This paper attempts to understand and critically examine the role played by moral judgments in historiography. It also discusses the views held by three prominent historians, i.e., E.H. Carr, Marc Bloch, and R.G. Collingwood on this topic.
One of the long standing and important issues in the philosophy of history is the permissibility or desirability of moral judgments. Historians in our own time continue to be wary of rendering explicit moral pronouncements, thinking it a derogation of their obligations. On occasion, some historians have been moved to embrace the opposite attitude, especially when considering the horrendous events of the twentieth century—the holocaust, …show more content…
To assess reasonableness of the beliefs held by Darwin and Haeckel in this instance, a historian would have to scrutinize what the scientific consensus happened to be in the second half of the nineteenth century. And in this case, a modestly diligent historian would discover that the community of evolutionary theorists, as well as other biologists, did understand the human races to stand in a hierarchy, just as did other animals that displayed a scale of traits. In the case of humans, these traits included those of intelligence, moral character, and beauty. Nineteenth-century evolutionary theory implied that conclusion, and all of the available evidence supported it. We might recognize from our perspective certain social factors constraining the judgments of biologists; but it’s safe to say they did …show more content…
The moral nature of their work is inescapable. In fact, forging a connection between the individual and the past is good writing. No matter the attempts made at trying to maintain objectivity in their arguments, it is necessarily tempered by the moral nature of emotive narratives. However, historians can preserve the objectivity of their arguments even as they participate in “moral conversations.” A historian must be able to balance a moral sensitivity to the injustices of the past with the kind of detachment that is necessary to fulfill his responsibility as a historian. When we look at the atrocities of the past few centuries, it would seem inhumane to describe them in morally neutral terms. However, even about events of this kind, any moral judgment ought to be delivered as obiter dicta, not really part of the objective account of these events. A clean depiction of individuals and actions would naturally provoke readers into making their own moral judgments about the past, without the historian coercing their