However, if I were Kant, I would claim that the Principle of Humanity can indeed account for the infants and other mentally disabled persons. Firstly, Kant makes it clear that regardless of whether a person is a rationally autonomous agent, Kant considers the life of any human to be “infinitely precious” (Shafer-Landau 2010, 23), therefore, if a rationally autonomous person should always be treated as an “end” then so would any infant or mentally disabled person due to their equivalent value. Secondly, infants and mentally disabled people still have the potential and capability to become fully rational autonomous agents in the future. For example, babies eventually will develop into full grown adults and possess the ability to resist temptation and hold responsibility for their actions. In addition, mentally disabled people always have the possibility of curing the source of their mental illness or at least reducing the quality of their mental disabilities through the assistance of therapy and medical drugs in order to become autonomous and rational agents. Lastly, although people share a close fondness to their animals, I would argue that the Principle of Humanity need not be able to account for animals as creatures worthy of being treated as “ends” because they possess neither humanity nor are they rationally autonomous agents. Similarly to how we use livestock as “mere means”, pets or other animals share the same property as being non-rational and non-autonomous agents. The view or idea that the Principle of Humanity has to account for animals as creatures worthy of being treated as “ends” is only caused by people 's’ personal attachment to animals and provides no reason why they should be worthy
However, if I were Kant, I would claim that the Principle of Humanity can indeed account for the infants and other mentally disabled persons. Firstly, Kant makes it clear that regardless of whether a person is a rationally autonomous agent, Kant considers the life of any human to be “infinitely precious” (Shafer-Landau 2010, 23), therefore, if a rationally autonomous person should always be treated as an “end” then so would any infant or mentally disabled person due to their equivalent value. Secondly, infants and mentally disabled people still have the potential and capability to become fully rational autonomous agents in the future. For example, babies eventually will develop into full grown adults and possess the ability to resist temptation and hold responsibility for their actions. In addition, mentally disabled people always have the possibility of curing the source of their mental illness or at least reducing the quality of their mental disabilities through the assistance of therapy and medical drugs in order to become autonomous and rational agents. Lastly, although people share a close fondness to their animals, I would argue that the Principle of Humanity need not be able to account for animals as creatures worthy of being treated as “ends” because they possess neither humanity nor are they rationally autonomous agents. Similarly to how we use livestock as “mere means”, pets or other animals share the same property as being non-rational and non-autonomous agents. The view or idea that the Principle of Humanity has to account for animals as creatures worthy of being treated as “ends” is only caused by people 's’ personal attachment to animals and provides no reason why they should be worthy