Military influence with Congress suffers from nebulous and ill-defined anti-lobbying rules that serve as figurative walls between Congress and the military. One anonymous Congressman summarized the problem, “Frankly, the anti-lobbying provisions as written are asine. If taken literally, Congress would be the loser. We need the services’ credible input.” Military officers limit their Congressional interaction for fear of their actions being interpreted as lobbying. According to military policy, “Federal law prohibits the use of appropriated funds… designed to influence in any manner a Member of Congress, to favor or oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation or appropriation by Congress.” If this was actually applied and enforced, it would effectively restrict most military outreach attempts. In an already risk adverse culture, this causes the military to interact with Congress only when compelled to do so.
Policy Recommendations: …show more content…
However, consider the following: despite the Trump administration’s stated initial budget goal to “invest in defense,” military spending is actually set to decline as a percentage of GDP from 3.1% in 2017 to 2.3% in 2027. This signal by a staunchly pro-defense administration reflects an informed presumption that Congress will continue to give less prioritization to defense spending. Lowering budget expectations portends a weak future for defense spending unless the military’s institutional phobia with Congress changes. Changing the institutional culture is a long-term endeavor. Proposed below are several policy recommendations that could ignite this