The independence of regulatory agencies indicates that they can operate without political interference and this ‘independence’ means protection from interference from the political power, particularly from the executive branch through ‘for-cause removal protection’ or through specified terms of tenure with their independence granted by legislation or the Constitution and mechanisms such as collegial membership . For Brown and others:
The key characteristic of the independent regulator model is decision-making independence. This means that the regulator’s decisions are made without the prior approval of any government entity, and no entity other than a court or a pre-established appellate panel can overrule the regulator’s decisions. The institutional building blocks for decision making independence are organizational independence (organizationally separate from ministries and departments), financial independence (an earmarked, secure and adequate source of funding), and management independence (autonomy over internal independence and protection from dismissal without due cause). In the United States the first independent regulatory agency was the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) established in 1887 with five commissioners appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate . These agencies are considered part of the ‘fourth branch of government’ and enjoy constitutional protection , although they are not part of the Constitution and they are to be distinguished from ‘executive agencies’ which are controlled by the Presidency . What is unique about independent agencies is that ‘they adjudicate, that is, decide contested matters, on a case by case basis. They make policy, whether through the formal/informal method of rulemaking, or by proclaiming standards and rules of conduct. They also prosecute for civil violations of the statutes they administer’. In Texas, the Railroad Commission of Texas provides a good example of an independent agency in the State of Texas responsible for the regulation of the oil and gas industry and the award of drilling licenses in State lands: The Railroad Commission, through its Oil and Gas Division, regulates the exploration, production, and transportation of oil and natural gas in Texas. Its statutory role is to (1) prevent waste of the state's natural resources, (2) to protect the correlative rights of different interest owners, (3) to prevent pollution, and (4) to provide safety in matters such as hydrogen sulfide. What is unique about the Railroad Commission is that its commissioners are elected officials and this gives them a stronger legitimacy that is supported by a direct democratic mandate, contrary to other independent agencies . In the United States, independent federal …show more content…
The agent-principal relationship is between Congress (the principal) and the independent Agency (the agent), as Posner argues:
one is delegation of authority by legislatures to administrative agencies. As mentioned earlier, legislatures cannot continuously regulate a complex area; they must delegate much of the regulatory function either to courts or to administrative agencies. In the area of economic regulation the legislative choice has generally been the administrative agency rather than the court.
As mentioned before, the establishment of independent regulatory agencies has led to the rise of the ‘regulatory state’ as a policy tool and the waning of the centralised system of regulation. As Majone explains:
among the most obvious structural consequences of the shift to a regulatory mode of governance is the rise of a new breed of specialised agencies and commissions operating at arm’s length from central
The key characteristic of the independent regulator model is decision-making independence. This means that the regulator’s decisions are made without the prior approval of any government entity, and no entity other than a court or a pre-established appellate panel can overrule the regulator’s decisions. The institutional building blocks for decision making independence are organizational independence (organizationally separate from ministries and departments), financial independence (an earmarked, secure and adequate source of funding), and management independence (autonomy over internal independence and protection from dismissal without due cause). In the United States the first independent regulatory agency was the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) established in 1887 with five commissioners appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate . These agencies are considered part of the ‘fourth branch of government’ and enjoy constitutional protection , although they are not part of the Constitution and they are to be distinguished from ‘executive agencies’ which are controlled by the Presidency . What is unique about independent agencies is that ‘they adjudicate, that is, decide contested matters, on a case by case basis. They make policy, whether through the formal/informal method of rulemaking, or by proclaiming standards and rules of conduct. They also prosecute for civil violations of the statutes they administer’. In Texas, the Railroad Commission of Texas provides a good example of an independent agency in the State of Texas responsible for the regulation of the oil and gas industry and the award of drilling licenses in State lands: The Railroad Commission, through its Oil and Gas Division, regulates the exploration, production, and transportation of oil and natural gas in Texas. Its statutory role is to (1) prevent waste of the state's natural resources, (2) to protect the correlative rights of different interest owners, (3) to prevent pollution, and (4) to provide safety in matters such as hydrogen sulfide. What is unique about the Railroad Commission is that its commissioners are elected officials and this gives them a stronger legitimacy that is supported by a direct democratic mandate, contrary to other independent agencies . In the United States, independent federal …show more content…
The agent-principal relationship is between Congress (the principal) and the independent Agency (the agent), as Posner argues:
one is delegation of authority by legislatures to administrative agencies. As mentioned earlier, legislatures cannot continuously regulate a complex area; they must delegate much of the regulatory function either to courts or to administrative agencies. In the area of economic regulation the legislative choice has generally been the administrative agency rather than the court.
As mentioned before, the establishment of independent regulatory agencies has led to the rise of the ‘regulatory state’ as a policy tool and the waning of the centralised system of regulation. As Majone explains:
among the most obvious structural consequences of the shift to a regulatory mode of governance is the rise of a new breed of specialised agencies and commissions operating at arm’s length from central