in this matter responded to their indictment on charges of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack by filing a Discovery Motion and an Affidavit alleging that the defendants were being selectively prosecuted because they were black. When the government failed to provide proof of its prosecutions, which would indicate the race of all individuals indicted within a certain timeframe, the District Court dismissed the case. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also held that “a defendant is not required to demonstrate that the government ahs failed to prosecute others who are similarly situated.” The Supreme Court granted cert, to determine who has the burden of proving the selective prosecution.
Issue. Whether criminal defendants who pursue selective prosecution claims demonstrate people of other races were not prosecuted for similar crimes. Dissent. Justice Stevens dissented noting a great disparity between defendants who are accused of crimes involving crack cocaine and those who are accused of other drug-related crimes. |
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Russel V Unites States
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Brief Fact Summary. This case arises when Russell, among a group of other Petitioners, sought to have an indictment dismissed before trial because it did not properly charge him.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An indictment must do more than repeat the language of a criminal statute; rather, it must inform the defendant what it is that he has in fact done. Facts. Petitioners were convicted of 2 U.S.C. Section: 192 for refusing to answer questions when summoned before congressional investigative committees. They sought to have their indictments overthrown on the grounds that the indictments failed to state what the petitioners were allegedly guilty of. Issue. Whether, in order to be upheld as valid, an indictment must state a cause of action. |
Held. An indictment must outline what petitioners are accused of withholding (when being accused of refusing to answer questions before a congressional subcommittee) in order to be considered valid. Otherwise Petitioners cannot adequately prepare themselves for the grand jury process.
Dissent. The dissent, written by Justice Harlan, maintains that by requiring an indictment to include the questions of congress, legitimate congressional inquiries may be affected. Discussion. While this case comes across as difficult, it boils down to a consideration of cause. In order to maintain a valid indictment, a prosecutor must state his cause of action so that a defendant can understand the questions which may be put before him before the grand jury |
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United States v Dixon
1993 |
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Double Jeopardy arises when a defendant is prosecuted twice on the same offense, or is subsequently prosecuted for a lesser-included offense which could have been prosecuted the first time.
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Brief Fact Summary. This case arises from the consolidation of two cases which both deal with the Double Jeopardy clause.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Double Jeopardy arises when a defendant is prosecuted twice on the same offense, or is subsequently prosecuted for a lesser-included offense which could have been prosecuted the first time. Facts. There are two distinguishable fact situations which the Court is dealing with: In Dixon, defendant was arrested for murder in D.C. and released on bail, on the condition that he not commit any criminal offense, or he would be held in contempt of court. While awaiting trial, Dixon was later arrested and indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and was found guilty of contempt and sentenced to 180 days in jail. Dixon moved to dismiss this indictment on double jeopardy grounds because that was prosecution was secondary to his first offense. In Foster, the defendant’s wife obtained a CPO (civil protection order) against him due to domestic attacks. The Order required that he not molest, assault, or in any manner threaten or physically abuse her. Later his wife sought to have him held in contempt for violation of the Order. Foster also filed a Motion to Dismissed, grounded in double jeopardy, because his contempt charges arose out of the original prosecution. Issue. This case questions whether a criminal can be later charged in contempt for committing the same crime of which he is already being prosecuted. |
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Batson V Kentucky
1986 |
Strauder v. West Virginia reaffirmed; prosecutors may not use race as a factor in making peremptory challenges; defendants must only make a prima facie showing on the evidence from their case to mount a challenge to race-based use of peremptories.
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The defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire [jury pool] members of the defendant's race. The defendant may also rely on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Finally, the defendant must show that such facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.
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