In my expert reports for the Fox and Kalamazoo matters, submitted in 2009 and 2015 respectively, I concluded that the weight of evidence prior to the time when NCR eliminated the substance from the paper did not indicate potential environmental hazards posed by the Aroclor 1242 in NCR CCP. I found that it was not credible to suggest that a company such as NCR had sufficient knowledge to be concerned about using a substance such as Aroclor 1242 in its CCP, especially in the absence of information about the toxicity of Aroclor 1242 at low environmental levels.
For convenience, my conclusions are repeated here:
1. Citing the risk assessment paradigm and risk assessment methodology set forth by the National Academy of Sciences in 1983, Dr. Rodricks erroneously concludes that prior to it ceasing use of Aroclor 1242 in its CCP in 1971, NCR knew that PCBs from its products were at that time posing serious environmental and human health risks. It is implausible to opine that NCR ought to have anticipated not only regulatory decisions, but an entire regulatory methodology for assessment of risks associated with environmental exposure levels to chemicals that did not even exist until 1976, the process that led to the 1983 NAS risk assessment paradigm. The fact that NCR had phased out Aroclor 1242 from its …show more content…
Dr. Rodricks asserts that NCR was slow in replacing Aroclor 1242, despite NCR having what he considers sufficient knowledge that it was harmful to the environment. However, the evidence suggests that NCR’s decision to replace Aroclor 1242 was a proactive and responsible step. On reaching this decision, it promptly commissioned Hill Top to conduct additional toxicity studies to ensure that the replacement material (MIPB) would not be harmful. A battery of tests was conducted in humans and animals to assess potential occupational, environmental, and end-user safety. NCR’s actions regarding the replacement material were consistent with proper product
For convenience, my conclusions are repeated here:
1. Citing the risk assessment paradigm and risk assessment methodology set forth by the National Academy of Sciences in 1983, Dr. Rodricks erroneously concludes that prior to it ceasing use of Aroclor 1242 in its CCP in 1971, NCR knew that PCBs from its products were at that time posing serious environmental and human health risks. It is implausible to opine that NCR ought to have anticipated not only regulatory decisions, but an entire regulatory methodology for assessment of risks associated with environmental exposure levels to chemicals that did not even exist until 1976, the process that led to the 1983 NAS risk assessment paradigm. The fact that NCR had phased out Aroclor 1242 from its …show more content…
Dr. Rodricks asserts that NCR was slow in replacing Aroclor 1242, despite NCR having what he considers sufficient knowledge that it was harmful to the environment. However, the evidence suggests that NCR’s decision to replace Aroclor 1242 was a proactive and responsible step. On reaching this decision, it promptly commissioned Hill Top to conduct additional toxicity studies to ensure that the replacement material (MIPB) would not be harmful. A battery of tests was conducted in humans and animals to assess potential occupational, environmental, and end-user safety. NCR’s actions regarding the replacement material were consistent with proper product