The international involvement in Afghanistan began as a response to an act of state-sponsored terrorism, with the goal of dismantling Al Qaida and toppling the uncooperative Taliban government Following the Bonn Agreement in December 2001 international involvement changed to dual processes of providing basic services for Afghans and building government institutions as the scale of human security crisis as a result of this conflict became apparent. This approach greatly reflects the “state centric” approach – only seeking humanitarian goals once the security of the state is enhanced. The extent of the “state-centric” perspective can be seen in a statement by the then secretary of state, describing humanitarian NGOs as “force multipliers” and “members of the combat team”, showing humanitarian workers as serving part of the militarized, state-centric operation. A major factor in the significant human insecurity of Afghan citizens was the violence and disruption caused by the rising insurgency. The Taliban-led insurgency was significantly fueled by the human insecurity so prevalent in Afghanistan; a lack of “freedom from want” was estimated to be driving up to 60% of the Taliban insurgents to fight. Additionally, the “big military”, state-centric approach, with its emphasis on “Taliban kills” and high rates of civilian casualties fostered a “culture of revenge” and “created 10 enemies out of one”. This local resentment of foreign forces further led Afghan’s towards Taliban loyalty, so much so that the Afghan security struggled with issues of recruitment and loyalty within its own soldiers. This resentment can further push people towards the other side and limits the ability of international powers to implement human security measures – A village elder in the aftermath of a huge assault was described as saying: “he believed the
The international involvement in Afghanistan began as a response to an act of state-sponsored terrorism, with the goal of dismantling Al Qaida and toppling the uncooperative Taliban government Following the Bonn Agreement in December 2001 international involvement changed to dual processes of providing basic services for Afghans and building government institutions as the scale of human security crisis as a result of this conflict became apparent. This approach greatly reflects the “state centric” approach – only seeking humanitarian goals once the security of the state is enhanced. The extent of the “state-centric” perspective can be seen in a statement by the then secretary of state, describing humanitarian NGOs as “force multipliers” and “members of the combat team”, showing humanitarian workers as serving part of the militarized, state-centric operation. A major factor in the significant human insecurity of Afghan citizens was the violence and disruption caused by the rising insurgency. The Taliban-led insurgency was significantly fueled by the human insecurity so prevalent in Afghanistan; a lack of “freedom from want” was estimated to be driving up to 60% of the Taliban insurgents to fight. Additionally, the “big military”, state-centric approach, with its emphasis on “Taliban kills” and high rates of civilian casualties fostered a “culture of revenge” and “created 10 enemies out of one”. This local resentment of foreign forces further led Afghan’s towards Taliban loyalty, so much so that the Afghan security struggled with issues of recruitment and loyalty within its own soldiers. This resentment can further push people towards the other side and limits the ability of international powers to implement human security measures – A village elder in the aftermath of a huge assault was described as saying: “he believed the