The world today is one in which sovereign state-borders have been faded by the quickening pace of global-interaction and have yet to be accurately redefined to account for the progress made through globalization. Globalization, when understood as a development-oriented force, is an advocate for the global community, at the fulcrum of which stands the concept of justice as a liberating force. The doctrine of moral responsibility, in its proposed constitution, campaigns that a collective effort must be taken by individuals and states within the global community to rewrite the wrongs of the past and deliver what is deserved by all, regardless of economic, social, or geographic limitations—equality.
In 2012, the New York Times conducted an investigation on the US military involvement in the Middle East, and reported their findings in order to shed some much needed light upon the dark reality of its counter terrorism strategy. Based upon the accounts of both current and former advisors to the White House, Jo Becker and Scott Shane reported This harsh reality is rationalized through the defence that, Shane and Becker argue that the use of drones within US warfare is excessive. They argue that it should be used only in instances in which it is necessary to achieve the objective of the mission (if and only if the intended objective cannot sufficiently be achieved in any foreseeable way besides the use of air strikes). The use of force with such a high potential for risk and error can be seen as one which warrants an explicitly higher standard of care, but in the case of drone use by the United States military in active strike zones, it does not seem that a high standard of care is observed. By generalizing that all individuals who fit the criteria of perceivable threats as enemy combatants, there is an incontrovertibly high foreseeable risk of inflicting unnecessary harm upon an innocent civilian. This case, puts into question he moral equality of the status of civilians in a strike zone. In this essay, I will attempt to investigate what Jeff McMahan's account of the morality of war would say about the use of drone strikes by the US. In particular, I will investigate whether the United States military's categorization of all military-age males in a strike zone as enemy combatants could be justified on McMahan's account. In light of the answer to that question (and in light of his theory of the morality of killing in war), what would McMahan say moral reasoning should look like when it comes to deciding whether or not to conduct a drone strike? Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are colloquially referred to as ‘Drones’, which are essentially pilotless aerial vehicles which are operated from a distance by individuals (Walsh, 2013). Currently, drones are primarily used in the targeting of terrorist and insurgent groups, where Drones are a highly sophisticated means of counterinsurgency. Walsh explains the technology and use of drones as follows: Drone strikes are a means of selective violence, where the effect of the strike is carefully targeted at specific individuals (in order to protect non-combatants from harm resulting from the strike) (Walsh, 2013). Walsh explains, “Walsh distinguishes selective …show more content…
The primary focus of Rodin’s general intolerance for collateral damage is his emphasis upon the violation of the rights of innocent individuals—a foreseeable consequence, for Rodin, of conducting drone strikes in such a way is that it could potentially impede upon the liberty of an innocent civilian/ non-combatant.
It is important to emphasize that this particular case is different from the conventional case, in that the idea is not that you are going to target somebody guilty and might have some foreseeable consequences (of harming innocents), but that you are targeting someone directly and what is merely foreseen but not intended is that that person is, in fact, innocent and you will have achieved nothing (but will have harmed an innocent civilian).
In Killing in War (2009), Jeff McMahan attempts to build a case for determining the status of individuals (whether part of the just or unjust side) within war. Given the facts and current state of the military-drone policy implemented by the United States, McMahan, I believe, would argue that the categorization of military-age males in a strike zone as enemy combatants could, under certain circumstances, be
In 2012, the New York Times conducted an investigation on the US military involvement in the Middle East, and reported their findings in order to shed some much needed light upon the dark reality of its counter terrorism strategy. Based upon the accounts of both current and former advisors to the White House, Jo Becker and Scott Shane reported This harsh reality is rationalized through the defence that, Shane and Becker argue that the use of drones within US warfare is excessive. They argue that it should be used only in instances in which it is necessary to achieve the objective of the mission (if and only if the intended objective cannot sufficiently be achieved in any foreseeable way besides the use of air strikes). The use of force with such a high potential for risk and error can be seen as one which warrants an explicitly higher standard of care, but in the case of drone use by the United States military in active strike zones, it does not seem that a high standard of care is observed. By generalizing that all individuals who fit the criteria of perceivable threats as enemy combatants, there is an incontrovertibly high foreseeable risk of inflicting unnecessary harm upon an innocent civilian. This case, puts into question he moral equality of the status of civilians in a strike zone. In this essay, I will attempt to investigate what Jeff McMahan's account of the morality of war would say about the use of drone strikes by the US. In particular, I will investigate whether the United States military's categorization of all military-age males in a strike zone as enemy combatants could be justified on McMahan's account. In light of the answer to that question (and in light of his theory of the morality of killing in war), what would McMahan say moral reasoning should look like when it comes to deciding whether or not to conduct a drone strike? Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are colloquially referred to as ‘Drones’, which are essentially pilotless aerial vehicles which are operated from a distance by individuals (Walsh, 2013). Currently, drones are primarily used in the targeting of terrorist and insurgent groups, where Drones are a highly sophisticated means of counterinsurgency. Walsh explains the technology and use of drones as follows: Drone strikes are a means of selective violence, where the effect of the strike is carefully targeted at specific individuals (in order to protect non-combatants from harm resulting from the strike) (Walsh, 2013). Walsh explains, “Walsh distinguishes selective …show more content…
The primary focus of Rodin’s general intolerance for collateral damage is his emphasis upon the violation of the rights of innocent individuals—a foreseeable consequence, for Rodin, of conducting drone strikes in such a way is that it could potentially impede upon the liberty of an innocent civilian/ non-combatant.
It is important to emphasize that this particular case is different from the conventional case, in that the idea is not that you are going to target somebody guilty and might have some foreseeable consequences (of harming innocents), but that you are targeting someone directly and what is merely foreseen but not intended is that that person is, in fact, innocent and you will have achieved nothing (but will have harmed an innocent civilian).
In Killing in War (2009), Jeff McMahan attempts to build a case for determining the status of individuals (whether part of the just or unjust side) within war. Given the facts and current state of the military-drone policy implemented by the United States, McMahan, I believe, would argue that the categorization of military-age males in a strike zone as enemy combatants could, under certain circumstances, be