To increase chances of success, strategists can borrow from Clausewitz, where he argues that, war has no distinct boundaries and “its parts are interconnected.” The production of an unchanging set of laws to be employed in all similar contexts of war is not merely useless, but it can become counterproductive and lead to inflexible mentality overwhelmed …show more content…
After being defeated by the Viet Minh in the Indochina war, the French military applied the lesson learned from an elusive enemy that employed the concept of revolutionary warfare to mount counterinsurgency against Algeria rebellion of 1954. France adopted the revolutionary warfare law was passed in 1956 to grant the Armed Forces special powers for the implementation of parallel hierarchies to counter-insurgency warfare in the entire Algerian territory. In particular, this focused on parallel hierarchies of institutions to establish new administration without eliminating the traditional districts to ensure control and pacification. As a result, French Army became present in the daily life of Algerian population that gradually fell from under the influence of the National Liberation Army, as well as the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) …show more content…
This essay pointed out some key reasons as to why militarily powerful states sometimes fail to achieve their desired political outcomes since 1914. The paper also in cooperated lessons learned from various wars which strategists could adapt to increase likelihood of success. Based on the literature, it is evident that political support, adaptability in the battlefield environment, power and military effectiveness, knowing the nature of war, are some of the factors that allows the strategists to increase chances of succeeding or surviving in the warfare. In particular, these factors are critical to enhance military operational capacity through skills, technology, and creation of wartime alliances that increasingly influence the changing conduct of warfare to meet the desired war outcomes