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54 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Wormall v Wormall |
Shield: action in trespass by the landlord, provided that the landowner had assured the ‘trespasser’ that they could enjoy the right now being denied |
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Lester v Hardy |
Shield: action in nuisance by the landlord |
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Crabb v Arun DC |
Sword: Generate a new property interest in favour of a claimant who has relied on an assurance by a landlord that they will be given some right or privilege over the land |
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Orgee v Orgee |
But a court of equity will rarely go beyond the maximum the claimant was informally promised. |
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Jennings v Rice |
Apart from Orgee v Orgee rule, the court will also seek to do that which remedies the unconscionability suffered by the claimant |
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Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees |
Conditions are: Assurance, reliance and detriment in circumstances in which it would be unconscionable to deny a remedy to the claimant; emphasis shifted away from an examination of the landowner's actions to that of the behaviour of the claimant |
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Thorner v Major |
But a holistic approach should be taken and the four features are not to be seen as isolated. |
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Willmott v Barber |
Old test: 'five probanda' of proprietary estoppel (represents the 'acquiescence' strand of cases put forward by McFarlane) -mistake as to legal rights over land belonging to another - true landowner must know of claimant’s mistaken belief -claimant must have expended money or carried out some action on the faith of the mistaken belief -landowner must have encouraged the expenditure by the claimant, either directly, or by abstaining from enforcing their legal rights and the owner of the land over which the right is claimed must know of the existence of their own rights -these are inconsistent with the alleged rights of the claimant. |
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Thorner v Major |
Assurance must be -'clear enough', though context-dependent -Express and specific but not necessarily so -Relate to or be about some reasonably identifiable land, though exact scope of land need not be certain (over time some land is sold and other purchased) as long as it is reasonably clear which land the assurance relates to at the time the claim of estoppel falls to be considered |
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Ramsden v Dyson |
Even silence can constitute an assurance |
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Whittaker v Kinnear |
'family' disputes and 'commercial' disputes need not be approached in the same way -Specificity of assurance may depend on whether it is in a domestic (thorner) or commercial context (cobbe) |
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Achom v Lalic |
The courts must beware of accepting proprietary claims too readily in commercial contexts |
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Creasey v Sole |
However, even in a family context, vague and ill-defined words still cannot amount to an assurance |
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Shirt v Shirt |
If parties' relationships are complex, there may be no adequate assurance found even in typical family disputes |
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Ramsden v Dyson |
Assurance can be implied where the landowner refrains from preventing the claimant using his land in a particular way (acquiescence strand?) |
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Murphy v Burrows |
If parties' relationship have a fluid and uncertain nature, the assurances might not give rise to estoppels as it is unclear whether they were given, or reasonably understood, as assurances about property. |
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JT Developments v Quinn |
An assurance can arise even if there was clearly no intention to create binding obligations between the parties at all, such as where parties had attempted to negotiate a contract governing use of land but had failed. |
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Kinane v Alimany Mackie-Conteh |
A written, though unenforceable, agreement can constitute the requisite assurance, even if the parties did not give the agreement legal effect through their own fault. -borrower had agreed by letter to charge his land as security for a loan, but written instrument did not meet the formality requirements of s2 of the LP(MP)A 1989 as both borrower and lender did not sign it. |
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Cobbe v Yeoman's Row |
But if both parties knew that they should have entered into an enforceable contract if they wanted to create a binding agreement and had chosen not to, then the claim of estoppel would likely fail |
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Herbert v Doyle |
Or had intended that further formalities would follow, then the claim of estoppel would likely fail |
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Thorner v Major |
Assurance can succeed provided that the claimant reasonably believes that an assurance has been made, even if the landowner did not intend to make an assurance by words or deeds. |
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Slater v Richardson |
But if the landowner know nothing and could not reasonably be expected to know of the claimant's belief that he has been promised some right in or over the land, and the landowner has done nothing to encourage the claimant's belief, then it is going to be difficult to establish an estoppel. |
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Creasey v Sole |
A claim of estoppel must be approached with scepticism when the only evidence of an assurance is the uncorroborated evidence of the claimant. |
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Thorner v Major |
Sufficient if claimant reasonably relies on the assurance, even if the landowner did not intend that he should rely so |
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Greasley v Cooke |
If clear assurance has been made and detriment has been suffered, it is permissible to assume that reliance has occurred. |
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Wayling v Jones |
There only needs to be a 'sufficient link' between the assurance made and the detriment incurred by the plaintiff, the existence of which would throw the burden of proof onto the defendant to show that they had in fact been no reliance |
