The 1955-75 Vietnam War, known in Vietnam as the “Resistance War against America”, motivated by the United States’ doctrine of containment of communism, represents a remarkable turning point in this doctrine’s implementation. The doctrine of containment had the goal of “[preventing] the Soviet Union from […] reshaping the postwar international order”, a prospect as dangerous to the West as Germany’s or Japan’s attempt (Gaddis 4). World War II, and more precisely Pearl Harbour, had also “ended [the United States’] isolationism for any realist” (McCullough 631). Both superpowers were striving for more influence by alliances or proxy wars in different parts of the globe, such as the Middle East, Cuba and precisely, Vietnam. The Vietnam War opposed
…show more content…
Symmetric containment held the belief that “the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union was precarious” and therefore that the “United States had to meet any Soviet challenge anywhere in the world at any level of violence” (92). If one was to follow the symmetric view, it is easy to explain why the United States would first send some troops to offer military aid to the South Vietnamese and afterwards deploy US force in direct combat. The asymmetric view of containment implies that the United States “neither needed nor was able to respond to everything the Soviet Union did” and “instead of reacting to each small Soviet probe, the United States could threaten ‘massive retaliation’” (93). It would therefore be harder to argue why the United States went to war in Vietnam. However, according to Jervis, Gaddis argued that “the Truman administration, influenced by George Kennan, started with an asymmetric strategy but drifted toward a symmetric strategy, partly because of the Korean War and the heightened fears that followed it” (93). It is also important to note the existence of another top secret document, the National Security Council Report 68 (NCS-68), written in 1950 right before the Korean War, which defined the US foreign policy with its “alarmist tone and Manichean rhetoric” (Hixson 508). The NCS-68 argued that “the issues that face [the United States] are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself” (I). Even though Kennan criticized the NCS-68’s “exaggerated perceptions of the Soviet aims and capabilities at the time of its drafting”, the document “inspired an overmilitarized American response and a tendency to view
Symmetric containment held the belief that “the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union was precarious” and therefore that the “United States had to meet any Soviet challenge anywhere in the world at any level of violence” (92). If one was to follow the symmetric view, it is easy to explain why the United States would first send some troops to offer military aid to the South Vietnamese and afterwards deploy US force in direct combat. The asymmetric view of containment implies that the United States “neither needed nor was able to respond to everything the Soviet Union did” and “instead of reacting to each small Soviet probe, the United States could threaten ‘massive retaliation’” (93). It would therefore be harder to argue why the United States went to war in Vietnam. However, according to Jervis, Gaddis argued that “the Truman administration, influenced by George Kennan, started with an asymmetric strategy but drifted toward a symmetric strategy, partly because of the Korean War and the heightened fears that followed it” (93). It is also important to note the existence of another top secret document, the National Security Council Report 68 (NCS-68), written in 1950 right before the Korean War, which defined the US foreign policy with its “alarmist tone and Manichean rhetoric” (Hixson 508). The NCS-68 argued that “the issues that face [the United States] are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself” (I). Even though Kennan criticized the NCS-68’s “exaggerated perceptions of the Soviet aims and capabilities at the time of its drafting”, the document “inspired an overmilitarized American response and a tendency to view