Establishing a reliable and widely accepted definition of the term ‘mental disorder’ is important because it would allow health care professionals to diagnose patients on a consistent basis. Without shared criteria for diagnosing a mental disorder, health care professionals might arrive at diagnoses that are in gross, and potentially harmful, conflict with one another’s. While clinicians may inevitably continue to differ in their diagnoses, their conclusions are in smaller conflict when based on the same criteria. Therefore, the definition of ‘mental disorder’ must be broad enough to accommodate a wide variety of disorders and symptoms, but also specific enough to the focus of an unhealthy mental situation so as to ensure that any mundane or momentary emotion does not qualify as a disorder. Based upon this framework, the DSM-IV’s definition of ‘mental disorder’ is adequate for the purposes of psychiatry. The proposed definition details that the issue must be present over a significant amount of time, either as a recurring pattern or on a continuous basis, so that it can be recognized as more than a momentary lapse. Further, the issue must also be substantial enough that it significantly interferes with personal well-being. However, the definition is inadequate because it allows for the consideration of cultural differences, making it immediately inconsistent across different societies. The DSM-IV’s definition of ‘mental disorder’ adequately serves my perception of a psychiatrist’s duty because the definition details that the individuals qualifying for help are those who endure mental distress, disability, or an elevated likelihood of pain or suffering. I believe the purpose of psychiatry is to aid the mentally disturbed and console the emotionally conflicted. In other terms, a psychiatrist’s purpose is to help people cope with and pursue different, or all, aspects of life if they lack the same abilities or freedoms than that of the statistical norm. The response to the DSM-IV’s definition of ‘mental disorder’ by healthcare experts has not been without controversy.
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Specifically, the opposition to the updated definition of ‘mental health’ emerges from the broadened qualifications for receiving a diagnosis, including the generous accommodation for cultural deviation. As a result, the likelihood of being diagnosed with a mental illness increases by a vast margin. For example, research conducted by Richard Warner, a philosophy professor, verified “that there are many cases of behavior that Western psychiatry would classify as symptomatic of mental disorder, which are not seen within their own cultures as signs of mental illness” (cited in Perring). Permitting a margin of leeway in diagnosing mental disorders by using a loose framework, rather than precise criteria, establishes global inconsistency. To the greatest extreme, the DSM-IV’s definition is in contradiction with itself, therefore imploding its logic and demolishing its purpose as a reliable, shared standard for professionals in diagnosing a patient with a mental disorder. Consider, for example, a young man living in the United States who, under the cultural patterns in this country, does not have a mental disorder. However, if he were to move to India, clinicians would consider a different set of cultural norms, and there the young man may be diagnosed with a mental disorder. The DSM-IV’s definition of ‘mental disorder’ is therefore inadequate because it demolishes psychiatric reliability cross-culturally. The objection against the psychiatric adequacy of DSM-IV’s definition of ‘mental disorder’ succeeds because it establishes distrust in a diagnosis through permitting deviations from the core definition. For example, an individual could be restricted from a necessary treatment
Specifically, the opposition to the updated definition of ‘mental health’ emerges from the broadened qualifications for receiving a diagnosis, including the generous accommodation for cultural deviation. As a result, the likelihood of being diagnosed with a mental illness increases by a vast margin. For example, research conducted by Richard Warner, a philosophy professor, verified “that there are many cases of behavior that Western psychiatry would classify as symptomatic of mental disorder, which are not seen within their own cultures as signs of mental illness” (cited in Perring). Permitting a margin of leeway in diagnosing mental disorders by using a loose framework, rather than precise criteria, establishes global inconsistency. To the greatest extreme, the DSM-IV’s definition is in contradiction with itself, therefore imploding its logic and demolishing its purpose as a reliable, shared standard for professionals in diagnosing a patient with a mental disorder. Consider, for example, a young man living in the United States who, under the cultural patterns in this country, does not have a mental disorder. However, if he were to move to India, clinicians would consider a different set of cultural norms, and there the young man may be diagnosed with a mental disorder. The DSM-IV’s definition of ‘mental disorder’ is therefore inadequate because it demolishes psychiatric reliability cross-culturally. The objection against the psychiatric adequacy of DSM-IV’s definition of ‘mental disorder’ succeeds because it establishes distrust in a diagnosis through permitting deviations from the core definition. For example, an individual could be restricted from a necessary treatment