He goes on to claim that time and space are part of our immediate knowledge of the world, or intuition rather than being independent from our perception (Caygill 262-6) (Kant 345). In claiming these things, it was a step along the departure from previous philosophies, which although they did accept, for the most part, two types of objects, broadly speaking, representations and non-representations. As per Paul Guyer, a professor at Brown University, Kant takes this and places our means of perceiving the world, space and time, as belonging to the domain of the representation. This leaves the non-representations with the ambiguous term of things-in-themselves. To these things-in-itself, beyond the human mind, Kant theorizes that the cause for the form of objects may derive (Guyer 68-9) (Stang). Kant purports to prove transcendental idealism by first claiming we perceive the world in our mind by means of mental representation. That is to say that our brains take in signals and what we experience are our senses, …show more content…
His influence was so great to be regarded by Ernst Behler in his compilation Philosophy of German idealism as the “all-crushing” Kant and his philosophy as the foundation for numerous later philosophers (Behler vii). A prominent successor was Johann Gottlieb Fichte who took his own take on transcendental idealism. Fichte argues that things-in-themselves can only exist because we do not consciously consider them. If we do consider then it becomes part of our ego, and therefore is reliant upon the ego (Behler x). Therefore Fichte declares his philosophy as being “Man has nothing nothing at all other than experience, and all that he arrives at, he arrives at only through experience, though life itself” (Fichte 47). He goes on further to claim that his philosophy is the “newest” in contrast to the “newer” philosophy of Kant. He frames his transcendental idealism under the frame of being reliant upon consciousness. He reasons that our subjective reality becomes whatever we are currently involved in, it therefore rests that the cause of the forms in our reality do not lie outside of the human consciousness, or ego and are therefore not things-in-themselves (Fichte 47-54). Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, another prominent philosopher of the time, has a spiritual take on transcendental idealism. Schelling was similar to Fichte for his take that rather than things-in-themselves