Tarrow claims that his explanation of participation in collective movement escapes the logical quagmire of free-ridership. However, we should remember that the free-rider problem arises solely because neoclassical economics assumes the lone motivation of the self. Within this unidimensional behavioral assumption of the Homo economicus, the showing of other incentives will not get us out of the free-rider problem. For a theoretical explanation of collective action, we must enlarge the fundamental assumption of human rationality. If one accepts commitment, ideology, or group utility based on collective identity as valid motivations for rational action, the free-rider problem ceases to
Tarrow claims that his explanation of participation in collective movement escapes the logical quagmire of free-ridership. However, we should remember that the free-rider problem arises solely because neoclassical economics assumes the lone motivation of the self. Within this unidimensional behavioral assumption of the Homo economicus, the showing of other incentives will not get us out of the free-rider problem. For a theoretical explanation of collective action, we must enlarge the fundamental assumption of human rationality. If one accepts commitment, ideology, or group utility based on collective identity as valid motivations for rational action, the free-rider problem ceases to