The general principle is that a State only has jurisdiction to try offences that are committed within its borders. However, legislation has acted to artificially extend a country’s physical boundaries for the purpose of jurisdiction. In Cox v. Army Council [1963] AC 48, HL, the words “or which, if committed in England, would be punishable by that law” found in section 70 of the Army Act, 1955 was given effect to convict a British Soldier for driving without due care and attention contrary to the English Road Traffic Act. This was so even though the incident itself had occurred in Germany. As Viscount Simonds stated, the “character of universality” of the offence was sufficient to bring it within the scope of the Act. A quintessential depiction of the extension of territoriality is the concept of territorial waters. A ship that is within the territorial sea of a country is within that country’s jurisdiction: Pianka v R (1977) 25 WIR 438, PC. In Trinidad and Tobago, s.3 of the Territorial Sea Act extends State boundaries by 12 nautical miles from the nearest point of the baselines. Since the incident between Scampie and Magneto took place 7 nautical miles from the coast of Trinidad and Tobago, it will be regarded as having occurred within their territorial waters under the Act. The prosecution is therefore correct in stating that it falls within the scope of that country’s jurisdiction. Issue two: Whether PC Apprehen’s actions were sufficient to constitute a lawful arrest? Alderson v. Booth [1969] 2 QB 216 indicated that Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd ed., vol. 10, (1955) captures the essence of an arrest where it states that: “there must be an element of compulsion which is provided by touching or by unequivocal words accompanied by submission.” It is imperative that the arrestee knows what he is submitting to, otherwise he is not arrested. The officer’s words “We need to talk mister” are too vague to constitute an arrest; clear words must be used in order to show that the person is under compulsion. However, it is noteworthy that minor irregularities in the way an arrest is carried out does not vitiate the charge itself. We are further told that PC Apprehen took Scampie’s arm, obviously with a view to restraining him. Even after being struck, the officer took Scampie’s arm again and this can classify the arrest as lawful. This is because the element of compulsion by touching was accompanied by Scampie’s submission. It is hard to see how Scampie could argue that he did not know what he was submitting to, especially since the officer was said to be in uniform. Thus, the charges of resisting a lawful arrest and assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty are valid. Issue three: Whether a warrant is always needed for an arrest? The defence …show more content…
The common law dictates that an arrest can be either with or without a warrant, and statute has codified and extended some of these common law powers. Section 3(4) of the Criminal Law Act of Trinidad and Tobago Chap 10:04 states “where a police officer with reasonable cause, suspects that an arrestable offence has been committed, he may arrest without warrant anyone whom he, with reasonable cause, suspects to be guilty of the offence.” A key element is that the officer must have reasonable cause for his belief. Section 3 (5) also empowers officers to arrest without warrant if they believe an arrestable offence “is about to be committed.” The Police Act also grants the power of arrest without warrant against any person resisting arrest or who commits aggravated …show more content…
However, according to Elias and Others v. Pasmore [1934] 2 KB 164, a person who has been arrested may be searched if it is believed that he has material evidence in his possession. Some Caribbean statutes have codified this. It therefore follows that since the search was only carried out after Smith informed PC Apprehen of the theft and identified Scampie as the perpetrator, the search was lawful. The offence had been recently committed, thus is was reasonable for PC Apprehen to assume that if guilty, Scampie would still have the wallet in his possession, just as the search