The next day, October 16, 1962, was the day that McGeorge Bundy, the national security adviser, made the President John F. Kennedy aware of the situation and its seriousness. This was the beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The first question for Kennedy and his officials who were present was whether or not the missiles presented an immediate risk to the United States and if they warranted an immediate response. They had not anticipated this type of action by the Soviets. In fact, they were told throughout most of the summer and early fall of 1962 by Soviet officials, including Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, that there were no Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, nor would Moscow deploy any such weapons on the island. According to the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, since they were reassured in this way, the American intelligence community failed to formulate and debate prior to their discovery the alternative ways of dealing with the deployment . This essentially was a slap in the face towards the Kennedy Administration, especially since they were still recovering from the embarrassment of the Bay of
The next day, October 16, 1962, was the day that McGeorge Bundy, the national security adviser, made the President John F. Kennedy aware of the situation and its seriousness. This was the beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The first question for Kennedy and his officials who were present was whether or not the missiles presented an immediate risk to the United States and if they warranted an immediate response. They had not anticipated this type of action by the Soviets. In fact, they were told throughout most of the summer and early fall of 1962 by Soviet officials, including Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, that there were no Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, nor would Moscow deploy any such weapons on the island. According to the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, since they were reassured in this way, the American intelligence community failed to formulate and debate prior to their discovery the alternative ways of dealing with the deployment . This essentially was a slap in the face towards the Kennedy Administration, especially since they were still recovering from the embarrassment of the Bay of