England, the central nation of the United Kingdom and much of the Western World for centuries, is named for a derivative of the Old English name Englaland, which means "land of the Angles". The Angles are an ancient Germanic people whose presence in history is dated as far back as the first century AD. Since then, the small island nation has grown politically, economically, and territorially. While most of this territorial gain has not been permanent, the British empire was at one point the largest in history, spawning the phrase, “the sun never sets on the British Empire.” In large part, this empire was due to a sense of intense patriotic nationalism and belief in British exceptionalism. The ultimate end goal was to spread British values, institutions, and ways of life to those not blessed to have been born in the British empire, “influenced by the assumption that the colonizing race was superior to the colonized (O’Neil 319). However, there are costs, ones that go beyond the obvious monetary and fiscal concerns. Lives, civilizations, and entire cultures were ruined, something most colonized nations have yet to fully recover from.
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However, a more subtle cost has been one that the British have paid: a decreased feeling of contentment with their place in the world. Similar to how Germany and Italy “felt they had been cut a bad deal” (Chehabi) following World War I, England saw its decline as an empire and the end of the age of Super-Powers as a slight to their history, one which had always been a source of pride and patriotism. Thus, much of the England’s post World War II history has been defined by its need to establish itself as an individual nation, a lone wolf in a world where nations are increasingly banding together, driven by the ideology of Conservative Nationalism. A great deal of the resentment felt by the British can be summarised through the understanding of the phrase “English, not European.” The complex and long history of England and its place as one of the dominant powers of the west lend to the nation a deep rooted, unshakable pride, one that is distinctly it 's own and, in their minds, does not deserve to be lumped in with the other European nations. England, after all, was the home of the Magna Carta and the industrial revolution, perhaps the most successful Constitutional Monarchy in history, and a former massive empire. While many historians question the reasons why democracy flourished in England, the English had no doubt there was “something special” (O’Neil 142) that allowed the tiny island to cast a long shadow. This sense of nationalistic pride pushed into all aspects of life, from the everyday to the political. Having come out of World War II the clear winner and largest remaining power in Europe, England felt it was separate from the others, as if the “us” versus “them” mentality of war was transferred to peace time as “us,” the English, don’t need “them,” everyone else. England, after all, had the Commonwealth, a hodgepodge group of realms, former colonies, and crown subsidiaries, to support itself. In the face of joining the growing political and economic group of the European Union, England turned its back (Chehabi). However, this proved to be ineffective and the promise of a large trading block uninhibited by tariffs was too tempting to resist for the Prime Minister and other Thatcherists, as well as those who believed relying on the Commonwealth was a mistake. England now felt forced to join the EU. In the 1960s, they applied for membership, only to have it vetoed by French President Charles DeGaulle, who felt the English weren’t committed to the cause and would soon abandon them (Chehabi). His successor, however, was more willing to forgive the Commonwealth mistake, and allowed the UK to join. England, like DeGaulle believed, was in it solefully for the economic benefit, not the add-ins or the EU’s original vision of a unified Europe (McWilliams, Piotrowski 386-388). Aside from straight zealous pride, England had other reasons to dislike the EU, each based on its views of nationalism. One of the largest concerns, over the economic risk of helping poorer member nations, was deeply imbedded in the nationalistic idea of national self-reliance. As more and more money was funneled to
However, a more subtle cost has been one that the British have paid: a decreased feeling of contentment with their place in the world. Similar to how Germany and Italy “felt they had been cut a bad deal” (Chehabi) following World War I, England saw its decline as an empire and the end of the age of Super-Powers as a slight to their history, one which had always been a source of pride and patriotism. Thus, much of the England’s post World War II history has been defined by its need to establish itself as an individual nation, a lone wolf in a world where nations are increasingly banding together, driven by the ideology of Conservative Nationalism. A great deal of the resentment felt by the British can be summarised through the understanding of the phrase “English, not European.” The complex and long history of England and its place as one of the dominant powers of the west lend to the nation a deep rooted, unshakable pride, one that is distinctly it 's own and, in their minds, does not deserve to be lumped in with the other European nations. England, after all, was the home of the Magna Carta and the industrial revolution, perhaps the most successful Constitutional Monarchy in history, and a former massive empire. While many historians question the reasons why democracy flourished in England, the English had no doubt there was “something special” (O’Neil 142) that allowed the tiny island to cast a long shadow. This sense of nationalistic pride pushed into all aspects of life, from the everyday to the political. Having come out of World War II the clear winner and largest remaining power in Europe, England felt it was separate from the others, as if the “us” versus “them” mentality of war was transferred to peace time as “us,” the English, don’t need “them,” everyone else. England, after all, had the Commonwealth, a hodgepodge group of realms, former colonies, and crown subsidiaries, to support itself. In the face of joining the growing political and economic group of the European Union, England turned its back (Chehabi). However, this proved to be ineffective and the promise of a large trading block uninhibited by tariffs was too tempting to resist for the Prime Minister and other Thatcherists, as well as those who believed relying on the Commonwealth was a mistake. England now felt forced to join the EU. In the 1960s, they applied for membership, only to have it vetoed by French President Charles DeGaulle, who felt the English weren’t committed to the cause and would soon abandon them (Chehabi). His successor, however, was more willing to forgive the Commonwealth mistake, and allowed the UK to join. England, like DeGaulle believed, was in it solefully for the economic benefit, not the add-ins or the EU’s original vision of a unified Europe (McWilliams, Piotrowski 386-388). Aside from straight zealous pride, England had other reasons to dislike the EU, each based on its views of nationalism. One of the largest concerns, over the economic risk of helping poorer member nations, was deeply imbedded in the nationalistic idea of national self-reliance. As more and more money was funneled to