Napoleon pushed his men; he pushed them beyond their logistical means and diminishing physical capabilities which were exacerbated due to lack of rations and supplies. This mistake in judgement for Napoleon as articulated by Gompert et al, “Napoleon did not dwell on how vastly different war in Russia would be compared with the wars that formed his experience and conditioned his thinking. Intuition is no match for unfamiliar situations. Evidently, self-doubt and reflection were as difficult for Napoleon as humility was” (46). On top of luring the Grand Armée through Russia, Czar Alexander also implemented a scorched earth policy, meaning, as the Russian Army retreated they would set fire to the land and structures in and around the areas they abandoned so that the French could not use the crops for food or the buildings for shelter. Then Moscow Governor-General Fyodor Rostopchin “ordered Moscow should burn to the ground rather than be possessed by the French” (Fisher, 2006). After a defeat at the Battle of Vinkovo, the French Emperor believed that if he left Russia now, it would appear as though he had been defeated. He instead chose to make one last ditch effort to move south to fight again. Here, Napoleon sealed his army’s fate with the decision to fight the Battle of Maloyaroslavets. His army lost more troops and the most amount of artillery pieces in any given battle, encouraging the Russian Army that the tides of war were now shifting in their favor. Napoleon’s Grand Armée could no longer fight and survive in the harsh winter conditions, so and so states, “The retreat from Moscow, as we know, was a catastrophe for those still dragging themselves through the
Napoleon pushed his men; he pushed them beyond their logistical means and diminishing physical capabilities which were exacerbated due to lack of rations and supplies. This mistake in judgement for Napoleon as articulated by Gompert et al, “Napoleon did not dwell on how vastly different war in Russia would be compared with the wars that formed his experience and conditioned his thinking. Intuition is no match for unfamiliar situations. Evidently, self-doubt and reflection were as difficult for Napoleon as humility was” (46). On top of luring the Grand Armée through Russia, Czar Alexander also implemented a scorched earth policy, meaning, as the Russian Army retreated they would set fire to the land and structures in and around the areas they abandoned so that the French could not use the crops for food or the buildings for shelter. Then Moscow Governor-General Fyodor Rostopchin “ordered Moscow should burn to the ground rather than be possessed by the French” (Fisher, 2006). After a defeat at the Battle of Vinkovo, the French Emperor believed that if he left Russia now, it would appear as though he had been defeated. He instead chose to make one last ditch effort to move south to fight again. Here, Napoleon sealed his army’s fate with the decision to fight the Battle of Maloyaroslavets. His army lost more troops and the most amount of artillery pieces in any given battle, encouraging the Russian Army that the tides of war were now shifting in their favor. Napoleon’s Grand Armée could no longer fight and survive in the harsh winter conditions, so and so states, “The retreat from Moscow, as we know, was a catastrophe for those still dragging themselves through the