First, although it is indisputable that a "complete" ethics system does not exist, within a social structure there can be, and almost always are, institutionalized social norms that, when internalized, inform individual actions to some degree. The construction of ethic code does not occur in an atomistic manner by simply ranking individual preferences as Hayke may have suggested. Indeed, later in chapter 9 where he talks about how the deliberate protection of security within one sector will harm the opportunities available to outsiders, Hayke mentions that "socialist teaching" under restrictive measures has shaped the value of a new generation that steers away from freedom (144). Crucially, here the young people 's preference for safety over entrepreneurship is not solely out of practically consideration: Hayke specifically denounces the "school and press" for presenting "the spirit of commercial enterprise" as "disreputable" and "the making of profit immoral" (144). But if a collectivist social structure has the power to preach some of its not-so-laudable moral into the society not through positive and negative sanctions only, why Hayke does not give any credit to the potential of the same structure to construct a more positive value norm? Secondly, Hayke warns against the danger for a well-intended central plan to turn into a tool for special interest groups. This concern, as he has adequately shown, is both real and logical, and it is through revealing this inherent weakness of the collectivism logic that Hayke illustrates the merit of individualism. A collectivist system where a few "experts" decide from their own perspectives what is a good aim for everyone to achieve no doubt violate freedom and cannot be called fair, but it is not clear from Hayke 's argument, that either a competitive market system or a
First, although it is indisputable that a "complete" ethics system does not exist, within a social structure there can be, and almost always are, institutionalized social norms that, when internalized, inform individual actions to some degree. The construction of ethic code does not occur in an atomistic manner by simply ranking individual preferences as Hayke may have suggested. Indeed, later in chapter 9 where he talks about how the deliberate protection of security within one sector will harm the opportunities available to outsiders, Hayke mentions that "socialist teaching" under restrictive measures has shaped the value of a new generation that steers away from freedom (144). Crucially, here the young people 's preference for safety over entrepreneurship is not solely out of practically consideration: Hayke specifically denounces the "school and press" for presenting "the spirit of commercial enterprise" as "disreputable" and "the making of profit immoral" (144). But if a collectivist social structure has the power to preach some of its not-so-laudable moral into the society not through positive and negative sanctions only, why Hayke does not give any credit to the potential of the same structure to construct a more positive value norm? Secondly, Hayke warns against the danger for a well-intended central plan to turn into a tool for special interest groups. This concern, as he has adequately shown, is both real and logical, and it is through revealing this inherent weakness of the collectivism logic that Hayke illustrates the merit of individualism. A collectivist system where a few "experts" decide from their own perspectives what is a good aim for everyone to achieve no doubt violate freedom and cannot be called fair, but it is not clear from Hayke 's argument, that either a competitive market system or a