There are four major groups of theories about the recent party realignment of the South. These theories focus on race class; ideology; religion/culture; and party development. Studies utilizing all four explanations focus on changes in partisanship. Partisanship can be thought of as a voter’s political brand preference. Ultimately, each of these theories seeks to explain why people change their partisanship.
Theories that Focus on Race
Many theories of southern political change focus on race. The basic idea of these theories is that as the parties changed on issues related to race, racist and racial conservatives went from voting for Democratic candidates to voting for Republican candidates. This happened in conjunction with a shift among black voters away from the Republican Party and towards the Democratic Party. One variation of a race-based theory of political change among whites focuses on the “black threat.” The theory of “black threat” holds that increased black participation in politics drove whites from the Democratic Party. Whites, the theory holds, viewed increased black participation as diluting their political influence (Black 2004). “Black threat” theory suggests that Republican voting and registration were concentrated among lower SES (socioeconomic status) whites (Giles and Hertz 1994). Some empirical research supports this view. For example, using registration data from Louisiana for the period 1975-1990, Giles and Hertz found that lower class whites increasingly registered as Republicans in communities with higher black voter registration. Further support for this theory was found using data from the 1990 Senate and 1991 Governor’s elections involving David Duke, an outspoken white supremacist and former leader of the Ku Klux Klan and Republican candidate. His campaigns tended to focus on racial messages. Giles and Buckner found that lower SES rural whites were more likely than other white voters to support David Duke (1993). However, this study has been criticized as flawed. Voss found that there were problems with both the data and with the methods (1996). He found that urban parishes were grouped together for data analyses without adequate reason, that necessary variables were omitted from models, and the authors used OLS () when GLS () would have been more appropriate for their data. When the data was analyzed correctly, Giles and Buckner’s results did not obtain statistical significance. Further, the data showed that while realignment and redistricting both had strong positive effects on the inroads Republicans made in southern legislatures, it was not the case that white-backlash played much of a role in this development (Lublin and Voss 2000). One version of “black threat” theory holds that whites tend to vote more Republican in places blacks made up a larger proportion of the population (Strong 1960). This …show more content…
For example, Republican congressional candidates in the South during the 1980s and early 1990s, campaigned against extending the Voting Rights Act. In addition, many argued that Democrats were “buying” the black vote. While such candidates generally presented policies such as the Voting Rights Act as unfair – that is, antithetical to states’ rights, and needlessly interventionist—some Republican candidates explicitly stated that these efforts to raise blacks up were hurting …show more content…
The evidence suggests that the answer is yes. For example, findings show that racial conservatives were more likely to vote for Republican John McCain in the 2008 presidential general election, and for Hillary Clinton in the Democratic primary in 2008 (Tesler and Sears 2010, Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2011) than their opponents. Moreover, studies show that racial conservatives have supported black candidates less than white candidates in elections for lower level offices. There is evidence that the effects of symbolic racism on white southerners have manifested themselves only recently (Knuckey 2005). For example, Knuckey analyzed the effect of racial conservatism on party identification from 1990-2000 among southern whites (2005). His findings reached statistical significance starting in 1994. Symbolic racism was seen as a factor that reinforced partisan and ideological voting effects. A racially conservative Democrat still had greater than 50 percent chance of voting for Obama in 2008. This was partially because the parties were polarized based upon racial dispositions. White southern Republicans were overwhelmingly racially conservative and whites southern Democrats were overwhelmingly racially liberal. Because of this polarization, even subtle racial appeals would be deemed unnecessary and would be replaced by partisan
Theories that Focus on Race
Many theories of southern political change focus on race. The basic idea of these theories is that as the parties changed on issues related to race, racist and racial conservatives went from voting for Democratic candidates to voting for Republican candidates. This happened in conjunction with a shift among black voters away from the Republican Party and towards the Democratic Party. One variation of a race-based theory of political change among whites focuses on the “black threat.” The theory of “black threat” holds that increased black participation in politics drove whites from the Democratic Party. Whites, the theory holds, viewed increased black participation as diluting their political influence (Black 2004). “Black threat” theory suggests that Republican voting and registration were concentrated among lower SES (socioeconomic status) whites (Giles and Hertz 1994). Some empirical research supports this view. For example, using registration data from Louisiana for the period 1975-1990, Giles and Hertz found that lower class whites increasingly registered as Republicans in communities with higher black voter registration. Further support for this theory was found using data from the 1990 Senate and 1991 Governor’s elections involving David Duke, an outspoken white supremacist and former leader of the Ku Klux Klan and Republican candidate. His campaigns tended to focus on racial messages. Giles and Buckner found that lower SES rural whites were more likely than other white voters to support David Duke (1993). However, this study has been criticized as flawed. Voss found that there were problems with both the data and with the methods (1996). He found that urban parishes were grouped together for data analyses without adequate reason, that necessary variables were omitted from models, and the authors used OLS () when GLS () would have been more appropriate for their data. When the data was analyzed correctly, Giles and Buckner’s results did not obtain statistical significance. Further, the data showed that while realignment and redistricting both had strong positive effects on the inroads Republicans made in southern legislatures, it was not the case that white-backlash played much of a role in this development (Lublin and Voss 2000). One version of “black threat” theory holds that whites tend to vote more Republican in places blacks made up a larger proportion of the population (Strong 1960). This …show more content…
For example, Republican congressional candidates in the South during the 1980s and early 1990s, campaigned against extending the Voting Rights Act. In addition, many argued that Democrats were “buying” the black vote. While such candidates generally presented policies such as the Voting Rights Act as unfair – that is, antithetical to states’ rights, and needlessly interventionist—some Republican candidates explicitly stated that these efforts to raise blacks up were hurting …show more content…
The evidence suggests that the answer is yes. For example, findings show that racial conservatives were more likely to vote for Republican John McCain in the 2008 presidential general election, and for Hillary Clinton in the Democratic primary in 2008 (Tesler and Sears 2010, Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2011) than their opponents. Moreover, studies show that racial conservatives have supported black candidates less than white candidates in elections for lower level offices. There is evidence that the effects of symbolic racism on white southerners have manifested themselves only recently (Knuckey 2005). For example, Knuckey analyzed the effect of racial conservatism on party identification from 1990-2000 among southern whites (2005). His findings reached statistical significance starting in 1994. Symbolic racism was seen as a factor that reinforced partisan and ideological voting effects. A racially conservative Democrat still had greater than 50 percent chance of voting for Obama in 2008. This was partially because the parties were polarized based upon racial dispositions. White southern Republicans were overwhelmingly racially conservative and whites southern Democrats were overwhelmingly racially liberal. Because of this polarization, even subtle racial appeals would be deemed unnecessary and would be replaced by partisan