Hayke's Arguments Against Collectivism

Hayke argues that a collectivist system is inherently incompatible with democracy rooted in an individualist liberalism tradition, regardless of the intention of the planner. Collectivism, Hayke points out, defends central planning by a "unitary end" (63) that conforms to the "general welfare" (64). To define the common end in a particular social context requires a single standard that ranks individual preferences. Due to the lack of a comprehensive system of "ethical code" (64) with universal consensus, however, such ranking is impossible, and so is a measurement of "the welfare and the happiness of millions" that alone can justify collectivism (64). As a result, other than a limited set of social ends unanimously deemed desirable, for example basic security, any promises of collectivism to promote social welfare are no more than cover-ups for projects aiming to benefit relatively small groups consisted of people with identical interest and value. Importantly, Hayke emphasizes that the incapability of collectivism to guide us toward the common good to a large extent lies on the inexistence of such thing as the common good. It does not matter if the planner is benevolent and altruistic or evil and selfish—it is simply impractical to envision social ends that attend to individual needs in a fair and all-encompassing fashion. The structural defect of collectivism leads Hayke to claim individualism as the only alternative: when individual ends do not coincide with each other as in the majority of cases, individuals should be "the ultimate judge of his ends" (66). There are two aspects in the arguments for individualism against collectivism that Hayke does not talk about explicitly. …show more content…
First, although it is indisputable that a "complete" ethics system does not exist, within a social structure there can be, and almost always are, institutionalized social norms that, when internalized, inform individual actions to some degree. The construction of ethic code does not occur in an atomistic manner by simply ranking individual preferences as Hayke may have suggested. Indeed, later in chapter 9 where he talks about how the deliberate protection of security within one sector will harm the opportunities available to outsiders, Hayke mentions that "socialist teaching" under restrictive measures has shaped the value of a new generation that steers away from freedom (144). Crucially, here the young people 's preference for safety over entrepreneurship is not solely out of practically consideration: Hayke specifically denounces the "school and press" for presenting "the spirit of commercial enterprise" as "disreputable" and "the making of profit immoral" (144). But if a collectivist social structure has the power to preach some of its not-so-laudable moral into the society not through positive and negative sanctions only, why Hayke does not give any credit to the potential of the same structure to construct a more positive value norm? Secondly, Hayke warns against the danger for a well-intended central plan to turn into a tool for special interest groups. This concern, as he has adequately shown, is both real and logical, and it is through revealing this inherent weakness of the collectivism logic that Hayke illustrates the merit of individualism. A collectivist system where a few "experts" decide from their own perspectives what is a good aim for everyone to achieve no doubt violate freedom and cannot be called fair, but it is not clear from Hayke 's argument, that either a competitive market system or a