This broke up into two categories: With warning/prior attempts at negotiations and an attack without warning. It was decided that an attack without a warning stood against American values. In other words, a surprise attack would make us look like Japan had in Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, an airstrike followed by an invasion was favored by a strong majority of the ExComms. But the further the group discussed the idea of an attack, the longer the list of cons grew. The biggest concern was the un-clarity of whether or not the missiles in Cuba were complete or not. The CIA believed that the warheads that the Soviet Union were trying to bring over were the first Cuba would see, but reconnaissance planes said otherwise. Thirty years after the conflict, Robert McNamara (who was Secretary of Defense during the Cuban Missile Crisis) wrote in his book, “It wasn't until January, 1992, in a meeting chaired by Castro in Havana, Cuba, that I learned 162 nuclear warheads, including 90 tactical warheads, were on the island at the time of this critical moment of the crisis. I couldn't believe what I was hearing, and Castro got very angry with me because I said, ‘Mr. President, let's stop this meeting. This is totally new to me, I'm not sure I got the translation right.’” The current head of the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command, General Walter Sweeney, also noted during one of the ExComm meetings, “We have the finest air force in the world. If we can’t do the job, nobody can. But can I say there is no chance that one or two missiles and nuclear warheads might still be operational, and can still be fired, after the attack? No, Mr. President, I can’t say
This broke up into two categories: With warning/prior attempts at negotiations and an attack without warning. It was decided that an attack without a warning stood against American values. In other words, a surprise attack would make us look like Japan had in Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, an airstrike followed by an invasion was favored by a strong majority of the ExComms. But the further the group discussed the idea of an attack, the longer the list of cons grew. The biggest concern was the un-clarity of whether or not the missiles in Cuba were complete or not. The CIA believed that the warheads that the Soviet Union were trying to bring over were the first Cuba would see, but reconnaissance planes said otherwise. Thirty years after the conflict, Robert McNamara (who was Secretary of Defense during the Cuban Missile Crisis) wrote in his book, “It wasn't until January, 1992, in a meeting chaired by Castro in Havana, Cuba, that I learned 162 nuclear warheads, including 90 tactical warheads, were on the island at the time of this critical moment of the crisis. I couldn't believe what I was hearing, and Castro got very angry with me because I said, ‘Mr. President, let's stop this meeting. This is totally new to me, I'm not sure I got the translation right.’” The current head of the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command, General Walter Sweeney, also noted during one of the ExComm meetings, “We have the finest air force in the world. If we can’t do the job, nobody can. But can I say there is no chance that one or two missiles and nuclear warheads might still be operational, and can still be fired, after the attack? No, Mr. President, I can’t say