Knizet discusses why the 3rd circuit court in Philadelphia rejected an asylum case similar to one accepted by the 9th circuit court in San Francisco. She looks at how their decisions relate to definitions and purpose of the Refugee Act and past Supreme court cases in order to determine which standard is right. With an analytical and qualitative approach, Knizet compares Sael v. Ashcroft with Lie v. Ashcroft. She looks at the principles in the Refugee Act, INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca and INS v. Kotasz, human rights law, and explains the burden of proof tests. Both Lie and Sael applied for asylum fearing further persecution by the majority population in Indonesia because of their Chinese Christian identities. …show more content…
The US signed, though not ratified, a UN protocol agreeing it would help refugees whose rights have been abused and to not repatriate them if it puts there life and freedom at danger (130). INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, in which a person seeks political asylum, ruled that a “reasonable possibility of persecution,” and not a “more than likely” proof is sufficient as evidence for fear and deems them eligible for asylum (131). Knizet explains that this case also intended to expand asylum to countries with oppressive governments (132). INS v. Kotasz, in which a member of an activist group feared police brutality, ruled that disfavored group membership is another grounds by which courts can grant asylum (137). Knizet explains that the disfavored group evidence is applied only by the 9th circuit court in the entire US (136). Knizet also explains that the Refugee Act had a human rights intention to protect refugees. She argues that the 3rd Circuit court minimized the fear of asylum applicants and limited asylum eligibility, also going against legislators’ goal of extending eligibility to more refugees