The military serves primarily as a political tool to further the government’s will, therefore in England’s military failures so too were there failures in the government’s attempts to calm rebellion. The Continental Army was notoriously incompetent as compared to the masterful British army and the fact that the Continental Army was able to win the war is almost unthinkable. The British army should have been able to annihilate the inexperienced Continental Army and extinguish the rebellion, but in their failure the revolution grew and the colonies subsequently succeeded in declaring independence. The New York campaign is, perhaps, the greatest piece of evidence towards this theory: although the British did overpower the Continental Army in New
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John Adams, when discussing the methods in which the Continental Army should improve, remarked that “...America lacked the kind of British aristocracy that encouraged military careers in the manner of the Howe brothers.” (193) This long British tradition of military careers gives a sense of honor that is not present in the Colonies and the Continental Army where the majority of troops “represented the bottom rung of the social ladder.” Apart from the prestige that came with enlistment, the British also had advantage based on the age and experience of their troops: the average British soldier was twenty-eight years old as compared to the twenty-year old American soldier. More important than age is the fact that British troops had an average of seven years of service while the average American had a mere six months, at most. Washington, who was acutely aware of this deficiency, rallied the troops with reassurances that they were “patriots fighting for the noble goal of independence,” while the British were “mercenaries fighting for money.” (85) These words of reassurance are ripe with the naïve hope of the “spirit of ’76:” the Americans were no match for the skilled British army …show more content…
To begin with, there were differing strategic opinions on the British side between General Howe and Henry Clinton that caused conflict: Clinton believed that the best method would be to destroy the Continental Army by blocking their exit from both Long Island and Manhattan, while Howe believed that the ultimate goal should be to capture New York “which would then become the base of operations for the British army and navy for the decisive campaign to close the Hudson corridor and isolate New England.” (133) Despite the discrepancy in strategy among the British, they were still more than able to defeat the Americans in most battles that made up the New York campaign, though their wish to shock “the leadership of the American rebellion into the realization that their glorious cause was, in truth, a hopeless waste of blood and treasure,” (153) was not satisfied just by winning this campaign. In fact, the victory of the British in New York was merely a lesson to Washington that “his goal was not to win the war, but rather not lose it,” (205) which was exactly what he did in New York, allowing the Continental Army, however unskilled, to win the war in the
John Adams, when discussing the methods in which the Continental Army should improve, remarked that “...America lacked the kind of British aristocracy that encouraged military careers in the manner of the Howe brothers.” (193) This long British tradition of military careers gives a sense of honor that is not present in the Colonies and the Continental Army where the majority of troops “represented the bottom rung of the social ladder.” Apart from the prestige that came with enlistment, the British also had advantage based on the age and experience of their troops: the average British soldier was twenty-eight years old as compared to the twenty-year old American soldier. More important than age is the fact that British troops had an average of seven years of service while the average American had a mere six months, at most. Washington, who was acutely aware of this deficiency, rallied the troops with reassurances that they were “patriots fighting for the noble goal of independence,” while the British were “mercenaries fighting for money.” (85) These words of reassurance are ripe with the naïve hope of the “spirit of ’76:” the Americans were no match for the skilled British army …show more content…
To begin with, there were differing strategic opinions on the British side between General Howe and Henry Clinton that caused conflict: Clinton believed that the best method would be to destroy the Continental Army by blocking their exit from both Long Island and Manhattan, while Howe believed that the ultimate goal should be to capture New York “which would then become the base of operations for the British army and navy for the decisive campaign to close the Hudson corridor and isolate New England.” (133) Despite the discrepancy in strategy among the British, they were still more than able to defeat the Americans in most battles that made up the New York campaign, though their wish to shock “the leadership of the American rebellion into the realization that their glorious cause was, in truth, a hopeless waste of blood and treasure,” (153) was not satisfied just by winning this campaign. In fact, the victory of the British in New York was merely a lesson to Washington that “his goal was not to win the war, but rather not lose it,” (205) which was exactly what he did in New York, allowing the Continental Army, however unskilled, to win the war in the