Marland (1963) and Giglio v. United States (1972), the Supreme Court has imposed rulings that all exculpatory evidence must be disclosed and that the defendant has a right to learn of any incriminating and/or discrediting information pertaining to the witnesses against them and may result in impeachment of witness testimony. With that said, an officer’s ability to be an effective law enforcement official has diminished in the eyes of the department because his or her lack of integrity and dishonesty “is likely to undermine the officer’s ability to testify effectively” in the court (Judge, 2005, para. 11). In United States v. Agurs (1976) and United States v. Bagley (1985) the courts expounded on exculpatory evidence disclosure rule stating that, “regardless of request, favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different’” (Spector, 2008, para. 5). Then the courts took it a step farther in Kyles v. Whitley (1995) declaring that prosecutors are constitutionally bound to not only to voluntarily turn over exculpatory any known favorable evidence to the defense attorney known to those acting on behalf of the government. (Spector, 2008, para.
Marland (1963) and Giglio v. United States (1972), the Supreme Court has imposed rulings that all exculpatory evidence must be disclosed and that the defendant has a right to learn of any incriminating and/or discrediting information pertaining to the witnesses against them and may result in impeachment of witness testimony. With that said, an officer’s ability to be an effective law enforcement official has diminished in the eyes of the department because his or her lack of integrity and dishonesty “is likely to undermine the officer’s ability to testify effectively” in the court (Judge, 2005, para. 11). In United States v. Agurs (1976) and United States v. Bagley (1985) the courts expounded on exculpatory evidence disclosure rule stating that, “regardless of request, favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different’” (Spector, 2008, para. 5). Then the courts took it a step farther in Kyles v. Whitley (1995) declaring that prosecutors are constitutionally bound to not only to voluntarily turn over exculpatory any known favorable evidence to the defense attorney known to those acting on behalf of the government. (Spector, 2008, para.