The test should be whether the evidence and questions relating to it was nevertheless so relevant to the issue of consent that to exclude it would endanger the fairness or the trial under Article 6 ECHR. Nonetheless, one wonders why their Lordships would even think that the complainant’s previous sexual behaviour with a third party or the defendant himself would be relevant to the alleged rape. Lord Slynn recognised the problem that to allow such evidence would be unfair to the complainant as it may lead the jury to accept the fact that having consensual sex once means that any future sex was with the woman’s consent and that the evidence of an unchaste woman is less credible. However, his Lordship stated that “men or women in the street would find it strange that evidence of two young people, who had lived together or in a happy relationship had had sexual acts together, must be wholly excluded on the issue of consent unless it is immediately contemporaneous”. Lord Steyn adopted the same approach where he stated that “as a matter of common sense, a prior sexual relationship between the complainant and the defendant may be relevant to the issue of consent” and “good sense suggests that is may be relevant to an issue of consent whether the complainant and the accused were ongoing lovers or strangers” . It is argued that such “common sense” approach was based on Dworkin’s account of law which is an interpretative process and consists of rules and principles. The rule is that the evidence of previous sexual behaviour should not be adduced but when the judges interpreted this law, they referred to the underlie principle which is common sense that once women consented to have sex with a guy in the past, they are more likely than not consenting to the current alleged rape. However, it is argued that this interpretation is based
The test should be whether the evidence and questions relating to it was nevertheless so relevant to the issue of consent that to exclude it would endanger the fairness or the trial under Article 6 ECHR. Nonetheless, one wonders why their Lordships would even think that the complainant’s previous sexual behaviour with a third party or the defendant himself would be relevant to the alleged rape. Lord Slynn recognised the problem that to allow such evidence would be unfair to the complainant as it may lead the jury to accept the fact that having consensual sex once means that any future sex was with the woman’s consent and that the evidence of an unchaste woman is less credible. However, his Lordship stated that “men or women in the street would find it strange that evidence of two young people, who had lived together or in a happy relationship had had sexual acts together, must be wholly excluded on the issue of consent unless it is immediately contemporaneous”. Lord Steyn adopted the same approach where he stated that “as a matter of common sense, a prior sexual relationship between the complainant and the defendant may be relevant to the issue of consent” and “good sense suggests that is may be relevant to an issue of consent whether the complainant and the accused were ongoing lovers or strangers” . It is argued that such “common sense” approach was based on Dworkin’s account of law which is an interpretative process and consists of rules and principles. The rule is that the evidence of previous sexual behaviour should not be adduced but when the judges interpreted this law, they referred to the underlie principle which is common sense that once women consented to have sex with a guy in the past, they are more likely than not consenting to the current alleged rape. However, it is argued that this interpretation is based