John Parachini “is a senior international policy analyst and director of the Intelligence Policy Center at the RAND Corporation.” He has in charge of Rand Projects concerning the “propensity of terrorists to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons; how the U.S. government can capture terrorists ' digital information; scenario development for counterterrorism planning; and the danger of terrorists and rogue states acquiring nuclear material expertise from the former Soviet Union.” (http://www.rand.org/about/people/p/parachini_john_v.html) John Parachini risk management perspective is inclusive of concluding that there is difficulty in gauging the threat of terrorism. He explains that what is missing from the equation is a discussion concerning how to develop a model that will be broad enough to assess threats, both internationally and domestically. The lack of this ability leads to random conclusions, assessments by individuals, based on their personal feelings. Firstly, it is Parachinis’ position that “The view of the intelligence community should serve as a critical baseline for the decisions of policymakers.”(http://cns.miis.edu/testimony/paraterr.htm). He further advises that policy makes should not acquire intelligence in a fashion that is disconnected and/ sporadic. Instead, policy makers should acquire intelligence with a method that is all-inclusive and combined, thus, allowing for a better overall representation of the issue. The method of evaluating threats on an individual basis may be counter- productive in identifying primary indications of an impending attack. Secondly, he points out the focus is in the wrong place, if it is only placed on by focusing on the “low probability, high consequence events.” Thirdly, he points out that public communication about possible terrorist threats, unintentionally provoke threats that have the potential to distract from actual threats. Lastly, Parachini warns against the incorrect use of resources. He cautions that concern about catastrophic domestic terrorism, may lead to military use, when those activities could be best served by non-military government agencies. “Eliminating all possibility of a terrorist group or individual using CBAN Weapons is impossible,” (Parachini, 2003) says Parachini, but offers that more success may be found in thwarting the activities s …show more content…
In terms of planning, the Japanese Government ignored early warning signs of an impending attack. As Parachini suggested, the government should have sought intelligence concerning the potential ramifications of an attack. With that in mind, the primary objective should have been an attempt to prevent this attack. What followed next should have been the preparation and training to respond to this or any attack. This attack had ill-prepared first responders, and a lack of communication between agencies. Both training and communication would have improved the outcome of this