Influence Of Congress In Douglas Kriner's After The Rubicon

In his book, After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War, author Douglas Kriner delves into the murky concept of congressional influence in the arena of the United States’ increasingly executive-driven military engagements. Kriner analyzes the ways, both formal and informal, that Congress exercises affect over presidential actions in the international sphere. The publication addresses the regularity with which Congress seeks to influence presidential conduct of major military affairs by engaging in the policymaking process. Additionally, Kriner parses the significance of congressional influence to military action when opposition arises from the president’s party as well as the role of influence when the opposition party supports the president in the middle of an inherited war. Kriner accepts the expansion of executive power since the imperialistic eras of Johnson and Nixon as a given, however, his book aims to illuminate the ways in which Congress shapes the decisions made by the commander-in-chief even when lacking legal recourse to compel the abandonment of his preferred policy course. Through case studies of operations in Grenada, Somalia, and Afghanistan, Kriner analyzes the various ways in which Congress utilizes indirect pathways in order to influence the wartime decisions of the executive branch. Kriner’s introductory chapter accepts that the president must be the conductor of war as commander-in-chief, however, the author also cites James Madison’s words that “[t]hose who are to conduct a war [c]annot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded.” Noting the tendency of recent presidents to exercise executive latitudes regarding wartime action, Kriner eschews the constitutionality of the shift, instead choosing to illuminate the ways in which Congress continues to influence the commander-in-chief despite the president’s ever-increasing wartime powers. In light of the ongoing debate as to where war powers lie, Kriner reflects on the Constitutional decision Congress’s ability to “declare” instead “make” war—the impetus of the debate. However, since the “imperial presidencies" of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, the power to initiate warfare resides heavily with the president. Kriner offers that Congress has two ways to challenge the president once military action begins, suggesting that as information accrues the initial informational advantages that the president exploits in order to demand congressional deference are mitigated. Second to this, Kriner notes that legislators engage in creative legislative maneuvers to constrain or direct the actions of the commander-in-chief once troops have been deployed. Furthermore, the author notes Congress's assertion of concrete, constitutional, legislative powers as historically weak. Additionally, he offers that most congressional attempts to rein in any presidential powers exerted during times of war have been relative failures. In the most straightforward sense, Kriner’s book illuminates the main factors driving presidential use of force as well as the congressional influence exercised by the legislature over the president in the military arena. Despite the perception of the president as the definitive authority on all military action abroad, Kriner asserts that Congress continues to maintain a level of influence over the executive’s actions by way of indirect means. First, Kriner cites Operation Urgent Fury in Somalia, wherein the Reagan Administration sought to combat communist expansion in Latin American countries. Kriner notes Congress’s mixed reaction to Reagan’s order to invade Lebanon, with some Democrats denouncing the move, others standing behind the president “in a time of international crisis”, and Republicans generally supporting the endeavor. The ambivalent reaction resulted in proposed legislation to limit the duration of military contact in Grenada. Congress challenged the unilateral assertions of presidential military power, and launched investigations into the administration's pretext for war and costs of the campaign. However, the public rallied behind the president and the …show more content…
However, Kriner’s book intentionally shies away from examining the extent to which the executive branch has commandeered Congress’s power to declare war and effectively made it an executive decision, although the author acknowledges the subversion several times in his publication. If we are to accept that Congress has conceded the power of war to the executive branch, then Kriner at the very least offers consolation in that Congress remains the integral arbiter of approval in regard to wartime actions undertaken by the