Operation Anaconda- Task Orginazation
Operation Anaconda should be looked at as a success for the Allied troops. The troops succeeded in greatly reducing the footprint of enemy Soldiers and disrupting their operations, and although task organization is vital to any mission success, at times this appeared to be lacking. Not only does well calculated task organization increase the likelihood of success, but it greatly mitigates the risks associated with the mission. With better reconnaissance, command structure and logistical planning, this mission could have been carried out with less confusion and casualties while achieving the same outcome. Reconnaissance Before any major operation or mission in the military, proper reconnaissance is absolutely …show more content…
The means by which the Command was structured was very confusing and caused a plethora of communication discrepancies. At one point, a Navy SEAL commander cut his radio off to completely shut off the direction of an Army commander. Because of this, that Army commander could not warn this Navy commander and his SEALs of possible enemy activity in their proposed insertion point. This led to a very unfortunate incident in which a SEAL’s life and an Army aircraft were lost. Again, a more concise and structured chain of command would have mitigated much confusion and disorder. Allowing a clearly defined ground force commander and air commander working in concert would have been the most advantageous approach to this operation. Clearly the command of air support should’ve been delegated to a single Air Force commander, Lieutenant General Moseley. Lieutenant General Moseley should’ve had a clear line of contact with a single ground forces commander. The likely candidate for a ground force Commander would have been Major General Hagenbeck. These two should have had direct contact with General Tommy Franks and complete authority of their operational space. This would have created an environment that was more conducive to clear lines of communication and orderly …show more content…
These limitations were driven by their effort to keep a “light footprint” in Afghanistan in an attempt to please to the American public. Much of the population was adamant about not wanting the United States’ presence in Afghanistan to end up looking like another Viet Nam. In order to ensure this would not happen, General Tommy Franks, Commander of CENTCOM, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield placed restrictions and caps on the Operation. These caps greatly affected the typical fire support many of these commanders were accustomed to having at their disposal. In order to satisfy these restrictions many units left behind vital weapon systems that were considered a normal part of their fighting load and had trained with on a regular basis. This, too, proved to be a costly decision that greatly influenced that effectiveness of the Allied
Operation Anaconda should be looked at as a success for the Allied troops. The troops succeeded in greatly reducing the footprint of enemy Soldiers and disrupting their operations, and although task organization is vital to any mission success, at times this appeared to be lacking. Not only does well calculated task organization increase the likelihood of success, but it greatly mitigates the risks associated with the mission. With better reconnaissance, command structure and logistical planning, this mission could have been carried out with less confusion and casualties while achieving the same outcome. Reconnaissance Before any major operation or mission in the military, proper reconnaissance is absolutely …show more content…
The means by which the Command was structured was very confusing and caused a plethora of communication discrepancies. At one point, a Navy SEAL commander cut his radio off to completely shut off the direction of an Army commander. Because of this, that Army commander could not warn this Navy commander and his SEALs of possible enemy activity in their proposed insertion point. This led to a very unfortunate incident in which a SEAL’s life and an Army aircraft were lost. Again, a more concise and structured chain of command would have mitigated much confusion and disorder. Allowing a clearly defined ground force commander and air commander working in concert would have been the most advantageous approach to this operation. Clearly the command of air support should’ve been delegated to a single Air Force commander, Lieutenant General Moseley. Lieutenant General Moseley should’ve had a clear line of contact with a single ground forces commander. The likely candidate for a ground force Commander would have been Major General Hagenbeck. These two should have had direct contact with General Tommy Franks and complete authority of their operational space. This would have created an environment that was more conducive to clear lines of communication and orderly …show more content…
These limitations were driven by their effort to keep a “light footprint” in Afghanistan in an attempt to please to the American public. Much of the population was adamant about not wanting the United States’ presence in Afghanistan to end up looking like another Viet Nam. In order to ensure this would not happen, General Tommy Franks, Commander of CENTCOM, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield placed restrictions and caps on the Operation. These caps greatly affected the typical fire support many of these commanders were accustomed to having at their disposal. In order to satisfy these restrictions many units left behind vital weapon systems that were considered a normal part of their fighting load and had trained with on a regular basis. This, too, proved to be a costly decision that greatly influenced that effectiveness of the Allied