The idiom “Hindsight is 20’20’” is not used to boast the reliability of memory when a situation has passed, but to point out the hypocrisy of understanding choices once results are in view, instead of as they were originally presented. Hindsight allows for improbabilities to turn into impossibilities and actions that were uncertain to seem necessary. One's understanding of history is never without someone else's hindsight. Therefore, controlling hindsight is imperative to maintaining public image. In the choice to bomb Hiroshima and the Cuban missile crisis, Truman, Kruschev, and Kennedy were surrounded by clouds of uncertainty, yet afterward, each described their actions as purposeful, successful, and in-line with the moral code that they
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CIA briefings on the day the Cuban Missile Crisis ended claim "those who Khrushchev has hurt are probably chuckling right now," indicating that it was immediately public perception that the Soviets had lost because of Kruschev's weakness. A few weeks later Khrushchev published a full-length memoir about Cuban missile crisis, suggesting that its completion high priority. If Khrushchev had not felt it was imperative to interject his view into the public conversation, he would not have rushed the project. After the dropping of the atomic bomb, there was a long period of near-unanimous American support in which Truman never gave a new explanation of his decision. Truman only ever explained why he dropped the bomb after the American public learned Japan would have surrendered without the bomb and began to feel sympathy towards the Japanese. If Truman wanted the public to remember his choices accurately not solely positively he would have been no more compelled to write about his decisions in that moment compared to the period of unwavering support. Since leaders only gave their side of the story when their legacy was in danger, it appears the purpose of telling one's side of the story for these leaders was to defend their …show more content…
It would be illogical for these documents to be written without the intent of positive public perception, for each choice during the crisis, and that of ending the war in Japan was made with public opinion in mind it was a natural and expected part of their behavior. The only reason Truman was in the business of dropping the bomb was that the United States was unwilling to accept anything less than an unconditional surrender, and the Japanese were willing to surrender if they were permitted to keep their emperor. Truman refused, not because the conditions were unreasonable (the US had to keep the emperor, to avoid the social collapse of Japan) but because US citizens would prefer to hear the term unconditional surrender. Kennedy escalated the Cuban missile crisis, by implementing a blockade, since promised to be harsh on the Campaign Trail and did not want to disappoint the public. Claiming that he would "have been impeached" if what he chose to do did not "look mean" and failing to consider early suggestions of negotiations. In both cases, leaders were willing to make choices that could lead to great destruction and devastation, simply in the name of protecting their own image, illustrating that they valued public perception
CIA briefings on the day the Cuban Missile Crisis ended claim "those who Khrushchev has hurt are probably chuckling right now," indicating that it was immediately public perception that the Soviets had lost because of Kruschev's weakness. A few weeks later Khrushchev published a full-length memoir about Cuban missile crisis, suggesting that its completion high priority. If Khrushchev had not felt it was imperative to interject his view into the public conversation, he would not have rushed the project. After the dropping of the atomic bomb, there was a long period of near-unanimous American support in which Truman never gave a new explanation of his decision. Truman only ever explained why he dropped the bomb after the American public learned Japan would have surrendered without the bomb and began to feel sympathy towards the Japanese. If Truman wanted the public to remember his choices accurately not solely positively he would have been no more compelled to write about his decisions in that moment compared to the period of unwavering support. Since leaders only gave their side of the story when their legacy was in danger, it appears the purpose of telling one's side of the story for these leaders was to defend their …show more content…
It would be illogical for these documents to be written without the intent of positive public perception, for each choice during the crisis, and that of ending the war in Japan was made with public opinion in mind it was a natural and expected part of their behavior. The only reason Truman was in the business of dropping the bomb was that the United States was unwilling to accept anything less than an unconditional surrender, and the Japanese were willing to surrender if they were permitted to keep their emperor. Truman refused, not because the conditions were unreasonable (the US had to keep the emperor, to avoid the social collapse of Japan) but because US citizens would prefer to hear the term unconditional surrender. Kennedy escalated the Cuban missile crisis, by implementing a blockade, since promised to be harsh on the Campaign Trail and did not want to disappoint the public. Claiming that he would "have been impeached" if what he chose to do did not "look mean" and failing to consider early suggestions of negotiations. In both cases, leaders were willing to make choices that could lead to great destruction and devastation, simply in the name of protecting their own image, illustrating that they valued public perception