Keohane And Martin's The False Promise Of Institutionist Theory

Following Mearsheimer’s assessment and critique of liberal institutionalism birthed the reply, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory”, coauthored by Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin. In this article, Keohane and Martin display their critique of realism and evidence for the impact of institutions on the international scene. They begin with outlaying what they affirm are the faults in Mearsheimer’s critique against them in “The False Promise of International Institutions.” Keohane and Martin summarize, “Realism is replete with global generalizations, lacking qualifications about the conditions under which they may be valid” (Keohane & Martin, 1995, pg. 41). By this statement, it is clear that Keohane and Martin believe Mearsheimer’s explanation …show more content…
“How are we to account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding international institutions, if such institutions are lacking in significance?” (Keohane & Martin, 1995, pg. 40). Institutions are designed to enable cooperation in both security and economy because an institution’s main function is to be a secure conduit of information. Keohane and Martin reason, “Institutionalist theory should be highly applicable to security issues because its argument revolves around the role of institutions in providing information” (Keohane & Martin, 1995, pg. 43). This is in direct response to Mearsheimer’s assumption that institutionalist theory only applies to political economic issues. Keohane and Martin would like to assert that institutions are actually perfectly suited to function in both because of their capacity to handle information. Continuing to pick apart Mearsheimer’s view of institutionalist theory, Keohane and Martin prop up institutions as the answer to the problem of cooperation. As institutions are designed to relay information, Keohane and Martin assert, “institutions can mitigate fears of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge, so can they alleviate fears of unequal gains from cooperation” (Keohane & Martin, 1995, pg. 45). In this light, institutions appear to the perfect solution to Mearsheimer’s claims that states have difficulty cooperating in response to fears of cheating, and unequal gains. By becoming the neutral common ground through which to share ideas and handle information, institutions are painted as the perfect conduit through which to get states to overcome short-term goals in favor of realizing more beneficial long-term