In this paper, I will discuss the orthodox definition of hope expressed in Adrienne Martin’s How We Hope: A Moral Psychology, and emphasize the inherent problems raised by Martin that challenge this definition.
Martin derives the ‘orthodox definition’ of hope from the works of Day and Downie introduced in the late 1960s. Day states that “hope involves (1) desiring and (2) estimating a probability” and names these two constituents of hope as the desiderative and the estimative constituents, respectively (Day 89). And this definition has its merits: it seems illogical that A hopes that X will happen if A doesn’t desire X to happen OR X is impossible. For example, A doesn’t hope to get pulled over by the police for speeding; A dreads it, since …show more content…
One example of these problems is the story of two cancer patients, Alan and Bess (Martin 14-15). Both Alan and Bess have the same amount of desire to win the battle against cancer and they both have the same probabilities of being cured by the miracle drug. Although their two constituents of hope are of the same level, fulfilling the necessary components for there to be equal amounts of hope between Alan and Bess, in reality, there seems to be a discrepancy. Alan is very quantitative, knows that the small probability of 1% isn’t high, and is careful to make decisions and to control his mood sans hope. Instead, he is content that the miracle cure that is being tested will be beneficial for those in the future. Bess, on the other hand, hopes that she will be the 1% and be cured by the miracle drug. The two different hopes expressed by them have different flavors, and expose the inherent problem that exists with the orthodox definition, for it shows that there must be another factor in order to conserve its biconditional nature. A psychologist will look at Alan, who begins writing his will for the family and exchanging his last good-byes, and Bess, who is obliviously lying on the hospital bed, hoping for the best, and determine that these two subjects are not reacting equally given equal initial conditions for
Martin derives the ‘orthodox definition’ of hope from the works of Day and Downie introduced in the late 1960s. Day states that “hope involves (1) desiring and (2) estimating a probability” and names these two constituents of hope as the desiderative and the estimative constituents, respectively (Day 89). And this definition has its merits: it seems illogical that A hopes that X will happen if A doesn’t desire X to happen OR X is impossible. For example, A doesn’t hope to get pulled over by the police for speeding; A dreads it, since …show more content…
One example of these problems is the story of two cancer patients, Alan and Bess (Martin 14-15). Both Alan and Bess have the same amount of desire to win the battle against cancer and they both have the same probabilities of being cured by the miracle drug. Although their two constituents of hope are of the same level, fulfilling the necessary components for there to be equal amounts of hope between Alan and Bess, in reality, there seems to be a discrepancy. Alan is very quantitative, knows that the small probability of 1% isn’t high, and is careful to make decisions and to control his mood sans hope. Instead, he is content that the miracle cure that is being tested will be beneficial for those in the future. Bess, on the other hand, hopes that she will be the 1% and be cured by the miracle drug. The two different hopes expressed by them have different flavors, and expose the inherent problem that exists with the orthodox definition, for it shows that there must be another factor in order to conserve its biconditional nature. A psychologist will look at Alan, who begins writing his will for the family and exchanging his last good-byes, and Bess, who is obliviously lying on the hospital bed, hoping for the best, and determine that these two subjects are not reacting equally given equal initial conditions for