In this position Augustine posits: “ideas are the primary forms, or the permanent and immutable reasons of real things, and they are not themselves formed; so they are, as a consequence, eternal and ever the same in themselves, and they are contained in the divine intelligence” (Kilma, 83). Here Augustine states that the ideas contained in the divine intelligence are eternal and permanent, which sounds remarkably similar to Plato’s theory of forms, where the forms are neither generated nor destroyed. This is quite in line with what the authors of “Blackwell Readings in Medieval Philosophy” say when they write that “for Augustine, Neoplatonic philosophy elevates human understanding just about as high as it can get on its own” (Kilma, 28). Neoplatonic philosophy is a revival of Plato’s philosophy; therefore, Augustine clearly has a great affinity with Plato’s approach to knowledge. However, Augustine also said that “there are two kinds of knowable things – one, of those things which the mind perceives by the bodily senses; the other, of those which it perceives by itself” (Kilma, 119). He goes on to say that much of our knowledge has come via the senses such as through testimony. So it seems that Augustine is hesitant in completely disregarding the senses. Even Aquinas says, “Augustine, who was steeped in the doctrines of the Platonists, whenever he found anything in their statements consistent with the Faith he accepted it, but amended what he found hostile” (Kilma, 88). This also seems to line up with Trundle’s line of thought where he says, “Professor S.E. Stumpf, for example, implicitly contrasts Plato's appeal to scientific knowledge to Augustine's notion that ‘the senses are always accurate as such’” (Trundle, 7). Augustine actually clarifies that bodily senses subserve the intelligence (Trundle, 7). So in short, Plato’s theory of knowledge is greatly appreciated by Augustine for its ability
In this position Augustine posits: “ideas are the primary forms, or the permanent and immutable reasons of real things, and they are not themselves formed; so they are, as a consequence, eternal and ever the same in themselves, and they are contained in the divine intelligence” (Kilma, 83). Here Augustine states that the ideas contained in the divine intelligence are eternal and permanent, which sounds remarkably similar to Plato’s theory of forms, where the forms are neither generated nor destroyed. This is quite in line with what the authors of “Blackwell Readings in Medieval Philosophy” say when they write that “for Augustine, Neoplatonic philosophy elevates human understanding just about as high as it can get on its own” (Kilma, 28). Neoplatonic philosophy is a revival of Plato’s philosophy; therefore, Augustine clearly has a great affinity with Plato’s approach to knowledge. However, Augustine also said that “there are two kinds of knowable things – one, of those things which the mind perceives by the bodily senses; the other, of those which it perceives by itself” (Kilma, 119). He goes on to say that much of our knowledge has come via the senses such as through testimony. So it seems that Augustine is hesitant in completely disregarding the senses. Even Aquinas says, “Augustine, who was steeped in the doctrines of the Platonists, whenever he found anything in their statements consistent with the Faith he accepted it, but amended what he found hostile” (Kilma, 88). This also seems to line up with Trundle’s line of thought where he says, “Professor S.E. Stumpf, for example, implicitly contrasts Plato's appeal to scientific knowledge to Augustine's notion that ‘the senses are always accurate as such’” (Trundle, 7). Augustine actually clarifies that bodily senses subserve the intelligence (Trundle, 7). So in short, Plato’s theory of knowledge is greatly appreciated by Augustine for its ability