Accidents happen, yes. But it keeps re-occuring over the last decades or so. Also the cause of accidents are very similar to each other, mainly due to systematic failures, human errors and such. How come we still fail to learn from the causes to prevent it form happenening again? There are a lot of reasearch that shows how human errors and systematic failures cause accidents. Over the last 40 years or so, the shipping industry has focused on improving ship structures, reliability and safety of ship systems to reduce incidents and accidents. Also, to increase productivity and efficiency (Leveson, 2011). It is true that everything has majorly improved from designs, to systems, technologies and navigational equipments. However, there are still
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Based on the investigations, the officers we informed and were aware that there would be an iceberg 48 hours prior to the collision. However, they were confident that everything would be okay and the officers would have calculated the time and safe distance inorder to avoid the iceberg. But they have failed to do so, the officer on watch made a mistake by stopping the engine and giving it a full astern while opperating with the rudder at the same time (Schroder-Hinrichs et al., 2012). This resulted thousands of deaths and casualties. Costa Concordia sank in 2012 and investigations are still on going. Just like Titanic, Costa Concodia hit an underwater rock in Giglio Island, Italy which has caused lost of watertigh integrity and massive flooding causing engines to shut down. The ship then returned to the island and capsized. The master did not reduce the speed when he approached the island, and auto pilot was off. The captain established a safety margin about a kilometre from the point of Le Scole Islands, just south of the main port of Giglio Island. A touristic nagivation should have went off parallel to the coast signalling islanders and sounding the horn of the ship. But, Costa Concodia got as close as 100 meters from the furthermost point taken, hitting an underwater rock with 7.3 metres depth (Schroder-Hinrichs et al., …show more content…
Leveson (2011) approaches this issue of constantly re-occuring events and learning from it which go back for decades but still have not improved over time. Leveson (2011) suggests that the answer can be found by re-examining the underlying assumptions and paradigms in safety. We assume that safety is increased by increasing the reliability of a system components but in reality, a system can be reliable and unsafe or safe but unreliable. One does not imply nor require the other to function harmonously. This is why in some cases such MV Sewol, these two system properties were conflicted, therefore, resulted the capsized. In the Herald of Free Enterprise accident, Leveson (2011) thinks that those making decisions about vessel, and harbour designs, cargo and passsenger management, traffic scheduling and vessel operations were unaware of the impact of their individual decisions on the others and the overall impact of their decisions process and on to the whole system which then caused the ferry to
Based on the investigations, the officers we informed and were aware that there would be an iceberg 48 hours prior to the collision. However, they were confident that everything would be okay and the officers would have calculated the time and safe distance inorder to avoid the iceberg. But they have failed to do so, the officer on watch made a mistake by stopping the engine and giving it a full astern while opperating with the rudder at the same time (Schroder-Hinrichs et al., 2012). This resulted thousands of deaths and casualties. Costa Concordia sank in 2012 and investigations are still on going. Just like Titanic, Costa Concodia hit an underwater rock in Giglio Island, Italy which has caused lost of watertigh integrity and massive flooding causing engines to shut down. The ship then returned to the island and capsized. The master did not reduce the speed when he approached the island, and auto pilot was off. The captain established a safety margin about a kilometre from the point of Le Scole Islands, just south of the main port of Giglio Island. A touristic nagivation should have went off parallel to the coast signalling islanders and sounding the horn of the ship. But, Costa Concodia got as close as 100 meters from the furthermost point taken, hitting an underwater rock with 7.3 metres depth (Schroder-Hinrichs et al., …show more content…
Leveson (2011) approaches this issue of constantly re-occuring events and learning from it which go back for decades but still have not improved over time. Leveson (2011) suggests that the answer can be found by re-examining the underlying assumptions and paradigms in safety. We assume that safety is increased by increasing the reliability of a system components but in reality, a system can be reliable and unsafe or safe but unreliable. One does not imply nor require the other to function harmonously. This is why in some cases such MV Sewol, these two system properties were conflicted, therefore, resulted the capsized. In the Herald of Free Enterprise accident, Leveson (2011) thinks that those making decisions about vessel, and harbour designs, cargo and passsenger management, traffic scheduling and vessel operations were unaware of the impact of their individual decisions on the others and the overall impact of their decisions process and on to the whole system which then caused the ferry to