Mao Zedong: The Cultural Revolution In China

The political and economic turmoil facing China in the decades leading up to the reform era created a climate that lent itself to the essential economic reforms. Sharing much of the Stalinist vision of rapid industrialisation, Mao Zedong invented his own version of a more radical approach to modernisation. Mao’s original plan of a gradual transition to socialism was abandoned in favour of the completion by 1956 of a ‘socialist transformation of agriculture, industry, commerce and handicrafts’ (Zhang, 1996, p. 14). Mao shelved the more moderate Second Five Year Plan with the establishment of the commune in 1958. He also commenced the promotion of ideological uniformity and the Great Leap Forward (Zhang, 1996). The People’s Commune movement and the Great Leap Forward, from 1958 to 1961, interrupted China’s smooth economic growth (Yao, 2005). The goal of the People’s Commune movement was to quickly transform China from a socialist to communist system. As economics lecturer, Shujie Yao concludes, the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Commune movement were the most disastrous economic and political events in China’s modern history, leading to chaos in the economy and society. Consensus among scholars on the disastrous nature of the Great Leap Forward is readily apparent. The economic disruption resulting from the Great Leap Forward was one of several features of the Chinese economy in 1978 that made it ripe for change (Fernández, n.d.). China’s retreat from the Great Leap Forward improved the economy, however, from Mao’s perception, his leadership was in decline. The Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong’s decade long attempt to revive the spirit of the Chinese Revolution, had serious impacts on China as a whole (Lieberthal, 2016). Lasting from 1966 to 1976, the complex social upheaval began as a struggle for influence within the CCP by Mao and other senior leaders. The movement, which called for a continuous revolution, took aim at moderate party members who were ‘taking the capitalist road’ (Bai, 2014). Mao put forward the slogan, ‘grasping revolution, promoting production’ believing that a new type of production, free from revisionist or bourgeois tendencies could emancipate the new forces of production in China (Zhang, 1996). It was believed that this liberation would ultimately lead to a socialist, modern nation. The Cultural Revolution movement saw cities bare the brunt of its policies, with rural areas generally experiencing less turmoil than their urban counterparts (Worden, Savada, & Dolan, 1987). The political upheaval engulfing China disrupted the economy and resulted in the stagnation of Chinese living standards (Shirk, 1993). Political ideology, not economic argument, was what was significant in the era and policy, as a result, was shaped accordingly (Powell, 1992). This negative economic effect is similarly noted by Liang Bai in his 2014 job market paper, where he confirmed ‘the Cultural Revolution was also a disastrous time for the country’s economy’ as regional governments pursued antagonist policies towards private enterprise (p. 12). However, consensus regarding the impact …show more content…
Due to the nature of the Cultural Revolution, which placed an unprecedented emphasis on culture, even those without a political background were targeted and branded as ‘class enemies’ because of their professions, interests or backgrounds (Bai, 2014). This classing led to perhaps the most serious and long-lasting impact on the Chinese economy, the dire shortage of highly educated workers resulting from the closure of universities (Worden et al., 1987). Consequently, the hiatus of higher education limited China’s ability to develop new technology and absorb imported technology for years (Worden et al., …show more content…
The nature of the political unrest and the lack of an economic plan, aided in the significant decline in the overall Chinese economy (Hou, Mead, & Nagahashi, 2005). Moreover, Chinese development plans and polices were frequently interrupted by damaging political movements (Yao, 2005). Similarly, after having witnessed the irrationalities of the communist system in such an extreme form, Chinese citizens and leaders were ready to consider reforming the system (Shirk, 1993). Trust in the moral and political virtue of the Chinese Communist Party similarly eroded during the Cultural Revolution, with some Chinese by 1978 believing that the answer lay in market competition, rather than central planning (Shirk, 1993). As American professor, Susan Shrink (1993) emphasises, the benefit of China’s Cultural Revolution was that it ‘weakened central institution and created a constituency for economic reforms’ (p.