Between September 1939 and May 1945, Germany and Britain, among other countries, engaged in one of the greatest military struggles in the history of the world, World War II. Many components contributed to the final outcome in Europe, an Allied victory over the Third Reich. Military technology, strategy, and infrastructure all played important roles. Less often considered is the role of intelligence in the war. Seeking the greatest possible security and secrecy, the Germans used a difficult-to-decipher cryptographic machine called the Enigma to encrypt messages in World War II. According to Khan, even before the war, in the 1920s, four people in different countries independently developed rotor cryptography, a secure encipherment method based
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The Enigma presented many difficulties to those trying to decrypt it. It created a new code for each letter, meaning that traditional cryptography methods would not work. Therefore, “…the reason for the machine’s [Enigma’s] adoption, was that even if the enemy had a machine, he would not be able to obtain useful information from the messages enciphered with it.” Germany had great faith in the Enigma. However, their faith lacked a firm basis. Several other failings of their cryptographic agencies further called into question their deep belief. The British took advantage of these failings and successfully decrypted the Engima, enabling them to obtain information that helped them and the rest of the Allies save time, money, and men. A variety of failings among the German cryptographic agencies allowed the British to decrypt the Enigma machine, thus contributing to a timely Allied …show more content…
Mulligan states that the Germans were utterly confident that their code could not be broken. Even in the 1970s, when books revealed that the Allies had cracked the code, many former German intelligence officials refused to believe it. According to Ratcliff, the fact that the Enigma theoretically had 〖3×10〗^144 possible daily configurations, greater than the number of atoms in the universe, contributed to their total confidence in the Enigma. However, taking into account certain practical limitations, the number was only about 10^23. However, this would still have seemed extremely secure to the Germans so long as they failed to take into account the possibility of mechanical cryptanalysis. During the Battle of the Atlantic, it became clear that the British had either cracked the Enigma or a traitor existed in the German ranks, but German officials concluded that decryption was highly unlikely. Their confidence in the Enigma meant they automatically assumed that British intelligence came from another source, causing them to overlook important warning signs of Allied decryption. Overconfidence also bred complacency. As time went on, German officers became lazy and began to use less-than-random settings for the Enigma, making it easier for the Allies to
The Enigma presented many difficulties to those trying to decrypt it. It created a new code for each letter, meaning that traditional cryptography methods would not work. Therefore, “…the reason for the machine’s [Enigma’s] adoption, was that even if the enemy had a machine, he would not be able to obtain useful information from the messages enciphered with it.” Germany had great faith in the Enigma. However, their faith lacked a firm basis. Several other failings of their cryptographic agencies further called into question their deep belief. The British took advantage of these failings and successfully decrypted the Engima, enabling them to obtain information that helped them and the rest of the Allies save time, money, and men. A variety of failings among the German cryptographic agencies allowed the British to decrypt the Enigma machine, thus contributing to a timely Allied …show more content…
Mulligan states that the Germans were utterly confident that their code could not be broken. Even in the 1970s, when books revealed that the Allies had cracked the code, many former German intelligence officials refused to believe it. According to Ratcliff, the fact that the Enigma theoretically had 〖3×10〗^144 possible daily configurations, greater than the number of atoms in the universe, contributed to their total confidence in the Enigma. However, taking into account certain practical limitations, the number was only about 10^23. However, this would still have seemed extremely secure to the Germans so long as they failed to take into account the possibility of mechanical cryptanalysis. During the Battle of the Atlantic, it became clear that the British had either cracked the Enigma or a traitor existed in the German ranks, but German officials concluded that decryption was highly unlikely. Their confidence in the Enigma meant they automatically assumed that British intelligence came from another source, causing them to overlook important warning signs of Allied decryption. Overconfidence also bred complacency. As time went on, German officers became lazy and began to use less-than-random settings for the Enigma, making it easier for the Allies to