The United States (U.S.) military efforts in both the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) were successful combat operations. Although the U.S. was successful in liberating the Philippines from Spain and freeing Iraqis from the oppressive Saddam Hussein Regime, the military struggled with a prolonged counter insurgency (COIN) in both instances. The similarities between the COIN policies of attraction and chastisement in the Philippines and OIF show that the U.S. military dominated conventional warfare, but failed to identify and address the root causes of an insurgency. Comparing and contrasting both COIN operations highlights the importance of correctly addressing the local populace’s grievances and ads to the legitimacy of the Host Nation (HN) government.
COIN can be defined as a blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain an insurgency by addressing its root causes with a goal of enabling the HN government to exercise political control over its population through legitimate governance (Department of Defense, 2013). In order to defeat and contain an insurgency you must understand what drives the insurgent narrative. In the Philippine Insurrection and OIF the U.S. thought winning the larger conflict and liberating the population was the key to success. In both cases military leaders did not have an understanding of their operational environment (OE) and failed to anticipate the grievances that led to both insurgencies. According to David Ucko, the U.S. military has adapted well during each individual war to the particular circumstances it encountered, it has consciously resisted the permanent institutionalization of counterinsurgency doctrine, so lessons have had to be repeatedly relearned at great cost (2008). To benefit from lessons learned military leaders must compare and contrast the similarities in U.S. nation building policy, along with the COIN policies of attraction and chastisement during both operations. Reviewing these lessons allows the military to capitalize on the successful practices and identify actions that can undermine COIN efforts. Compare and Contrast Nation Building Policies Through the application of the national instruments of power, the U.S. has forged ahead to become the unipolar superpower. U.S. policy for nation building has changed over the years but the end state remains the same; ensure the U.S. maintains economic prosperity and international order that favors America. The examination of U.S. nation building policy is paramount in understanding why the military conducted COIN operations in both the Philippines and Iraq. The U.S. military liberated both countries from oppressive regimes; which allowed the U.S. an opportunity for economic expansion and military projection. During the Philippine Insurrection U.S. policy for nation building was focused on economic expansion and globalization. On 21 December 1989, President William McKinley proclaimed the “Benevolent Assimilation” of the Philippines. In this proclamation he highlighted the defeat of the Spanish fleet and that the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States (1898). President McKinley viewed this as an opportunity to expand U.S. national interests into the pacific region to capitalize on economic opportunities for trade with China and other Asian nations. He also viewed this as an opportunity to project military power closer to the European nations. In comparison, the Bush administration viewed OIF as an opportunity for economic expansion and military projection to maintain the U.S. unipolar status. President Bush’s National Security Strategy stated the U.S. “will ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets …show more content…
Both operations initially used a policy of attraction until it failed, which led to the application of a policy of chastisement. Looking at the analogy of the “carrot and the stick” approach, chastisement is the stick. The policy of chastisement is a punishment based system which uses calculated measures of aggression against the insurgents to eliminate them or against the local populace that supports the insurgents in order to dissuade popular support for the insurgency. Like the policy of attraction, chastisement is also important in legitimizing the HN government. It demonstrates the government, through military force, can provide security and protection for the people. It also shows insurgents that the government is strong and can eradicate a threat if necessary. To understand the repercussions of using this policy we must assess its application during both COIN
COIN can be defined as a blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain an insurgency by addressing its root causes with a goal of enabling the HN government to exercise political control over its population through legitimate governance (Department of Defense, 2013). In order to defeat and contain an insurgency you must understand what drives the insurgent narrative. In the Philippine Insurrection and OIF the U.S. thought winning the larger conflict and liberating the population was the key to success. In both cases military leaders did not have an understanding of their operational environment (OE) and failed to anticipate the grievances that led to both insurgencies. According to David Ucko, the U.S. military has adapted well during each individual war to the particular circumstances it encountered, it has consciously resisted the permanent institutionalization of counterinsurgency doctrine, so lessons have had to be repeatedly relearned at great cost (2008). To benefit from lessons learned military leaders must compare and contrast the similarities in U.S. nation building policy, along with the COIN policies of attraction and chastisement during both operations. Reviewing these lessons allows the military to capitalize on the successful practices and identify actions that can undermine COIN efforts. Compare and Contrast Nation Building Policies Through the application of the national instruments of power, the U.S. has forged ahead to become the unipolar superpower. U.S. policy for nation building has changed over the years but the end state remains the same; ensure the U.S. maintains economic prosperity and international order that favors America. The examination of U.S. nation building policy is paramount in understanding why the military conducted COIN operations in both the Philippines and Iraq. The U.S. military liberated both countries from oppressive regimes; which allowed the U.S. an opportunity for economic expansion and military projection. During the Philippine Insurrection U.S. policy for nation building was focused on economic expansion and globalization. On 21 December 1989, President William McKinley proclaimed the “Benevolent Assimilation” of the Philippines. In this proclamation he highlighted the defeat of the Spanish fleet and that the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States (1898). President McKinley viewed this as an opportunity to expand U.S. national interests into the pacific region to capitalize on economic opportunities for trade with China and other Asian nations. He also viewed this as an opportunity to project military power closer to the European nations. In comparison, the Bush administration viewed OIF as an opportunity for economic expansion and military projection to maintain the U.S. unipolar status. President Bush’s National Security Strategy stated the U.S. “will ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets …show more content…
Both operations initially used a policy of attraction until it failed, which led to the application of a policy of chastisement. Looking at the analogy of the “carrot and the stick” approach, chastisement is the stick. The policy of chastisement is a punishment based system which uses calculated measures of aggression against the insurgents to eliminate them or against the local populace that supports the insurgents in order to dissuade popular support for the insurgency. Like the policy of attraction, chastisement is also important in legitimizing the HN government. It demonstrates the government, through military force, can provide security and protection for the people. It also shows insurgents that the government is strong and can eradicate a threat if necessary. To understand the repercussions of using this policy we must assess its application during both COIN