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Orgee v Orgee |
When plaintiff's alleged detriment was ordinary expenses that would normally have been incurred in any event, then there is no reliance |
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Campbell v Griffin |
But there can still be reliance where the claimant admitted that he would have assisted the landlords out of ordinary human compassion rather than in clear reliance on their promises; a dual motive does not thereby diminish the fact that reliance has occurred. |
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Chun v Ho |
Where the claimant's actions in giving up her career and establishing a life with the landowner to the disgust of her family could not be explained solely on the basis of her love on him |
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Bradbury v Burkinshaw |
Parties' failed attempts to regulate formally the claimant's use of land, which came to nothing, did not mean that the claimant had ceased to reply on the informal assurances. -Detriment is highly fact-sensitive and is not to be discounted because of family or emotional ties between the claimant and landowner that might otherwise explain a course of action |
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Kinane v Alimany Mackie-Conteh |
Spending money on land or advancing money to the landowner is detriment. |
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Campbell v Griffin |
Physically improving the land in some way or devoting time and care to the needs of the landowner is detriment. |
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Lloyd v Dugdale |
Forsaking some other opportunity is detriment. |
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Suggitt v Suggitt |
Positioning your entire life on the faith that the land might one day be yours is detriment. |
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Jennings v Rice |
Detriment does not have to relate to land, it can include spending money in other ways on the faith of an assurance that you would have somewhere to live or even inheritance to enjoy |
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Gillett v Holt |
Where a claimant can be thought of having done rather well out of his relationship with the landowner as the former now owned valuable shares in the farm company and held property in his own right, as long as there were lost opportunities, there can still be detriment |
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Bradbury v Burkinshaw |
Occupation of the land, though beneficial, may not outweigh the detrimental reliance. |
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Taylor v Dickens |
But detriment itself, no matter how extensive, is not enough. -If there was no assurance that the deceased would never change her will and there is no enforceable assurance, it does not matter if the plaintiff works for many years in the expectation he would inherit from the deceased |
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Lloyd v Dugdale |
Detriment must be incurred by the person to whom the assurance is made; there is no concept of 'derivative detriment' -in this case Mr Dugdale had to prove that the detriment was incurred by him personally and not on behalf of his company |
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Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees |
Unconscionability is the very essence of a proprietary estoppel claim |
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Hopper v Hopper |
Unconscionability is a fluid concept and much depends on the facts of each case.
-It means simply whether in all of the circumstances the landowner can resile from the assurance he has given and on which the claimant has relied to detriment, but even if the claimant has relied to detriment on an assurance there can be no proprietary estoppel claim without unconscionability. |
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Canty v Broad |
An oral agreement deliberately made 'subject to contract' cannot be enforced for want of unconscionability |
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Ravenocean v Gardner |
A void executory contract cannot be enforced for want of unconscionability |
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Uglow v Uglow |
A conditional assurance, of which the conditions are not fulfilled, cannot be enforced for want of unconscionability |
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Gillett v Holt |
Unconscionability may exist if the assurance if withdrawn after it is repeated so often that no one could doubt that the landowner meant what they said about the destination of their property on their death -In this case, Mr Holt had promised Mr Gillett over a 40-year-old period that he would be the beneficiary of Mr Holt's will, so when the will was changed to exclude Mr Gillett, and there was unconscionability established |
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Wayling v Jones |
If he claimant engages in bullying, he has behaved unconscionably and no amount of assurance, reliance and detriment is going to be enough to establish estoppel -he who wants equity must behave equitably |
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Murphy v Rayner |
Undue influence by the claimant is unconscionable behaviour that will deny the claimant a proprietary estoppel claim. |
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Walden v Atkins |
An 'inchoate equity', under s16 of the LRA 2002, is a property right but does not give one any specific right until it is enforced. -Court in this case held that it was a property right which was already transferred to the trustee in bankruptcy with all the other property rights |
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Crabb v Arun DC |
Court should do at least the minimum to achieve justice between the parties to 'satsify' the equity in any manner that is appropriate to the case before it -Apart from Orgee v Orgee and Jennings v Rice rules. |
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Bradbury v Burkinshaw |
Remedy might need to be 'proportionate' |
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Henry v Henry |
'Proportionality lies at the heart of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel and permeates its every application'. |
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Thorner v Major |
Claimant got the whole farm. |
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Gillett v Holt |
Claimant got part of the farm and lump sum. |
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Jennings v Rice |
Claimant only got compensation in lieu of proprietary interests. |