As we turn to the issue of atheism, I believe some framework is necessary. Atheism is typically defined as a lack of belief in God and it is in the definition of God that the issue arises. Clearly, the two philosophers have a different definition of the word God. As hopefully made clear in the second and third paragraph, Spinoza thinks that God is an impersonal summation of all things (i.e. substance), while Berkeley thinks that God is a personal, thinking thing responsible for but distinct from ideas. If atheism is defined by a lack of belief in Berkeley's God, then Spinoza is an atheist. Yet Spinoza does not operate on this definition, so he would think the label of atheist unfair. I am not going to claim that one definition is more correct
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If I do not have to worry about the number of assumptions I make in an argument, then I can put forth some rather extravagant explanations for what mind and matter truly is in our world. Perhaps I am a recreated memory of some highly-advanced civilization’s leader, who wanted to see how his ancestors lived before they discovered once and for all that matter is made up of former minds that decided they were sick of thinking so often, and so they decided to become chairs and grass and coffee beans. (Skeptics’ minds make a better brew, I am told). Now, let us say I publically support this opinion and at my pulpit, preaching the truth of mind coffee, I am encountered by an adherent to Berkeley’s immaterialism, who tells me I am being ridiculous. If I pressed them on why I am being ridiculous, sooner or later they are bound to tell me I have no grounds on which to base my theory and make too many assumptions. If I refuse to accept this as an invalidation, I doubt they would accept my refusal, and though I’m sure the irony would be lost on Berkeley’s supporter, an on looking Humean might appreciate it. Still, if the Berkeley advocate does accept my refusal, I cannot imagine what other way they might have of invalidating my theory. How can anyone disprove my fantastical theory if simplicity is off the table? I do not see why we should depart from Occam’s razor for Berkeley’s theory, but not for mine, no matter how stupid mine appears. Again, if we dismiss simplicity, I am still not disproving Berkeley’s theory, but his argument cannot claim the high ground to any other under this
If I do not have to worry about the number of assumptions I make in an argument, then I can put forth some rather extravagant explanations for what mind and matter truly is in our world. Perhaps I am a recreated memory of some highly-advanced civilization’s leader, who wanted to see how his ancestors lived before they discovered once and for all that matter is made up of former minds that decided they were sick of thinking so often, and so they decided to become chairs and grass and coffee beans. (Skeptics’ minds make a better brew, I am told). Now, let us say I publically support this opinion and at my pulpit, preaching the truth of mind coffee, I am encountered by an adherent to Berkeley’s immaterialism, who tells me I am being ridiculous. If I pressed them on why I am being ridiculous, sooner or later they are bound to tell me I have no grounds on which to base my theory and make too many assumptions. If I refuse to accept this as an invalidation, I doubt they would accept my refusal, and though I’m sure the irony would be lost on Berkeley’s supporter, an on looking Humean might appreciate it. Still, if the Berkeley advocate does accept my refusal, I cannot imagine what other way they might have of invalidating my theory. How can anyone disprove my fantastical theory if simplicity is off the table? I do not see why we should depart from Occam’s razor for Berkeley’s theory, but not for mine, no matter how stupid mine appears. Again, if we dismiss simplicity, I am still not disproving Berkeley’s theory, but his argument cannot claim the high ground to any other under this